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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 970532-CA 
1 Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this action for divorce pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the two 
natural children of the parties to plaintiff/appellee Rebekah R. Bohman ("Rebekah"). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
A. Whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequate to support its 
award of custody of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. 
Standard of Review: Whether the findings of fact demonstrate a rational 
factual basis for the ultimate decision by reference to pertinent factors that relate to 
the best interests of the child, including specific attributes of the children. Smith v. 
Smith 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). 
B. Whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact 
concerning custody. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning the 
custody reviewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
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favorable to the findings are supported by the evidence. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 
1209 (Utah 1996). 
II. Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning its visitation order are 
adequate. 
Standard of Review: Findings of fact must demonstrate a rational, factual basis for 
the trial court's decision. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). 
III. Whether the trial court erred in failing to impute income to Rebekah for 
purposes of calculating alimony and child support. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993). 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings of fact as to 
the appropriate child support amount. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings of fact to 
support its award of alimony. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
VI. Whether the trial court erred in finding that certain premarital property of 
defendant/appellant Bradford K. Bohman ("Brad") had been consumed during the marriage. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
VII. Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning values of certain personal 
property are inadequate. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 
1990). 
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VIII. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the obligation to BB Ranchers 
should be limited to a four-year period based on the statute of limitations. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Howell 806 
P.2d 1209. 
IX. Whether the trial court erred in not taking into account the value of Rebekah's 
wedding rings in valuing the marital estate. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
X. Whether the trial court erred in ordering Brad to pay a portion of Rebekah's 
attorney's fees. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes bear upon the issues in this case: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7) (Supp. 1997), which provides in pertinent parts: 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify 
the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996), which provides in pertinent part: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
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(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded 
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, 
wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; 
also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or 
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases 
may be commenced at any time within four years after the last charge 
is made or the last payment is received; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997), which provides: 
If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least 
at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater 
income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the 
evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (1996), which provides: 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level 
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be 
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than 
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
This is an action for divorce. The complaint was filed on September 13, 1994. The 
trial took place on April 22, 23, 24, and 26, 1996. On June 14, 1996, the court made an oral 
ruling. Thereafter, Brad filed a motion to amend or clarify the court's ruling, which was 
argued on July 30, 1996. On October 17 and 21, 1996, the court heard and reviewed the 
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce. After 
other issues concerning the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of 
divorce were resolved, the decree of divorce was entered on August 6, 1997. 
Statement of Facts 
Background 
Brad and Rebekah Bohman were married September 20, 1989. R. at 448. Rebekah 
had been married three times before; Brad had one previous marriage. Rebekah had four 
children from her previous marriages; Brad did not have children before this marriage. 
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The Bohmans had two children together. At the time of trial, Braxton was age 6 and 
Bryson was age 4. R. at 452. Brad had also adopted Angela, one of Rebekah's children from 
her previous marriages. At the time of trial, Angela was 14. R. at 451. 
The Bohmans separated for the first time in the fall of 1994. This action was filed on 
September 13, 1994. At the initial hearing on the parties' motions for temporary relief, the 
court awarded the parties temporary joint custody of the parties' two natural children, 
Braxton and Bryson. At least in part because of Rebekah's aversion to joint custody, the 
parties reconciled for several months. R. at 534. They separated again in May of 1995, and 
the divorce proceeded. R. at 536. 
Brad is a physician specializing in anesthesiology. R. at 648-49. He had worked as 
an anesthesiologist and had an established practice before his marriage to Rebekah. R. at 
648-49. Prior to the marriage, Rebekah worked at a hospital. During her relationship with 
Brad, she quit her employment and attended college for a period of two years. R. at 454. 
However, when she was pregnant with the parties' first child, she stopped her education. Id. 
During the period when Rebekah attended college, she expressed her intention to 
become a nurse anesthesiologist. However, during the parties' separation, she made no effort 
to seek employment or further her education. She testified that she no longer wanted to be a 
nurse and that she wanted to work in the field of sports medicine, but had undertaken only the 
most minimal investigation of the training required to work in that field and had taken no 
classes. R. at 454-55. 
Facts Pertaining to Custody 
Each party sought custody of the two natural children, Braxton and Bryson. A 
custody evaluation was performed by Philip B. Johnson, who recommended joint custody, 
with Rebekah to have primary physical custody and with Brad to continue to have extensive 
visitation as he had during the separation. The court found that it was "unfortunate" that it 
could not order joint custody in this case, because "each party has strengths, which combined 
with one another in a joint custody arrangement and the flexibility of Defendant's work 
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schedule, would really inure to the benefit of the children." Finding of Fact No. 7, R. at 
1532. However, because the parties could not agree to joint custody and because the 
relationship between the parties had been tempestuous and punctuated by a history of 
"uncooperation," the court declined to award joint custody. Finding of Fact No. 7, R. at 
1532. 
The primary reason for the recommendation by the custody evaluator that Rebekah 
have primary physical custody of the children was the fact that she had been the primary 
physical caretaker of the children in the past. 
However, the evidence presented by Brad indicated that Rebekah had substantially 
diminished her role in the younger children's lives during the last several years of the 
marriage. For example, the evidence showed, and the court found, that Rebekah was 
drinking to excess. Finding of Fact No. 14, R. at 1534. Rebekah had been out of the home in 
activities with her friends who had no children, patronizing clubs, golfing, and playing tennis. 
Because of Brad's flexible work schedule, he was able to spend substantial time with the 
children and did so during the last several years of the marriage. 
The court found that Rebekah needed to become educated and become employed, but 
that she could provide personal care for the children. Finding of Fact No. 10, R. at 1532-33. 
The court also found that Rebekah is a profligate spender; her extravagant spending 
caused the court concern about her stability and ability to manage money. Finding of Fact 
No. 15, R. at 1534. 
The court also questioned Rebekah's stability in light of the fact that she was leaving 
her fourth marriage. Finding of Fact No. 13, R. at 1534. 
With respect to Brad, the court found that he was a very mature, stable parent who 
will provide constancy and consistency. Finding of Fact No. 18, R. at 1535. The court also 
found that Brad was attuned to education and its importance in the children's lives, and that 
he would be a positive influence if he is allowed substantial contact with the children, so that 
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he could help with the homework, monitor their grades, and provide fundamental motivation. 
Finding of Fact No. 17, R. at 1535. 
Facts Concerning the Parties 
At the time Rebekah met Brad, she was separated from her third husband and had 
been living in a friend's home. R. at 557. Rebekah testified that she had been married to a 
Mr. Kimber from 1974 to 1981, and that he was the father of her three eldest children. She 
then married Mr. Sanders in 1981, and he was Angela's father. 
Rebekah then moved in with Mr. Branz in 1982, and she married Mr. Branz in 1985. 
She testified that her children lived with her while she lived with Mr. Branz and that Mr. 
Branz had problems with alcohol and drugs and was abusive to her. Immediately after 
leaving Mr. Branz, Rebekah became involved with Brad. 
Rebekah's oldest child from a previous relationship, Janica, age 21, had a child out of 
wedlock. At the time of trial, she was working as a certified nurse assistant. She had moved 
in and out of the Bohmans' home several times during their marriage. R. at 593-94. 
Rebekah's child Ryan was age 17 at the time of trial. He had been arrested for 
fighting and had other academic and citizenship problems in high school. R. at 646. Like 
Janica, he had moved in and out of the home during the marriage and the parties' separation. 
R. at 595-96. 
Rebekah's daughter Cami was age 18 at the time of trial. She had lived with her 
grandfather and was arrested for shoplifting. R. at 597. She had had difficulty in high school 
and a history of truancy.1 She had moved out of her mother's home and back again. R. at 
597-99. 
Angela, who was adopted by Brad, was doing well in school at the time of trial. 
After awarding custody to Rebekah, the court awarded Brad visitation three weekends 
per month from Friday to Sunday or from Saturday to Monday, depending on Brad's 
1
 Rebekah testified that, although her daughter was truant a good part of her junior year, Rebekah did not learn 
of the truancy for several months. R. at 628, 646-47. 
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schedule, holiday visitation in accordance with the statutory schedule, one midweek visit 
each month, and visitation for half the summer. 
Financial Issues 
Income 
Brad testified that he expected to earn about $240,000 in 1996. Based on his 
historical income, the court found that his annual income for purposes of calculating alimony 
and child support was $278,000. The court found that Rebekah had no income and imputed 
no income to her. The court observed that the alimony award "won't last very long." 
Finding of Fact No. 26, R. at 1540. 
Child Support 
The court awarded child support of $1,000 per month, per child, for the parties' three 
children. No specific findings were made as to the basis for that award. 
Alimony 
The court found that, based on the standard of living of the parties, Rebekah's 
reasonable needs were $7,225 per month and that Brad's reasonable living expenses were 
between $8,300 and $8,900 per month. The court found that Brad could meet his needs and 
pay alimony, child support, and taxes. Finding of Fact No. 30, R. at 1542. Thus, taking into 
account the child support awarded, the court awarded alimony of $4,225 per month for five 
years, beginning July 1996. 
Premarital Assets 
Brad had accumulated substantial assets prior to his marriage to Rebekah. By Brad's 
calculation, the premarital assets for which he was entitled to credit had a total value of 
$531,478. Exhibit 45a at trial. In addition, Brad had a number of premarital assets that had 
not changed form that he sought to have awarded to him. Although the trial court recognized 
that Brad was entitled to credit for the amounts held in his IRA accounts at the time of the 
marriage and the appreciation on those amounts, the trial court did not recognize any credit 
for the amounts Brad held in checking accounts or in his business at the time of the marriage. 
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The trial court also refused to grant credit for a Jeep owned by Brad at the time of the 
marriage, a loan repaid by Brad's brother, and a loan owed by Rebekah to Brad. 
Valuation Issues 
The court recognized that Brad was entitled to a premarital credit for a house on Ross 
Drive he had purchased prior to marriage, but did not grant the proper amount of credit. 
Likewise, the parties disagreed as to the value of a checking account and a van. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Custody of the 
Parties' Two Children to Rebekah. 
The trial court did not make adequate findings of fact to support its award of custody 
of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. The trial court failed to take into account 
much of the evidence adduced at trial concerning the best interests of the children and simply 
awarded custody based on its finding that Rebekah had been the primary caretaker of the 
children. In addition, the trial court and the custody evaluator gave excessive weight to the 
fact that Rebekah had temporary custody of the children. 
The evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact concerning custody in 
certain crucial areas, including the finding that Rebekah was the primary caretaker, that she 
had been equal to Brad in promoting visitation, that she had greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the children, that she had the ability to provide adequately for the children 
financially, and the moral character, past conduct, and demonstrated moral standards of the 
parties. The trial court also failed to take into account Rebekah's lack of contact with her 
extended family and the problems suffered by her older children. 
II. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning its Visitation Order are 
Inadequate. 
The trial court's visitation order was not consistent with its findings of fact 
concerning the importance of Brad's remaining involved in the children's lives, particularly 
in their education. 
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III. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Impute Income to Rebekah for 
Purposes of Calculating Child Support and Alimony. 
The trial court did not impute any income to Rebekah because it found that she should 
care for the children and not work outside the home. However, Utah law requires that 
income be imputed for child support purposes, the children are now in school, and Rebekah 
was already using surrogate care for the children. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Make Adequate Findings of Fact as 
to the Appropriate Child Support Amount. 
The trial court awarded $1,000 per month, per child, as child support, without any 
findings of fact on which to base that amount. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (1996) 
requires that such findings be made. 
V. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Make Adequate Findings of Fact to 
Support its Award of Alimony. 
The findings of fact as to Rebekah's needs were inadequate, since the trial court 
simply accepted her claims. The trial court made no findings as to Brad's net income or as to 
Rebekah's ability to contribute to her own support. Also, the trial court failed to make 
adequate findings of fact on which to base the duration of the alimony award. 
VI. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Certain Items of Brad's 
Premarital Property had been Consumed during the Marriage. 
The trial court failed to apply consistent principles in determining whether Brad was 
entitled to premarital credits for certain property. Because many of the assets at issue were 
cash, and because the parties had cash at the end of the marriage, the trial court erred in 
finding that those accounts had been consumed. Also, the trial court erred in granting a 
$5,000 credit to Rebekah for her premarital property. 
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VIL The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning the Values of Certain 
Items of Personal Property were Inadequate. 
The trial court did not indicate by its findings of fact how it determined the values of 
certain marital property, including the van, the First Security checking account, and the 
proceeds of the sale of Brad's premarital home located on Ross Drive. 
VIII. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Obligation to BB Ranchers 
Should Be Limited to a Four-Year Period Based on the Statute of Limitations. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996) provides for a four-year statute of limitations 
for oral contracts. However, the statute also provides that the action may be commenced 
within four years after the last charge is made. In this case, the last charge at issue was made 
in 1995. For that reason, the statute of limitation does not apply. 
DC The Trial Court Erred in not Taking into Account the Value of 
Rebekah's Wedding Rings. 
Because the rings are marital property, their value should have been included in the 
marital estate. 
X. The Trial Court Erred in Ordering Brad to Pay a Portion of Rebekah's 
Attorney's Fees. 
The trial court failed to make adequate findings as to the reasonableness of the 
requested fees, the financial need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse 
to pay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE TWO NATURAL CHILDREN 
OF THE PARTIES TO REBEKAH. 
Custody determinations in Utah are governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 
1997), which provides in pertinent parts as follows: 
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(1) . . . In determining custody, the court shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties. . . . 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other 
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the mandate of § 30-3-10 (1997) in awarding 
custody of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. The court failed to properly weigh 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each party and did not adequately 
consider which parent was most likely to act in the best interests of the children. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings Were Not Adequate to Support its Award of 
Custody of the Parties' Two Natural Children to Rebekah. 
In Smith, 726 P.2d 423, the Utah Supreme Court examined the role of the trial court 
in custody determinations. The Court noted that it would not overturn a trial court's custody 
determination unless the evidence clearly showed that the custody determination was not in 
the child's best interests. Id. At 425. 
The Court also noted that no one set list of factors can govern custody determinations 
in all cases, but that the factors relied on by the trial judge in awarding custody must be 
articulable and articulated in the judge's written findings and conclusions. Id. At 426. In 
addition, the Court said: 
[I]t is essential that the court set forth in its findings of fact not only that it 
finds one parent to be the better person to care for the child, but also the basic 
facts which show why that ultimate conclusion is justified. There must be "a 
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." 
Id. At 426. Citations omitted. 
In the Bohmans' case, the trial court's findings do not set forth a logical and legal 
basis for the ultimate conclusion that custody should be awarded to Rebekah. Many of the 
findings are critical of Rebekah; for example, the court expressed concerns about her stability 
12 
in light of four marriages, her excessive drinking, her extravagant spending, and her failure to 
take steps to become educated or employed. 
The court's findings with respect to Brad were more favorable; the court found that he 
is mature and stable and can provide constancy and consistency. Further, the court said that 
Brad is attuned to education and its importance in the children's lives and would be a positive 
influence and motivator for their education. The court noted that Brad's work schedule has 
large blocks of time that he can spend with the children. 
Some of the findings that support the custody award are internally inconsistent. For 
example, the court said in finding of fact no. 10 that Rebekah has greater flexibility to 
provide personal care for the children because she is unemployed, but that she needs to 
become employed or pursue an education.2 In that same vein, the court noted that alimony 
would terminate in five years so that it was necessary for Rebekah to plan for her future by 
obtaining employment or education, but that she could provide personal care for the children. 
With respect to the parties' respective abilities to provide for the children financially, 
the court found that it should not give that issue any weight (finding of fact no. 21), despite 
the fact that Rebekah was a profligate spender without any employment prospects beyond a 
wage of $5.00 per hour, whose alimony will terminate in five years or earlier, if she remarries 
or cohabits. The court ignored Brad's higher income, his career stability, and his proven 
ability to manage money. 
The trial court noted that this case was a close one and that "this case boiled down to 
a choice between a very good parent and one who was just slightly better." Finding of Fact 
No. 22. The findings that seemed to tip the balance in Rebekah's favor were as follows: 
2
 The trial court was apparently confused about the children's ages and the time at which they would begin 
school. In finding of fact no. 4, the court noted that Braxton was age 6 and Bryson was age 5, but said that the 
youngest child would be in school in two or three years. At the time of trial, Braxton was already in 
kindergarten and Bryson was scheduled to begin kindergarten in the fall of that year, 1996, not two or three 
years in the future. 
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(1) that Rebekah was the primary caregiver, although defendant had 
contributed meaningfully, especially during the last few years (finding of fact no. 8); 
(2) that Rebekah could provide more personal care (finding of fact no. 10); 
(3) that Rebekah had temporary custody of the children and they were 
doing well, although the court also found that Brad had contributed very meaningfully 
to their state of emotional health and happiness (findings of fact nos. 11 and 12); 
(4) that Rebekah is a very loving, caring parent who has the best interests 
of her children at heart (finding of fact no. 16); 
(5) that the children should live with Angela, their older half-sister 
(finding of fact no. 20); 
(6) that Rebekah was the primary psychological parent, although the 
children were closely bonded to both parents (findings of fact no. 20). 
Many of the foregoing findings are linked to the fact that Rebekah had temporary 
custody of the children. Likewise, the report of the custody evaluator, Philip B. Johnson, was 
based in large part on the temporary custody arrangement. 
In Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, the Supreme Court defined the consideration to be given to 
temporary custody arrangements. The Court noted that temporary arrangements are not to be 
given the same weight as a permanent custody order; modifiable only on a showing of a 
substantial change in circumstances. As the court said: "A temporary custody order is only 
that, temporary. It is effective only until a fully informed custody determination can be made 
at a final hearing." Id. at 1215. 
In Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, the court emphasized the necessity for adequate findings of 
fact in custody cases. The court said: "The trial court is required to make adequate findings 
regarding the best interests of the child and past conduct and demonstrated moral character of 
each of the parents. It is also required to consider which parent is most likely to act in the 
child's best interest and to make findings regarding that consideration." Id. At 259 (citations 
omitted). 
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In this case, the trial court failed to make findings on the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral character of each of the parents. Instead, it simply found that it was in 
the children's best interests that custody be awarded to their mother. The court failed to take 
into account the past conduct of Rebekah and also failed to find which parent would be most 
likely to act in the children's best interests and to make findings regarding that consideration. 
The court's findings actually support the conclusion that Brad would be more likely to act in 
the children's best interests, especially given the court's findings concerning his financial 
stability and the likelihood that he would encourage the children's education. In this case, as 
in Barnes: "The record is replete with highly disputed evidence relevant to the custody issue 
which is not dealt with at all in the findings." Id. At 261. 
Thus, the court's findings of fact concerning custody are inadequate under the 
standards set forth in the cases cited, and reversal and remand should be ordered. 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support Certain of the Trial Court's Findings 
Concerning Custody. 
The evidence does not support the following findings of the trial court: 
(1) that Rebekah was the primary caregiver of the children; (finding of 
fact no. 8); 
(2) that the parties would be equal in promoting visitation (finding of fact 
no. 9); 
(3) , that Rebekah had greater flexibility to provide personal care for the 
children because she has no employment (finding of fact no. 10); 
(4) that Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children 
financially (finding of fact no. 21); 
(5) that the parties are equal in moral character (finding of fact no. 20). 
Utah appellate courts have held that an appellant who attacks the evidence supporting 
a trial court's findings of fact must marshal the evidence supporting the findings and then 
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demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support those findings. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 
P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
In addition to the findings set forth above, it is appellant's position that the trial court 
failed to make adequate findings concerning the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties and which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the children. Those findings are required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 1997). 
(1) Evidence Relating to Finding that Rebekah was the Primary 
Caregiver of the Children. 
Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Finding: Rebekah testified that she was the 
primary caregiver of the children. The custody evaluator accepted that representation, 
apparently because Rebekah had not worked outside the home. 
Evidence Contradicting Finding: Brad reported that he had provided more of the care 
for the children in recent years, because of the flexibility of his schedule and the fact that 
Rebekah was out of the home doing other things. R. at 705. There was strong evidence 
corroborating Brad's testimony that Rebekah had been out of the home a great deal in recent 
years. For example, Brad introduced into evidence cellular telephone bills for representative 
periods of time—Exhibits 56, 57, and 58. Those telephone bills indicated that Rebekah was 
using her cellular telephone, out of the home, a great deal during the representative time 
periods of May 1995 (Exhibit 56), October of 1994 (Exhibit 57), and April of 1995 (Exhibit 
58). If Rebekah were truly a stay home mom, it is difficult to imagine why she would be 
required to make dozens of cellular telephone calls each month. 
Rebekah's friends testified that she liked to socialize and play golf and that several of 
her friends were unmarried women without children. Brad likewise testified as to time 
Rebekah spent with her friend Debbie Larsen. The evidence also clearly showed that 
Rebekah traveled with boyfriends, sometimes with the children and sometimes without; 
played tennis and golf; was out of the home for hair appointments, nail appointments, plastic 
surgery, and many other commitments which interfered with her care taking of the children. 
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The custody evaluator put great weight on the fact that the children were in Rebekah's 
physical custody during the separation. However, the custody evaluator seemed to ignore the 
fact that Brad had the children every weekend and as much of the rest of the time as Rebekah 
would allow. 
The recommendation of the custody evaluator to grant physical custody of the 
children to Rebekah was based on his assumption that she was the primary caretaker of the 
children. Because the evidence was conflicting on this issue, particularly as to the last few 
years of the parties' marriage, this finding on the part of the custody evaluator, and likewise 
on the part of the court, seems to have been based primarily on the fact that Rebekah was not 
employed and Brad functioned as the breadwinner for the family. This assumption results in 
a bias that makes it nearly impossible for a breadwinner parent to obtain custody of children, 
when the other parent has not worked outside the home. 
Because of this assumption, the custody evaluator and the court ignored the negative 
evidence concerning Rebekah's capabilities as a parent, her excessive drinking, her inability 
to manage money, the poor school and behavior records of her four older children, her 
friendship with an emotionally disturbed person, Debbie Larsen, her lack of supervision of 
the children as testified by her own mother, and her multiple successive relationships. Thus, 
although the court found that Brad was more stable and mature, and more likely to promote 
the children's education, custody of the children was awarded to Rebekah because of her 
supposed ability to provide personal care for them and her past history of providing care for 
them. Thus, although the evidence indicated that Brad was in the position to provide 
personal care for the children, because of his flexible schedule, and to provide a more stable 
environment, especially in the long term, it was almost impossible for Brad to overcome the 
presumption in favor of the nonworking parent. 
Likewise, the custody evaluator put great weight on the fact that the children were 
with Rebekah during the separation. The custody evaluator seemed to ignore the problems 
that Rebekah had had in prior relationships and with her four older children. He did not even 
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interview those children. He also ignored the fact that the four older children had returned to 
live with their father at one point. It appeared that the custody evaluator was biased because 
of the fact that Brad had questioned his evaluation. R. at 701-2. 
(2) Findings that the Parties Would Be Equal in Promoting Visitation. 
Evidence Supporting Finding: Rebekah testified that she understood the importance 
of Brad's relationship with her children and had cooperated with Brad in visitation. 
Evidence Contradicting Finding: It was undisputed that visitation had been difficult 
during the parties' separation. It was further undisputed that Rebekah refused to engage in 
mediation concerning visitation and custody issues. R. at 870-71. 
From the time of the first hearing on the motion for temporary relief, Rebekah sought 
to limit Brad's visitation with the children as much as possible. She refused to consider joint 
custody, even though the custody evaluator recommended it, and even reconciled with Brad 
briefly to avoid joint custody. During the separation, she refused to communicate with Brad 
when she took the children out of town, refused to provide information about the children's 
whereabouts so that Brad could call them, and took no part in transporting the children back 
and forth for visitation. R. at 779-82. Although Rebekah had no employment and no 
commitment to any particular schedule, she resisted allowing flexibility in the visitation 
schedule to accommodate Brad's work schedule. 
Rebekah constantly accused Brad of being "controlling" because he sought as much 
visitation with his children as possible, when, in fact, it was Rebekah who sought to control 
and limit the amount of time the children spent with Brad. 
(3) Evidence Relating to Finding that Rebekah had Greater 
Flexibility to Provide Personal Care for the Children because she 
had no Employment. 
Evidence Supporting the Finding: Obviously, Rebekah should have had greater 
ability to provide personal care for the children, because she was not employed outside the 
home. 
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Evidence Contradicting Finding: The e\ idence at ti ial in this matter si 1 :»v < eel tl lat 
Rebekah needed to become educated or obtain employment, so that she could support herself 
in the future. Ihe facts that she had moved quickly from one relationship with a man to 
another and that she had had only low level employment, clearly indicated the necessity for 
her to obtain training to be able to support herself. Her alimony award in this case is for a 
period of onl> fi ( - e years. E\ en hei adi ill: children depend on hei foi suppoi t I hus, she 
should not long remain unemployed. 
Brad, on the other hand, is employed as an anesthesiologist. His schedule is 
children get home from school on most days, and he could provide backup care for the times 
when he was on call as an anesthesiologist. R. at 788. 
T i n I ' t u h m . i CIIMH I I H I J U I I U I lliuil l\\ I I L L I I I li.inJ n o t I I'I 11« 111 ii . d i : s p i k l i u L t i k o f 
employment. The evidence indicated that in 1993, Rebekah started going out more in the 
evenings and during the days. R. at 762-63. In particular, Rebekah would socialize with her 
friend Debbie Larsen and they would drin k to excess, R at ) 63. Rebekah testified that si le 
spent $150 per month on gasoline. That would amount to approximately 2,500 miles per 
month . .: - ipossible for her to drive that fai as a stay home mother. 
Exhibits :-o. 57, and 58 also indicate that Rebekah was not in the home, These 
exhibits were her cellular telephone bills indicating use of telephone out of the home during 
tl • . . • D. 
It is clear that Rebekah must work outside the home or obtain education so that she 
can work outside the home to support herself in the future. Neither the custody evaluator nor 
the court seemed t :> ha1' - z :oi isidered the fact that R ebel ;:al i • ill be v • ithc I it alin IOI P • in a five-
year period. No credible evidence was presented showing that Rebekah had given any 
thought to the children's financial stability in the future oi to what will happen when her 
a ,f 
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custody seemed to assume maintenance of the status quo with a lack of concern for the 
future. 
(4) Evidence Concerning Rebekah's Ability to Provide Adequately for 
the Children Financially. 
Evidence Supporting Finding: The only evidence supporting the finding that 
Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children financially is the court's order 
awarding her alimony of $4,225 and child support of $3,000 per month. However, alimony 
will terminate from five years from the summer of 1996. Angela, Brad's adopted child, will 
turn eighteen in four years. There was no evidence whatsoever that Rebekah would be able 
to provide for the children after her alimony award expired and she was no longer receiving 
child support for Angela. 
In addition, there was overwhelming evidence that Rebekah could not manage 
money. The court found that " Plaintiff is a profligate spender and that that was part of the 
problem in the parties' marriage. Plaintiffs extravagant spending caused the Court some real 
concerns about Plaintiffs stability and her ability to manage to stay on a budget where things 
are going to be somewhat limited following this marriage." Finding of Fact No. 15, R. at 
1534. 
There was overwhelming evidence to support this finding. Throughout the last 
several years of the parties' marriage, and during the separation, Rebekah insisted on 
spending more money than the parties could afford and more money than she was awarded as 
temporary alimony and child support. When she learned that the parties were separating the 
second time in the spring of 1995, she purchased a grand piano for $18,000, signing Brad's 
name to the contract. R. at 567. Throughout the separation, she was consistently late in 
making mortgage payments. She testified that she had difficulty making ends meet. She 
incurred substantial debt during the separation, despite the fact that Brad paid alimony and 
child support on a temporary basis as ordered by the court. There is every reason to think 
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court's finding that Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children financially. 
(5) Evidence that the Parties Are Equal in Moral Character and 
Evidence Concerning the Past Conduct and Demonstrated Moral 
Standards of Each of the Parties. 
hwileme Supportwy hlmlmy •• •- <li|h(iil| in n|ci|ii(\ nn ^\n|t'mv supju»i"tij](i« |lu . 
finding. 
Evidence Contradicting Finding: The evidence presented at trial indicated that 
Rebekah.. was age 38 at the time of ti ial an :1 lea \ ing hei foi irth mai riage. She had had foi u 
children prior to her marriage to Brad. Her older children had been sent, to li\ e with theii 
father during the time that she was dating Brad. During the parties' separation, she had two 
fairly serious boyfriends, i,-.. :Iintze and David Garside, and had other boyfriends as well 
Testimony of Shirley Morgan, R. at 936 Brad had been married once before this 
max riage and. had one I. :)iig tei m i elationship during the pai tie s"!l separation. 
Rebekah had traveled extensively with her boyfriends during the separation—to Mr. 
Hintze's home at Bear Lake on numerous weekends, to Mexico, New York, Jackson Hole, 
A
 .he had taken the el lildrei I : I it 
of school to travel to Mexico with David Garside. 
Extensive evidence was presented concerning Rebekah's drinking habits. Her own 
her supervision of the children. Brad's mother, Mildred Bohman, testified that Rebekah 
drank to excess in her presence. 
In respoi lse to a qi lestion naire she filled en it c!.i n ing tl le custody ' e eali iatioi :i Rebekal I 
indicated that the most positive thing that ever happened to her was her friend, Debbie 
Larsen. Debbie Larsen was a fiiend without children, with whom Rebekah would drink at 
private clubs and play golf Rebekah had told her husband, that Debbie Larsen had made 
lesbian advances to her. Debbie Larsen was an alcoholic who eventually killed herself. 
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Debbie Larsen also considered adopting Rebekah's daughter Janica's out of wedlock child. 
R. at 610-12. 
Noleen Bennett, a therapist who saw both parties, suggested that Rebekah may have a 
narcissistic personality and borderline personality disorder. R. at 379-80. 
Brad testified that Rebekah's appearance was very important to her, that she spent a 
great deal of money on clothing, had had a number of plastic surgeries, including several 
breast augmentations, liposuctions, chemical peels, cosmetic alterations to her legs and teeth, 
that she spent a good deal of time on her nails, her tanning, and her hair, and that her values 
put greater emphasis on appearance and image than on character. By Rebekah's own 
testimony, the values most important to her to instill in her children were being polite and 
clean. R. at 532. Rebekah had forged Brad's name on a contract, had lied about taking real 
estate classes, and had "stockpiled" goods that she could charge to Brad's account at the time 
of separation. 
(6) Other Factors not Taken into Account in the Court's Findings of 
Fact. 
Rebekah has very little contact with extended family. She has almost no contact with 
her own father, and he does not function as a grandfather to her children. She is estranged 
from her sister. Brad, on the other hand, has a large, extended family, which he sees 
frequently. He has four brothers and the children have a number of cousins on his side of the 
family. Brad's family owns a ranch in Morgan, and family gatherings regularly take place at 
the ranch. R. at 649. 
The trial court also failed to take into account the many problems of Rebekah's older 
children-they had not done well in school, they had had legal problems, they had moved in 
and out of their mother's home and required her to provide support. By contrast, it was clear 
that Brad could provide the direction and motivation to assist the younger children to succeed 
academically and could provide a more stable environment. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING 
ITS VISITATION ORDER ARE INADEQUATE. 
The parties originally separated in the fall of 1994. In November of 1994, a hearing 
on Rebekah's motion for temporary relief took place The commissioner ordered the parties 
to share equally custody of the two younger children, Braxton and Bryson, neither of whom 
was Rebekah immediately objected to that recommendation. Rebekah also 
requested an evidentiary hearing on the custody issue. 
The parties then reconciled for a period of time. Alter they separated again, the 
o •» d 
subsequent hearings, a temporary order was finally entered which provided that the parties 
would have joint legal custody of Braxton and Bryson, with defendant to have reasonable and 
awarded one week per month for the summer months and holiday visitation. Each party was 
ordered to provide the other with the opportunity to provide care for the children in instances 
where the parent would otherwise use surrogate care. Rebekah was also ordered to 
encourage and facilitate Brad's visitation with the older child, Angela. 
The ci istod> e \ ah lation condi icted b> I 'hilip B Jol inson re ;:: Dmmended that tl ite 
temporary visitation schedule continue. I lie custody evaluation further recommended that 
there should be flexibility to allow for continuity of visitation with Brad and his on-call 
schedule as an anestl lesiologist 
In its findings of fact, the court made the following finding of fact that related to the 
visitation schedule: 
12 The Court finds that the children are happy, well adjusted and 
doing very well. However, the Court also recognizes that the Defendant has 
contributed very meaningfully to their state of emotional health and happiness. 
R. at 1533. 
The court found that Brad was very attuned to education and its importance in the 
c ! • • s : 
23 
The court finds that Defendant will be a positive influence on the children 
if he is given an opportunity to have substantial contact so that he can help 
the children with their homework, monitor their grades and provide good 
fundamental motivation. Defendant's work schedule has large periods of 
time when he can spend time with the children and flexibility needs to be 
realized in his visitation schedule. 
Finding of Fact No. 17, R. at 1535. 
The court then awarded defendant visitation three weekends each month, from Friday 
to Sunday or Saturday to Monday, holiday visitation pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
35, and one visit each month from the time the children get home from school to 8:00 p.m. in 
the evening, to take place in the week prior to or the week following the weekend when Brad 
would not have weekend visitation. The court further provided for make up visitation when 
necessary and an equal division of the children's summer vacation—each party taking the 
children for two weeks at a time. Finding of Fact No. 23, R. at 1536-39. 
Although the visitation awarded to Brad exceeded the standard visitation provided for 
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35 (Supp. 1997), the schedule does not take into account either 
the recommendation of the custody evaluator that Brad continue to have the same amount of 
visitation, or the court's finding that Brad should be involved in the children's educational 
life. Because Brad only has one weeknight visitation per month, he does not truly have an 
opportunity to monitor the children's homework or their education. Because the weekend 
visitation is three days, from Friday at 4:00 p.m. on school days to Sunday evening, or from 
Saturday at 9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m., Brad does have an opportunity to work with 
the children on weekends concerning their educational requirements, but simply does not 
have the opportunity for the consistent contact that would be necessary for him to truly assist 
with the children's education. 
Nor does the visitation order take full advantage of Brad's flexible work schedule. 
Because of that flexible work schedule, Brad is available to spend time with the children 
during the week, but the visitation schedule does not allow that to take place. 
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The trial court's factual findings do i lot draw the necessary relationship between the 
visitation schedule ordered and facts of the case. For that reason, they are inadequate. 
Ill THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE 
INCOME TO REBEKAH FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
that she had made only $5.00 per hour prior to the parties' marriage and that she should 
remain at home to care for the parties' children. The trial court said: 
Because of the tender years of the children and because of the interest that each party 
has in seeing that they are nurtured properly and considering the expenses of work, 
additional clothing and day care, it may not be highly profitable for the plaintiff to 
work, although the Court finds that plaintiff should obtain employment or go to 
school. 
1 M i l 1111} I M I l i t 1 INI I « I'1 i l l I » 4 Z . 
The court also said "it ma> not be in the best interests of plaintiff to return 
immediately to work Based upon the current financial circumstances the Court imputes no 
income to plaintiff at this time . . I lie Court observes that the alimony award that the Court 
will award in this case won't last very long." Finding of Fact No. 26, R. at 1540. 
"-: ^ - ' >p. 199/j - ' ..; of 
calculating child support iik a»un Miouid impute income ft- a pare*.; a lw>t at the federal 
minimum wage level for a forty-hour workweek. The court is not required to impute income 
* •- * : >me 
the custodial parent can earn However, in this case, Rebekah was already using surrogate 
care for the children. In fact, her monthly budget included an item for child care. I he court 
made no findii ig that the costs of child care • oi ild exceed the ai noi int. R ebek: ll * : , J ;I i* • 
Rebekah had two years of college paid for by Brad since her last ..r j: ^ - .»«. per 
hour. She had ample opportunity during the separation to return to work or employment, but 
simpi . . !iere was no basis for the trial court's refusal to impute income 
to her at least at the minimum wage level. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE CHILD 
SUPPORT AMOUNT. 
In this case, the trial court made the following findings of fact concerning child 
support: 
27. With respect to child support based upon the defendant's 
income, the Court finds it is fair and reasonable that the defendant pay to 
plaintiff child support in the amount of $1,000 per month for each of the three 
children for a total of $3,000 per month. That sum is to be payable one-half 
on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the parties 
mutually agree otherwise. Child support under the Decree of Divorce should 
commence with the month of July, 1996. 
As additional support defendant should be ordered to provide health 
insurance so long as the same is available to him through his employment. 
Each party should be responsible for one-half of the uninsured medical and 
dental expenses except routine office visits which should remain the 
responsibility of the plaintiff. Plaintiff should not incur any non-emergency 
extraordinary medical expenses which would include medical, dental, 
orthodontia and counseling expenses without giving the defendant notice and 
an opportunity to be heard first. 
R. at 1540-41. 
Child support in Utah is governed by the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-1 et seq. (1953, as amended). That Act contains guidelines for the 
calculation of child support. However, when the parties' combined income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the child support guidelines, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (1996) 
requires that "an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case 
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the table for 
the number of children due support." 
In this case, Brad's annual income was found by the court to be $278,000, or $23,167 
per month. Obviously, that income is higher than $10,100 per month, the highest income 
dealt with in the table. For three children, the highest amount of child support set forth in the 
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table is $1,808. Thus, the trial court was required to award at least $1,808 per month as child 
support for the three children, but was not required to award more than that amount. 
In tl lis cas z the trial c< il11 ,r l » l: « ^ "'" >< •1| '" »< lings ;ai ^  ' •" m >vi< U •< 1 1 io explanatioi l foi its award 
of $1,000 per month, per chih tiaii. ^12 P.2d a; \r,: - this court held that, when the 
parties' income exceeds the highest monthly combined adjusted gross income listed on the 
statutoi > table, "a ti ial ji i igc: iiii ist consider and make specific findings on all 'appropriate 
and just' factors." 
In this case, the trial court failed to make any findings whatsoever to justify its child 
support of $1,000 per month, per child. Accordingly, thai child support award must be 
reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD 
OF ALIMONY. 
This court has repeatedly set forth the standards for a trial court's award of alimony: 
in determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, 
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to provide for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
When the trial court has failed to make findings on the three factors 
listed above, [this court will] reverse, unless pertinent facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment 
iony award are conclusory 
and do not meet the standards set by this court. 
A Fhe Trial Cciii n I: Dl ::l I" J : I: I \ lake • I dequate Findings to Support the Needs 
of Rebekah. 
With respect to the needs of the recipient spouse, the trial court made the following 
findings: 
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29. With respect to alimony the Court finds that the plaintiffs 
present standard of living based upon her reasonable needs and consistent with 
what appeared to be the standard of living of the parties in the past, was the 
monthly need of $7,225 . . . . 
31. Based upon plaintiffs demonstrated need, which the Court 
finds to be reflected in the plaintiffs Submission of Detailed Expenses as set 
forth in her Exhibit P-10 which appear to be reasonable . . . . 
R. at 1541-42. 
Exhibit 10, which the court relied upon in determining Rebekah's needs, included a 
monthly house payment of $2,460. However, the court did not award the house to Rebekah. 
Likewise, many of the expense items listed were related to the house—property taxes of $234 
per month, homeowner's insurance of $83 per month, home repairs of $400 per month. The 
court did not consider, nor make findings, as to Rebekah's projected expenses in a different 
home. 
In addition, the court did not consider whether any of the claimed expenses were 
inflated or unreasonable. It is clear that most of the expenses were estimated and not tied to 
records or an actual accounting. For example, $300 per month for recreation, plus $120 for 
an athletic club, plus $200 for vacation is duplicative and excessive. Likewise $50 per month 
for toys, plus $100 per month for gifts also seems duplicative. The claim of $100 for 
"incidentals" was also unsubstantiated. The court even ignored the fact that Rebekah was 
claiming $250 per month for child care, when she does not work outside the home, her 
children were in school, and the fact that the preschool charge of $50 per month would 
disappear when the younger boy entered kindergarten in a few months. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has required that trial courts make detailed findings to 
support their alimony awards. E.g., Bell 810 P.2d 489. The findings of need made by the 
court here do not satisfy that standard. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings as to Brad's Ability to 
Pay or Rebekah's Ability to Contribute to her own Support. 
The trial court found that Brad's annual gross income was $278,000, or $23,167 per 
month Finding of Fact No. 25, R at 15^9. The court made no finding as to Brad's net 
income. 
With o 
her because of the presumption that she should not work and should care for the children. 
Finding of Fact No. 26, R at 1539-40. 
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expenses and found that he could meet these expenses even after paying taxes, alimony, and 
child support. Finding of Fact No. 30, R at 1542 
Since tl .a :k no findings as to Brad' 's net ' .v income or his taxes, it is 
impossible to determine whether its finding as to his ability to pay is correct. Implicit in that 
finding is the assumption that Brad would have at least $8,300, ^7,225, or $15,525 
available as net monthly income, but there was no such finding. 
In addition, the finding that Rebekah is incapable of contributing to her own support 
award will not last very long and "to the extent possible she needs to be either advancing her 
education or advancing her employment' Finding of Fact No 10, R at 1533. 
The coi ii I: sh :>i l l ;:! ha \ e made a finding as to the extent t :) 1 \ hid I R ebekal I is capable of 
contributing to her own support, aside from her child care responsibilities, especially given 
the fact that her youngest child would reach school age within a few months of the trial date. 
C. The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings of Fact Supporting 
the Duration of the Alimony Award. 
With respect to the duration of the alimony award, the court made the following 
finding: 
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Alimony under the Decree of Divorce should commence with the month of 
July 1996, and be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of 
each month unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. 
Finding of Fact No. 31, R. at 1541-43. 
Plaintiffs entitlement to alimony shall terminate on the 30th day of 
June, 2001, or sooner upon the remarriage or cohabitation of plaintiff or the 
death of either party or by operation of law. The amount of alimony can be 
reviewed before the expiration of five years if there is a substantial and 
material change of the circumstances of the parties. 
Finding of Fact No. 33, R. at 1543. 
The trial court did not include in its findings any of its reasoning concerning the 
duration of alimony. Obviously, the trial court must have tied alimony to the duration of the 
marriage. The parties were married in September of 1989, and separated in the fall of 1994. 
At the time of trial, Rebekah had been receiving temporary alimony for approximately one 
and one-half years. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997) provides that: "Alimony may not be 
ordered for a duration longer than the number of the years that the marriage existed unless, at 
any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Thus, the court could not have 
awarded alimony longer than the duration of the marriage. However, because the court did 
not explain the duration of alimony it did award, its findings of fact on that issue were 
inadequate and should be reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CERTAIN 
ITEMS OF BRAD'S PREMARITAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN 
CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
In Utah divorces, "[t]he general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the 
separate property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)." Dunn, 802 P.2d 
at 1320. 
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Brad had practiced medicine for several years before his marriage to Rebekah and had 
accumulated substantial premarital assets. At the time of the marriage, those assets included 
tl le follow ing: 
Key Bank, checking account no. 000577510 $ 21 286 
Fidelity Investments USA account X29-002453 50,829 
1706 R ossDrr e I >n >ceeds from Sale 50,470 
Fidelity Investments, IRA account T022114548 
IRA Rollover (129074128 as of 6/30/93) 131,481 
IRA Contributory (129079790 as of 12/31 93) 74,197 
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Retirement Plan 30,000 
(Deposited-Fidelity Inv,, acct. no. T06214 ^) 
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Accounts Receivable 
at 8/31/89 ($498,210 + 3,240 - 4 x 80%) 100,289 
1986 Jeep Cherokee 10,025 
Cash in. I: I isiness a v ailable to Bi ad 35,901 
Brent Bohman (personal loan from brother paid during marriage) 10,000 
Rebekah Bohman (personal loan still outstanding) 17,000 
Winetou Minerals Corp. (2,1)00 shares) 
Buenaventura Resources Corp. (249,333 shares) 
Bohman Ranch 
Business interest in Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology 
BB Ranchers 
Furniture, fine arts & silverware 
1980 S^ 
1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. 
Defi sndanl 's Exhibit' 14 i 
The trial court awarded to Brad all his premarital assets that had not changed form: 
the stocks, his interest in the family ranch, his Porsche, and the 1989 Jeep Cherokee. The 
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trial court also awarded Brad the amounts in his two IRA accounts to the dates indicated 
because the accounts had been maintained as separate to those dates, despite the fact that the 
accounts were later changed. 
However, the trial court ruled that the Key Bank checking account, the Fidelity 
Investments USA account, the 1986 Jeep Cherokee, the $35,901 cash credit in Brad's 
business, the loan repaid by Brad's brother, and the loan to Rebekah had all been consumed 
during the marriage. In so finding, the trial court erred. 
A. Key Bank Checking Account and Fidelity Investment Account. 
Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that he had $21,286 in his Key Bank checking 
account at the time of his marriage to Rebekah. R. at 652. He produced a bank statement 
showing the balance in September 1989, the date of marriage. Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 44a. 
Likewise, Brad testified that he had $50,289 in his Fidelity Investment account, a money 
market checking account, at the time of the marriage and he produced a statement for that 
account. R. at 652, Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 44a. 
The court found that the two accounts were consumed, "taken from the individual 
name of defendant and put into the family income stream and used. They are consumed and 
gone and no premarital credit should be allowed." Finding of Fact No. 36a, R. at 1544. 
At the time of the trial of the divorce action, however, the court found that Brad had 
$23,687 in a First Security checking account and approximately $180,000 in a Fidelity 
Investment account, which was also a checking account.3 Thus, while Brad had 
approximately $72,000 in cash in checking accounts at the beginning of the marriage, there 
was at least $200,000 in cash in such accounts at the end of the marriage. The cash that 
existed in September 1989 had not been consumed; instead, more funds had been 
accumulated. The evidence simply did not support the trial court's conclusion that the 
accounts had been consumed. 
3
 Other accounts, such as the Charles Schwab Family Trust account, also contained substantial liquid assets. 
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Apparently, the trial court believed that, because tl segregate i 
kept in the same account in which it was held at the beginning the marriage, Brad should not 
r-«v. ; not require that premarital assets be kept segregated in 
the same account to be considered separate property. In Bm t, 799 P.2d 1166, the court said: 
"Conversion from one investment medium to another does not, by itself, destroy the integrity 
of segregation ' ' i \ I at 116 5" I ikew ise the fact that Brad chai lged tl ic location :)f a checking 
account or the number of his money market account with Fidelity Investment, does not mean 
that the funds have been consumed. The trial court should have granted a premarital credit 
foi these accounts 
The trial court's reasoning as to segregation of premarital propertv not only penalizes 
the party who comes into the marriage with assets; it also punishes a par* • n^ does not 
maintain strict segregati - r t 
found to have been consumed in this case had a total value of $145,401. Because Brad did 
not maintain those assets in strictly segregated form or in the same accounts, he now suffers a 
financial penalty while Rebekah receives a winu... relatively short marriage of 
$72,521.50. 
IB 
Brad testified that, at the time of the marriage, he owned a 1986 Jeep Cherokee with a 
value of $10,025. He further testified that the Jeep was sold and the proceeds deposited into 
his accounts. R at 655. 
The court found that the Jeep Cherokee was "gone and consumed and for it defendant 
should receive no premarital credits " Finding of Fact \*» R a? 1 ; +4. However, at the 
time of the divorce, tl ic par ties o\ v lie d ./ ehicles of sub ... . "sche 1 * < itl I a « 'ah lie 
of $43,225 and a van with a value of $14,691. Although the 1986 Jeep was itself sold, its 
value augmented the marital estate. If Brad had not owned that vehicle at the time of the 
marriage, and if the parties had otherwise conducted theii financial at lairs in I he same 
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manner, the value of their total estate would have been smaller. Brad should have received a 
credit for the value of the Jeep. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant a Credit for the Cash in Rocky 
Mountain Anesthesiology to which Brad Was Entitled at the Time of the 
Marriage and by Failing to Deduct the Deficit that Existed at the Time of 
the Divorce, 
Brad testified that, as of the date of his marriage to Rebekah, he had cash in his 
personal account with his business partnership, Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology, in the 
amount of $35,901. Exhibit 44a, R. at 656. As of the time of trial, Brad testified, he had no 
cash in his account with the business (R. at 656), and in fact owed $7,417, which would have 
to be made up from earnings before any distributions could be made to Brad. Exhibit 45a. 
The court found that the $35,901 in Brad's business account in 1989 was "gone and 
consumed" (Finding of Fact No. 36e, R. at 1545) and ignored the deficit of $7,417 existing in 
1996. 
Ironically, however, the court recognized that the accounts receivable of Rocky 
Mountain Anesthesiology were a premarital asset for which Brad should receive a premarital 
credit of $100,289, and that the current accounts receivable were a marital assets with a value 
of $93,349, and that there was a balance sheet asset of $2,798 which should also be charged 
to Brad. Finding of Fact No. 37b, R. at 1547. 
It is impossible to follow the trial court's reasoning on this issue. First, Rocky 
Mountain Anesthesiology was itself a premarital asset. If the change in the value of a 
premarital asset is to be considered at all in determining the various values that make up the 
marital estate, it should be the change in the whole value, not just selected portions of the 
asset. 
Clearly, the trial court should have awarded a credit to Brad for the $35,901 held in 
the cash account with his business at the time of the marriage and should have debited the 
$7,417 deficit amount. 
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D. The Loan to Brad's Brother Brent and the Loan to Rebekah. 
Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that he had loaned $10,000 to his brother, Brent 
the marriage. This was an asset owned by Brad prior to the marriage. The fact that Brent 
repaid it during the marriage augmented the marital estate in the amount of $10,000. Again, 
all c ther things being eqi ial. the parties had $10 000 ' "  ": "  assets at the end of the marriage 
than they would have had if Brent had not repaid the k>ai, For that reason, Brad should have 
been granted a premarital credit for the amount of the l^an 
Likew ise, it * as Bi ad' 's i m :ontro \ • ei ted testimon> that 1 it ha 1 loai led $1 1 000 to 
Rebekah prior to the marriage. This amount had not been repaid If Brad and Rebekah had 
not married, this loan was an asset to which he would have been entitled. The trial court 
presented no reasoning as to why the loan should not be recognized. Rather, the court simply 
said that "the loan to Rebekah Bohman of $17,000 loaned prior to the marriage of the parties 
is gone and for \\ hich defendant shoi lid receive no pi emai ital credit " I :; ii idi* * •. : No. 
36g, - The court gave no explanation for its ruling on this issue. 
Because the trial court's findings of fact with respect to the two loans are inadequate, 
ai I ;:1 becai ise Brad shoi il :!! i l 
court's findings of fact on those issues should be reversed. 
E. The I rial Court E n e • ci in Gi anting a $5,000 Ci c -dit il: : Re 'Ill: • = i i ; .1 i If : r 
Premarital Property. 
Rebekah initially te stifled that at the time of the marriage, she owned property with a 
value of $16,000, for which she sought credit in the distribution of the parties'1 property. 
Exhibit 23. I he property consisted of furniture, a Porsche, household goods, and gins irom 
friends Later, cross-examination revealed that Rebekah still had possession of the gifts from 
friends (R. at 622), that she had sold the Porsche prior to the marriage, and that she still had 
instead of $16,000. 
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Rebekah testified that the couch listed on Exhibit 23 had been sold to her mother and 
that the bedroom sets, to which she had assigned a value of $5,000, were located at Brad's 
family ranch. R. at 622-23. Brad testified that he had actually purchased the bedroom sets 
from Rebekah prior to the marriage. 
Not only is it difficult to determine how bedroom sets many years old could possibly 
be worth $5,000, it is impossible to reconcile the trial court's treatment of Rebekah's 
premarital assets with Brad's. With respect to Brad's cash accounts, the court held that they 
were consumed. With respect to Rebekah's claim for a premarital credit, the court ignored 
the gaps in the evidence, as well as the fact that the personal property at issue still existed and 
could have been returned to Rebekah, and awarded her a credit of $5,000 for her premarital 
property. Neither the evidence nor the law support that result. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS CONCERNING THE 
VALUES OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY ARE 
INADEQUATE. 
"To permit appellate review of a trial court's property division, the lower court must 
have made adequate factual findings. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. The findings should be 
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Walters, 812 P.2d at 67. In this 
case, the court failed to make such findings as to a number of issues concerning personal 
property. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Regarding the Value of the Van are 
Inadequate. 
The trial court found that the value of the van owned by the parties was $14,691. 
Rebekah testified as to that value; Brad testified that the value was $19,385. In addition, 
Brad asked that the van be awarded to him at the higher value and was willing to accept that 
higher value on his side of the ledger. The trial court awarded the van to Rebekah without 
explanation, and also accepted the value she assigned to it. No factual findings were made. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings as to the Value of 
Brad's First Security Checking Account. 
The trial court erred in finding that the balance in Brad's First Security checking 
account was $23,687. Brad had a checking account with First Security Bank, account no. 
2021027327, into which his paychecks were deposited. Shortly before trial, a mistake had 
been made by his corporation and an extra $10,810 had been deposited. R. at 1047-48. For 
that reason, the last statement available for the account showed a balance of $23,687. 
However, Brad testified, without contradiction, that the $10,816 deposit was a mistake and 
that he had written a check back to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology to correct the incorrect 
deposit. R. at 1047. Brad had also updated the balance in the account by deducting checks 
and adding deposits that had been made since the date of the last available statement. As of 
the date of trial, the balance in that account was $19,854. 
Because the evidence as to the balance in the account was uncontradicted, the court 
erred in failing to use the $19,854 figure in computing the value of the account for purposes 
of computing the marital estate. 
C. Ross Drive Proceeds 
The trial court recognized that Brad was entitled to a premarital credit for the Ross 
Drive house, but found that the amount of the credit should be $40,000, "based upon the 
testimony of the parties and the exhibits introduced." Finding of Fact no. 36b, R. at 1544. 
However, the only evidence introduced as to the value of Brad's interest in the Ross Drive 
house was the evidence indicating that the net proceeds of its sale were $50,470. The 
$40,000 figure apparently came from Rebekah's Exhibit 22, which contained figures 
indicating that the value of the Ross Drive home at the time of the marriage was $150,000 
and the mortgage balance was $40,000. However, those figures were not supported by any 
documentary evidence or testimony. 
Because the only competent evidence as to the value of Brad's interest in the Ross 
Drive house was $50,470, the trial court erred in finding the value to be $40,000. 
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
OBLIGATION TO BB RANCHERS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO 
A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD, BASED ON THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Brad testified that BB Ranchers was a family partnership established as the operating 
entity for his family's ranch. Brad further testified that he had an agreement with his family 
members, pursuant to which he had been allowed to claim the tax savings attributable to the 
ranch operations over a period of years, and that he then owed the partnership the amount of 
the tax savings he had enjoyed. R. at 664-65. This testimony was uncontroverted. 
At the time of trial, the amount owed to BB Ranchers for the obligations incurred 
during the marriage was $77,098. This amount represented the tax savings that the parties 
had enjoyed for the years 1989 through 1995. However, although the court recognized the 
obligation, it decided that the amount of the obligation should be limited to the tax savings 
enjoyed by the parties for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. The court found that: 
"Defendant's claim for a longer period should be denied because of the statute of 
limitations." Finding of Fact No. 37hh, R. at 1553. 
The court did not refer to any particular statute of limitations, but presumably had in 
mind UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996), which provides for a four year statute of 
limitations for oral contracts. The court made no factual findings on which to base its 
conclusion that this statute barred claims for the tax savings for years prior to 1992, nor was 
evidence presented that any such defense to the obligation had ever been asserted. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996) provides that "[a]n action may be brought 
within four years: (1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing." The statute further provides "that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is 
received." § 78-12-25(1) (1996). 
In this case, the last charge at issue was made for the tax year 1995. For that reason, 
the statute of limitations had not run by the time of trial. The court erred in finding that the 
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statute of limitations had run to bar the obligations for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991. Thus, 
Brad should have been entitled to a premarital credit in the amount of $77,098 for the BB 
Ranchers obligation. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT THE VALUE OF REBEKAH'S WEDDING RINGS 
IN VALUING THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The court ruled that the jewelry acquired during the marriage should be divided along 
with the other personal property of the parties, but that the wedding rings should be excluded 
because they were gifts to Rebekah. 
Rebekah valued the wedding rings at $12,000. R. at 572. 
The court did not cite any legal principle or controlling law in determining that the 
wedding rings should not be included in the marital estate. Obviously, they have substantial 
value and were property acquired during the marriage. Gifts between husbands and wives are 
not necessarily excluded from the marital estate. Accordingly, the court's ruling on that issue 
should be reversed. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING BRAD TO PAY A 
PORTION OF REBEKAH'S ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1995) authorizes trial courts to award attorney's fees in 
divorce proceedings. Such an award "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Citations omitted. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493. 
In determining whether the fees are reasonable, the court may consider, among other 
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of 
the hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved 
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. 
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). Bell 810 P.2d at 494. 
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In this case, Rebekah was represented by two highly experienced domestic relations 
attorneys: one attorney handled the financial aspects of the case; the other handled the 
custody issues. As a result, Rebekah's fees and costs totaled approximately $42,000. R. at 
1094. Brad had only one attorney and his fees and costs totaled approximately $23,000. 
In its findings, the trial court made no effort to reconcile the disparity in the fees or to 
apply any of the factors listed above. Instead, the court simply found that the requested fees 
were reasonable "based on the respective financial circumstances of the parties and 
defendant's greater income capacity." Finding of Fact No. 40, R. at 1560. 
With respect to Rebekah's need for assistance with her fees, the court recognized that 
Rebekah would receive a substantial amount of cash in the property distribution (actually 
approximately $192,109, that Brad had already paid $7,500 of fees on a temporary basis, and 
that she had used marital funds of $4,000 to pay fees. Notwithstanding those facts, and 
notwithstanding the fact that Rebekah would receive $7,225 per month as alimony and child 
support, the court found "there is some need" and ordered Brad to pay an additional $5,000. 
Finding of Fact no. 40, R. at 1560. 
With respect to Brad's ability to pay fees, the court simply said that "there is some 
limited ability to pay." Finding of Fact No. 40, R. at 1560. 
As in Bell the trial court in this case gave "no explanation" for its finding that the 
fees were reasonable, that a need existed, and that Brad had the ability to pay. For that 
reason, the trial court's findings do not meet the standards set forth in Bell and are 
inadequate. 
CONCLUSION 
In seeking custody of his two children, Brad faced an insurmountable obstacle. 
Because he had had a career during the marriage and Rebekah had not, the custody evaluator 
and eventually the court both assumed that Rebekah had served as the primary caretaker for 
the children. An analysis of all the evidence and of the court's findings of fact in this case 
makes its clear that the fact that Rebekah was found to be the primary caretaker for the 
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children was outcome determinative. Although the court questioned her stability, in light of 
her prior relationships, the problems of her older children, her excessive drinking, her 
profligate spending, her "distractions" (Finding of Fact No. 16, R. at 1534), all those factors 
were overcome by the finding that she had been the children's primary caretaker. 
There was nothing that Brad could do to prove otherwise. Although he offered strong 
evidence to the court that Rebekah had not been in the home during the last several years of 
the children's lives, including documentary evidence such as her cellular telephone bills, all 
that evidence was swept away based on the presumption that because she did not work 
outside the home, Rebekah must be caring for the children. The reasoning of this case 
virtually assures that a parent who is employed always faces an enormous disadvantage in a 
custody determination, no matter how good a parent he or she may be and how strong his or 
her efforts to care for his or her children may have been. 
The trial court failed to support its award of alimony and child support with adequate 
findings of fact. Instead, the trial court simply awarded Rebekah the amounts she sought for 
alimony and child support, without a critical examination of her needs and Brad's ability to 
pay. 
With respect to the premarital property, the trial court failed to apply consistent 
principles. It recognized that Brad was entitled to premarital credits for retirement accounts, 
but failed to give premarital credits for cash accounts, loans, and other items. The court 
granted a premarital credit of $5,000 to Rebekah for furniture without sufficient evidentiary 
support. 
The trial court applied the statute of limitations to limit Brad's obligation to BB 
Ranchers, without making any findings as to why that statute should apply. Under plain 
language of the statute, since the last charge was made less than four years before Brad 
sought to have the obligation recognized, the statute of limitations does not apply. 
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The trial court also failed to make adequate findings to support the valuation of 
certain assets, including the equity in the premarital home, the van, the jewelry, and the First 
Security checking account. 
Likewise, the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its award 
of attorneys' fees. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rulings on the issues set forth above 
should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for the entry of 
adequate findings of fact. 
With respect to the BB Ranchers' obligations, this court should find, as a matter of 
law, that the statute of limitations does not apply and the full amount of that obligation 
should be considered in computing the value of the marital estate. 
DATED this / 7 day of December, 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034 
ELLEN MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
***** 
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
COURT RULING 
CASE NO. 944901996 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING 
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 14TH DAY OF JUNE 1996. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 





REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146 
2 
OGDEN. UTAH JUNE 14. 1996 11:00 A.M. 
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. LET ME JUST PUT YOU ON 
THE SPEAKER PHONE SO EVERYONE CAN HEAR. CAN YOU HEAR OKAY? 
MS. MAYCOCK: YES. 
MS. DONOVAN: YES. 
MR. DART: WE CAN HEAR FINE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I ASSUME THAT ALL THREE 









THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
ARE THE PARTIES PRESENT OR JUST THE 
YOUR HONOR, DR. BOHMAN IS OUT OF TOWN 
YES. MAYBE YOU DIDN'T HEAR ME. BECKY 
AND WASN'T ABLE TO BE WITH US TODAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. IS MRS. BOHMAN PRESENT? DID 
ANYONE HEAR ME? 
MR. DART: 
BOHMAN IS HERE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THE RECORD MAY SHOW THEN THAT 
MRS. BOHMAN IS PRESENT. DR. BOHMAN IS OUT OF TOWN. THE 
LAWYERS ARE PRESENT IN THEIR OFFICES AND I'M IN MY CHAMBERS 
WITH MY COURT REPORTER AND THE DECISION THAT I'M GIVING IS NOW 
ON THE RECORD. THIS IS A DECISION FROM A CASE THAT I HAVE 
PREVIOUSLY TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
1 THE COURT FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
2 AND DEFENDANT ARE RESIDENTS OF WEBER COUNTY AND WERE SO FOR AT 
3 LEAST THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE DIVORCE 
4 ACTION AND ALSO THE COUNTERCLAIM. THEY WERE MARRIED ON 
5 SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1989. THEY SEPARATED IN THE FALL OF 1994. 
6 COURT FINDS THAT IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES HAVE IRRETRIEVABLY 
7 BROKEN THE MARRIAGE. THE PARTIES ARE GRANTED A MUTUAL DIVORCE 
8 TO BECOME FINAL UPON ENTRY OF THE DECREE. 
9 THE PARTIES ARE THE PARENTS OF THREE CHILDREN: ANGELA, 
10 WHO WAS BORN OCTOBER 30TH, 1981. SHE IS 14 YEARS OF AGE. SHE 
11 IS A CHILD FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S PREVIOUS MARRIAGE; HOWEVER, 
12 DR. BOHMAN ADOPTED HER. THEY HAVE AS ISSUE OF THEIR MARRIAGE 
13 NATURALLY TWO CHILDREN: BRAXTON, WHO WAS BORN APRIL 17TH, 
14 1990 AND IS SIX YEARS OF AGE. BRYSON, WHO WAS BORN JULY 25TH, 
15 1991, WHO IS FOUR. 
16 THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PRIMARILY A HOMEMAKER DURING THE 
17 MARRIAGE. DR. BOHMAN IS AN ANESTHESIOLOGIST. 
18 COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE COURT 
19 CANNOT ORDER JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY IN THIS CASE. COURT FINDS 
20 THAT EACH PARENT HAS STRENGTHS WHICH COMBINED WITH ONE ANOTHER 
21 IN A JOINT CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT, AND THE FLEXIBILITY OF DR. 
22 BOHMAN'S WORK SCHEDULE, WOULD REALLY INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF 
23 THESE CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT FOR JOINT 
24 CUSTODY, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS BEEN 
25 SOMEWHAT TEMPESTUOUS DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT THESE 
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PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN PENDING, HAS BEEN PUNCTUATED BY A 
HISTORY OF UNCOOPERATION AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL 
DECLINE TO MAKE ANY JOINT CUSTODY AWARD. 
ALTHOUGH THIS IS A CLOSE CASE, THE COURT FINDS THAT IT IS 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE BOYS THAT THEY BE AWARDED TO 
THEIR MOTHER. CUSTODY IS SUBJECT TO LIBERAL VISITATION BY DR. 
BOHMAN AS OUTLINED IN PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN PROPOSAL. AND I'M 
SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY OF THE ONE, MISS DONOVAN, THAT YOU 
PREPARED THAT OUTLINES THREE WEEKENDS A MONTH THEY WILL SPEND 
WITH THEIR FATHER. I'M GOING TO ADD TO THAT SOME CHANGES, 
HOWEVER. HE IS ENTITLED TO HAVE 3 0 DAYS OF VISITATION DURING 
THE SUMMER. THOSE CAN BE A STRAIGHT PERIOD OF TIME OR THEY 
CAN BE BROKEN INTO TWO-WEEK INCREMENTS. I DON'T REALLY CARE, 
I'LL LEAVE THAT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE PARTIES AFTER THEY 
RECEIVE THE SOUND ADVICE OF THEIR LAWYERS. HOWEVER, DURING 
THE 3 0 DAYS THAT HE HAS THEM, THEY WILL HAVE RECIPROCAL 
VISITATION ON THE WEEKENDS WITH THEIR MOTHER. IN OTHER WORDS, 
IF HE WERE TO HAVE THEM FOR A MONTH, SHE WILL ALSO HAVE THEM 
THREE WEEKS, THREE WEEKENDS OUT OF THE MONTH. NOW, IF YOU 
DON'T LIKE THAT, YOU CAN DO WHATEVER YOU WANT TO WORK OUT, BUT 
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT, THAT'S WHAT THE COURT WILL 
ORDER. 
WE'VE HAD SEVERAL HEARINGS ON THE ISSUE OF ALLOWING DR. 
BOHMAN LIBERAL VISITATION BY HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH 
THESE CHILDREN WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS OTHER ACTIVITIES GOING. 
1 AND I SENSE THAT THE TWO-HOUR ARRANGEMENT WHERE THEY WOULD 
2 BE -- IF SHE IS GOING TO BE GONE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN 
3 EXCHANGE -- OR BE GONE FOR TWO HOURS OR FOR A PERIOD GREATER 
4 THAN TWO HOURS, THAT HE BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH THEM. 
5 AND MAYBE THAT ISN'T WORKABLE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, I'M NOT 
6 SURE THAT JUST RESTRICTING IT TO AN OVERNIGHT VISITATION WILL 
7 ACCOMPLISH WHAT THE COURT WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE BEST 
8 INTERESTS OF THESE CHILDREN. I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT 
9 THEY NEED TO HAVE A LOT OF CONTACT WITH THEIR FATHER. I THINK 
10 THAT HE LENDS SOME STRENGTHS THAT WILL BE REALIZED ONLY IF HE 
11 CAN HAVE A LOT OF ACCESS TO THEM. AND HIS WORK SCHEDULE, 
12 ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT ERRATIC AT TIMES, STILL HAS LARGE PERIODS OF 
13 TIME WHERE HE CAN SPEND TIME WITH THEM, AND THAT FLEXIBILITY 
14 NEEDS TO BE REALIZED IN HAVING VISITATION. 
15 I AM GOING TO SUGGEST -- AND I'LL HEAR FROM BOTH LAWYERS 
16 RIGHT NOW, NOT EXTENSIVELY, BUT JUST WHETHER THAT'S SOMETHING 
17 THAT YOU THINK YOU CAN WORK WITH OR NOT, BUT I WOULD SUGGEST 
18 THAT MAYBE WE EXPAND THE TWO-HOUR TO A FOUR-HOUR OTHER PARENT 
19 CARE PROVISION. IN OTHER WORDS, IF SHE'S GOING TO BE GONE FOR 
20 A PERIOD OF TIME LONGER THAN FOUR HOURS, AT THAT POINT THEN 
21 SHE MUST FIRST OFFER THE CHILDREN TO HIM RATHER THAN OFFER 
22 THEM TO SURROGATE CARE. 
23 ANY HEARTBURN WITH THAT ON EITHER SIDE? 
24 MS. MAYCOCK: I DON'T HAVE ANY, YOUR HONOR. 
25 THE COURT: MISS DONOVAN? 
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MS. DONOVAN: NO, YOUR HONOR, WE DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM 
WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. LET ME JUST SAY TO YOU, MISS 
BOHMAN, SINCE YOU'RE PRESENT, THAT I WAS DEAD SERIOUS AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE ABOUT OPERATING BY THE GOLDEN RULE. 
THIS WAS A CLOSE CASE. AND I DON'T KNOW THAT IT WAS SO CLOSE 
THAT BY THE SKIN OF YOUR TEETH YOU DID GET CUSTODY, BUT THERE 
WAS ENOUGH GOOD EVIDENCE THAT I HAD TO TAKE SOME CAREFUL 
THOUGHT TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD BE REALLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THESE CHILDREN. AND I BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED TO HAVE A LOT 
OF CONTACT WITH THEIR DAD. AND WHAT I WANT YOU TO DO IS TRY 
TO TREAT HIM THE WAY THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE TREATED HAD I 
AWARDED CUSTODY TO HIM. AND I WANT YOU TO ALWAYS JUST USE 
THAT AS SORT OF A TOUCHSTONE, AND I THINK THAT IF DO YOU THAT, 
THE LIVES OF THESE CHILDREN WILL BE BLESSED. AND I THINK 
THAT'S WHAT'S REALLY AT ISSUE IS WHAT'S IN THEIR BEST 
INTERESTS, NOT IN TERMS OF WHAT WE MIGHT WANT OR WHAT MIGHT BE 
CONVENIENT AND BEST FOR US. 
NOW WITH RESPECT TO ANGELA, I'M GOING TO AWARD JUST 
STANDARD VISITATION TO DR. BOHMAN. BECAUSE OF THE STRAINED 
RELATIONSHIPS THERE, HE WILL PROBABLY JUST HAVE TO WORK OUT 
THAT VISITATION AS HE CAN. BUT I AM REQUESTING, MRS. BOHMAN, 
THAT YOU ENCOURAGE THAT RELATIONSHIP. 
NOW, IN MAKING THESE ORDERS, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY CARE GIVER OF THESE CHILDREN, 
1 ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT HAS CONTRIBUTED MEANINGFULLY, 
2 ESPECIALLY THE LAST FEW YEARS. I FIND THAT THE CHILDREN ARE 
3 DOING WELL AND HAVE ADAPTED TO THEIR SEPARATE HOMES APART FROM 
4 THEIR PARENTS. 
5 I FIND THAT BOTH PARENTS ARE EQUAL OR WOULD BE EQUAL IN 
6 PROMOTING VISITATION AND, THEREFORE, I DON'T SEE ANY ADVANTAGE 
7 ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AS I EVALUATED THAT FACTOR. 
8 I FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO 
9 PROVIDE PERSONAL CARE FOR CHILDREN BECAUSE SHE HAS NO 
10 EMPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH THAT NEEDS TO CHANGE. SHE EITHER NEEDS 
11 TO GO TO SCHOOL OR GET EMPLOYMENT, AND I'LL ADDRESS THAT 
12 LATER. 
13 I FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYMENT ENABLES HIM TO GIVE 
14 GENEROUSLY TO THESE CHILDREN AND, THEREFORE, ON THAT ISSUE 
15 IT'S A SOMEWHAT CLOSE QUESTION. 
16 MISS MAYCOCK, AS I PROMISED YOU, I WOULD LOOK AT THE 
17 EVIDENCE OBJECTIVELY WITHOUT GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF WEIGHT TO 
18 WHO'S HAD THE CHILDREN DURING THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION 
19 PERIOD. AND SO AS I EVALUATED THIS CASE, I SPECIFICALLY HELD 
20 OUT OF THE EQUATION WHAT EFFECT THAT HAD AND CAME TO MY 
21 DECISION INDEPENDENT OF WHO'S HAD THEM SINCE THEY'VE BEEN 
22 SEPARATED, AND BY DOING SO I FOUND THAT IT WAS A CLOSE CASE, 
23 BUT NONETHELESS, THAT THE MOTHER MET MORE OF THE FUNCTION 
24 RELATED FACTORS THAN THE DEFENDANT DID. HOWEVER, ONCE I HAD 
25 PASSED THAT HURDLE AND THEN CONSIDERED THAT SHE HAS HAD THEM 
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DURING THE TIME THAT THESE PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN PENDING, AND 
RECOGNIZING THE VALUE IN NOT BOUNCING THESE CHILDREN BACK AND 
FORTH, BUT IN PROVIDING SOME CONSTANCY IN THEIR LIVES, THEN IT 
MADE VERY GOOD SENSE THAT SHE HAVE CUSTODY OF THESE CHILDREN. 
I FIND THAT THEY ARE HAPPY AND WELL ADJUSTED AND DOING 
VERY WELL. BUT I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
CONTRIBUTED VERY MEANINGFULLY TO THEIR STATE OF EMOTIONAL 
HEALTH AND HAPPINESS. 
I FIND THAT THE STABILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF EACH 
PARENT REALLY MADE THIS CASE CLOSE. THE PLAINTIFF IS LEAVING 
HER FORTH MARRIAGE, ALTHOUGH SHE IS JUST 38 YEARS OF AGE. AND 
ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT SHE'S HAD IN PREVIOUS 
MARRIAGES I SENSE WERE NOT ENTIRELY OF HER OWN MAKING AND 
THERE WERE INSTANCES OF ABUSE AND OTHER PROBLEMS, THAT HIS 
SOMEWHAT MADE HER A VICTIM OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
NONETHELESS, HER HAVING NOW GONE THROUGH FOUR MARRIAGES DOES 
NOT LEND A LOT OF CONSTANCY IN HER LIFE. 
I FIND ALSO THAT SHE DRINKS EXCESSIVELY. AND THERE IS 
ALSO, THEREFORE, THAT POTENTIAL FOR AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE 
CHILDREN. HOWEVER, I FIND NO EVIDENCE OF THAT NEGATIVE 
IMPACT, ALTHOUGH WE COULD CERTAINLY PERHAPS DRAW SOME CONCERNS 
BY JUST A NATURAL INFERENCE. I WOULD JUST POLITELY SUGGEST, 
MRS. BOHMAN, THAT YOU NEED TO PERHAPS CONSIDER YOUR WAYS AND 
EVALUATE WHERE YOU'RE HEADING AND SEE IF THERE IS SOME ROOM 
FOR SOME CORRECTION. 
9 
I ALSO FIND THAT MRS. BOHMAN IS A PROFLIGATE SPENDER. 
THAT THAT WAS PART OF THE PROBLEM IN THE MARRIAGE. AND THAT 
HER EXTRAVAGANT SPENDING CAUSED THE COURT SOME REAL CONCERNS 
ABOUT HER STABILITY AND HER ABILITY TO MANAGE TO STAY ON A 
BUDGET WHERE THINGS ARE GOING TO BE SOMEWHAT LIMITED FOLLOWING 
THIS MARRIAGE. I GIVE AS A EXAMPLE OF HER IMPRUDENT SPENDING 
THAT SHE WENT OUT AND BOUGHT A $13,000 BABY GRAND PIANO AFTER 
THE PARTIES HAD SEPARATED. THAT IS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE. 
ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, I FIND THAT SHE IS A VERY LOVING, 
CARING PARENT WHO REALLY HAS AT HEART THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
HER CHILDREN. AND THAT ALTHOUGH SHE CAN BE DISTRACTED BY A 
LOT OF OTHER ACTIVITIES, THAT FUNDAMENTALLY SHE DEEPLY CARES 
AND LOVES THESE CHILDREN AND WOULD ALSO PUT THEM FIRST. AND 
I, THEREFORE, HAVE EVERY EXPECTATION THAT SHE WILL BE A GOOD 
MOM AND WILL BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE CHILDREN. BUT SHE 
NEEDS TO BE CAUTIOUS IN THE AREAS THAT THE COURT HAS 
IDENTIFIED. 
I FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS MANY STRONG QUALITIES, AND 
THAT HE'S VERY ATTUNED TO EDUCATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN HIS 
CHILDREN'S LIVES. AND THAT HE WILL BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON 
THESE CHILDREN IF HE IS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A LOT OF 
CONTACT SO THAT HE CAN HELP THEM WITH THEIR HOMEWORK, MONITOR 
THEIR GRADES, AND PROVIDE JUST GOOD FUNDAMENTAL MOTIVATION. 
I FIND THAT HE IS A VERY MATURE, STABLE PARENT WHO WILL 
PROVIDE A LOT OF CONSTANCY AND CONSISTENCY. HE HAS A STRONG 
10 
1 PERSONALITY AND CAN SOMETIMES BE CONTROLLING, BUT THERE IS NO 
2 EVIDENCE THAT THAT HAS REDOUNDED TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE 
3 CHILDREN. 
4 I FIND THAT ANGELA WANTS TO LIVE WITH HER MOTHER AND THAT 
5 THE DEFENDANT ACCEPTS THIS. THE BOYS ARE TOO YOUNG TO DECIDE 
6 WHERE THEY WANT TO LIVE. 
7 I FIND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY AND 
8 EMOTIONAL SUPPORT OF THESE BOYS, HAVING JUST GONE THROUGH A 
9 SEPARATION FROM THEIR PARENTS OR FROM THEIR PARENTS LIVING 
10 TOGETHER, THAT THEY ALSO LIVE TOGETHER WITH ONE ANOTHER AND 
11 THAT THEY ALSO LIVE WITH ANGELA. THAT APART FROM THE TENSION 
12 THAT THEY MIGHT SENSE EXISTS BETWEEN THEIR PARENTS, THAT 
13 ANGELA WOULD PROVIDE SOME STABILITY AND EMOTIONAL SECURITY. 
14 AND THAT IS ANOTHER REASON WHY I FEEL THAT IT'S IMPORTANT THAT 
15 THEY GO WITH THEIR MOTHER. THAT IS, I'M SPEAKING OF THE BOYS. 
16 THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A STRONG BOND BETWEEN THE CHILDREN 
17 AND BOTH PARENTS, ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFF IS THE PRIMARY 
18 PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT, ACCORDING TO DR. JOHNSON. 
19 I FIND THAT BOTH PARENTS ARE EQUAL IN MORAL CHARACTER. 
20 THE DEFENDANT WILL IN THE LONG RUN OFFER A MORE STABLE 
21 FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT THAN WILL THE PLAINTIFF, BUT WITH CHILD 
22 SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND THE INCOME THAT SHE WILL EVENTUALLY BE 
23 ABLE TO EARN, SHE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATELY FOR THE 
24 CARE OF THE CHILDREN AND, THEREFORE, THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE. 
25 IN CONCLUSION OF THIS POINT ON CUSTODY, AND DESPITE 
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1 WHATEVER SLANTS THERE WERE ON THE EVIDENCE PORTRAYED BY EACH 
2 PARTY, I FOUND THAT THIS CASE BOILED DOWN TO A CHOICE BETWEEN 
3 A VERY GOOD PARENT AND ONE WHO WAS JUST SLIGHTLY BETTER. AND 
4 AGAIN, I WOULD JUST COUNSEL BOTH PARTIES TO FORGET THEMSELVES 
5 AND ALWAYS ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. I WOULD 
6 ENCOURAGE THE PLAINTIFF TO LIVE IN THE SAME SCHOOL DISTRICT AS 
7 THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE I THINK IT WILL FACILITATE THIS LIBERAL 
8 VISITATION THAT THE COURT IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT. AND I 
9 THINK THAT IT DEMONSTRATES AN EFFORT TO PUT THE NEEDS OF THE 
10 CHILDREN AHEAD OF THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES. 
11 I WILL ENTER AN ORDER THAT MRS. BOHMAN WILL NOT LEAVE THE 
12 AREA BEYOND 150 MILES WITHOUT GIVING REASONABLE NOTICE TO DR. 
13 BOHMAN. 
14 NOW, WITH RESPECT TO INCOME, THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES 
15 THAT THE DEFENDANT EARNS APPROXIMATELY $278,000 A YEAR, 
16 PRIMARILY ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS HISTORICAL INCOME. ALTHOUGH 
17 THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT REMUNERATION FOR PHYSICIANS MAY BE 
18 CHANGING, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THAT IMPACTS DR. BOHMAN. 
19 COURT FEELS THAT IT IS JUST TOO SPECULATIVE FOR THE COURT TO 
20 DEAL WITH THAT ISSUE AT THIS POINT. THE DEFENDANT CAN MOVE TO 
21 MODIFY LATER IF HIS DIRE PREDICTIONS COME TRUE. 
22 COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO INCOME, THOUGH 
23 SHE'S ACQUIRED TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
24 COURT HAS NO IDEA WHETHER SHE CAN IMPROVE HER PLACE IN THE 
25 MARKET, IN THE JOB MARKET WHEN --IF SHE WERE TO RETURN TO 
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EMPLOYMENT. BEFORE SHE MARRIED DR. BOHMAN, HER HIGHEST WAGE, 
AS I RECALL, WAS ABOUT FIVE DOLLARS AN HOUR. I HAVE NO IDEA 
WHETHER SHE CAN EARN MORE THAN THAT OR NOT. GIVEN THE SMALL 
AGES OF THE CHILDREN AND WHAT I WOULD SENSE WOULD BE A MUTUAL 
CARING THAT THEY BE NURTURED PROPERLY, IT MAY NOT BE IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF MRS. BOHMAN TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO WORK, 
ALTHOUGH I THINK THE LAW PROBABLY WOULD REQUIRE THAT. I THINK 
IT MIGHT MAKE SOME SENSE FOR HER TO ASSIDUOUSLY PURSUE HER 
STUDIES AND FINISH COLLEGE SO THAT SHE IN THE LONG RUN CAN 
IMPROVE HER STATION. 
THE COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT THE ALIMONY THAT THE COURT IS 
GOING TO AWARD WON'T LAST VERY LONG. 
WITH RESPECT TO CHILD SUPPORT, BASED ON THE DEFENDANT'S 
INCOME, I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE THAT HE PAY THE 
PLAINTIFF CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000 PER MONTH FOR 
EACH OF THE THREE CHILDREN FOR A TOTAL OF $3,000. THAT SUM IS 
PAYABLE ONE-HALF ON THE 5TH AND ONE-HALF ON THE 20TH OF EACH 
MONTH UNLESS THE PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE OTHERWISE. 
AS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, HE SHALL PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE 
SO LONG AS SAME IS AVAILABLE THROUGH HIS EMPLOYMENT. EACH 
PARTY SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-HALF OF THE UNINSURED 
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES, EXCEPT ROUTINE OFFICE VISITS 
WHICH SHALL REMAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
PLAINTIFF SHALL NOT INCUR ANY NON EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY 
MEDICAL EXPENSES -- THAT'S MEDICAL, ORTHODONTIA, COUNSELING, 
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1 SO FORTH -- WITHOUT GIVING THE DEFENDANT NOTICE AND AN 
2 OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD FIRST. THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE 
3 RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-HALF OF THE WORK RELATED OR EDUCATION 
4 RELATED DAY CARE EXPENSES, AND SHALL SUBMIT TO THE DEFENDANT 
5 SATISFACTORY PROOF OF THOSE EXPENSES. 
6 THE DEFENDANT SHALL MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE FOR THE 
7 BENEFIT OF THE CHILDREN IN AN AMOUNT NOT LESS THAN WHAT WOULD 
8 BE SUFFICIENT AT THAT TIME TO SEE THAT SUPPORT IS MAINTAINED 
9 FOR THE CHILDREN AT THE RATE THROUGH THEIR MAJORITY. 
10 WAS THAT CLEAR? 
11 MS. MAYCOCK: YES. 
12 THE COURT: OKAY. WITH RESPECT TO ALIMONY, COURT 
13 FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF -- I STRUGGLED WITH THIS ONE, 
14 FRANKLY, AND I WORKED ON THIS LAST NIGHT AT HOME, MOST OF THIS 
15 DECISION, AND I COULDN'T FIND AN EXHIBIT, BUT CONCLUDED AS 
16 BEST I COULD FROM MY NOTES AND MY RECOLLECTION THAT HER 
17 STANDARD OF LIVING WAS MOSTLY ARRIVED AT THROUGH THE ONE 
18 BUDGET THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AN ACCOUNTANT AND BY WHAT 
19- HAD SEEMED TO BE THE PARTIES' PRESENT STANDARD OF LIVING. 
20 BASED ON THAT, I FOUND THAT BASED ON HER REASONABLE NEEDS, 
21 THAT I INFERRED FROM THOSE THINGS THAT -- AND CONSISTENT WITH 
22 WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE PARTIES IN 
23 THE PAST, THAT SHE HAD REASONABLE MONTHLY NEEDS OF $7,225. I 
24 FIND THAT SHE PRESENTLY HAS ONLY A LIMITED ABILITY TO 
25 CONTRIBUTE BECAUSE OF HER UNEMPLOYMENT WITH NO SIGNIFICANT 
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1 WORK HISTORY. HER LAST GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE MARRIAGE 
2 GAVE HER FIVE DOLLARS AN HOUR. SHE HAS TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE, 
3 AND OUGHT TO CONTINUE HER STUDIES BECAUSE THE AWARD OF ALIMONY 
4 THE COURT IS GOING TO AWARD WILL BE BRIEF. BECAUSE OF THE 
5 TENDER YEARS OF THE CHILDREN AND THE INTEREST THAT I THINK 
6 THAT EACH PARTY HAS IN SEEING THAT THEY ARE NURTURED PROPERLY, 
7 AND IN CONSIDERING THE EXPENSES OF WORK, ADDITIONAL CLOTHING, 
8 DAY CARE, IT MAY NOT BE HIGHLY PROFITABLE FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO 
9 WORK, ALTHOUGH THE COURT IS GOING TO ORDER THAT SHE OBTAIN 
10 EMPLOYMENT OR GO TO SCHOOL. AND AT SUCH TIME AS EITHER OF 
11 THOSE CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE, MATERIAL CHANGE OF 
12 CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT WILL BE WILLING TO TAKE A LOOK AGAIN 
13 AT ALIMONY. 
14 THE COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT IT WAS DISAPPOINTED DURING 
15 THE TRIAL THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID 
16 ANYTHING THIS PAST YEAR OR SO WHILE THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING 
17 WAS PENDING TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT OR TO GO TO SCHOOL. IT WAS 
18 MY OPINION THIS WAS SOMEWHAT SHORTSIGHTED BECAUSE EVEN WITH 
19 THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, THAT WON'T LAST VERY LONG, AND WHEN IT 
20 CHANGES, THERE WILL BE A DRAMATIC ADJUSTMENT, NOT ONLY IN HER 
21 LIFE, BUT IN THE LIVES OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE INEVITABLY SOME 
22 OF THE MONEY THAT WILL BE GIVEN FOR ALIMONY INDIRECTLY 
23 BENEFITS THE CHILDREN. 
24 THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S REASONABLE LIVING 
25 EXPENSES ARE APPROXIMATELY BETWEEN EIGHTY-FIVE TO EIGHTY-NINE 
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HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH, PROBABLY -- EXCUSE ME, EIGHTY-THREE 
HUNDRED TO EIGHTY-NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH, AND PROBABLY 
MORE CLOSE TO THE $8,300. AFTER MAKING ADJUSTMENTS FOR TAXES, 
CHILD SUPPORT, PROJECTED ALIMONY -- EXCUSE ME, MY NOTES ARE SO 
TERSE AND I GUESS I WAS GETTING TIRED LAST NIGHT. 
MR. DART: YOU TAKE YOUR TIME, YOUR HONOR. YOU 
GAVE US ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD. 
MS. MAYCOCK: THAT'S THE TRUTH. 
THE COURT: I KNOW WHAT I WANTED TO SAY. AFTER I 
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT I ANTICIPATED HIS TAXES TO BE, 
WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT --OR 
ALIMONY AND DEDUCTING ALSO THE CHILD SUPPORT, I CONCLUDE THAT 
HE CAN MEET THE NEEDS THAT -- THE REASONABLE LIVING NEEDS THAT 
I'VE IDENTIFIED FROM HIS SALARY OF $278. IN SHORT, I GUESS 
WHAT I'M SAYING IS I THINK THERE'S ENOUGH TO GO AROUND. AND 
THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR $4,225 A MONTH ALIMONY 
IS GRANTED. THAT'S ESSENTIALLY HOW I ALSO I ARRIVED AT THAT 
SINCE THERE WAS NOT THE SAME KIND OF PRECISE BUDGET THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAD PREPARED. AND I WILL ORDER THAT THAT $4,225 A 
MONTH BE PAID ONE-HALF ON THE 5TH, ONE-HALF ON THE 20TH UNLESS 
THE PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE OTHERWISE. 
I BELIEVE THAT THIS SUPPORT LEVEL SHOULD GENERALLY 
EQUALIZE THE STANDARD OF LIVING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE 
EXTENT THAT THAT CAN EVER OCCUR AFTER A DIVORCE. 
THIS AWARD OF ALIMONY SHALL TERMINATE ON JUNE 1ST, 2 001 
16 
UNLESS TERMINATED SOONER BY OPERATION OF LAW OR THE DEATH OF 
EITHER PARTY. 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE IN A FACE 
AMOUNT THAT IS EQUAL TO HIS REMAINING OBLIGATION AT ANY TIME 
TO THE PLAINTIFF. SO THAT EACH YEAR HE COULD REDUCE THE 
AMOUNT OF HIS INSURANCE IF HE WANTED TO. I WANT TO MAKE SURE 
THAT THIS OBLIGATION IS TAKEN CARE OF. I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT 
SORTS OUT, MR. DART, FRANKLY, FROM A TAX CONSEQUENCE BECAUSE I 
THINK ONE OF THE I.R.S. CONDITIONS OF ALIMONY IS THAT IT BE 
TERMINABLE UPON THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY. AND I HAD SOME 
CONCERNS LAST NIGHT AS I WAS THINKING THAT THROUGH THAT THAT 
PERHAPS BY PROVIDING INSURANCE, YOU MAY HAVE UNWITTINGLY 
CREATED OR -- CREATED A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT INSTEAD OF AN 
ALIMONY AWARD, BUT I'LL LET YOU AND YOUR ACCOUNTANT WORRY 
ABOUT THAT. YOU REQUESTED IT, AND I'VE DONE THIS A FEW TIMES 
AND I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS IN ORDERING IT, BUT THERE MAY BE 
THAT TAX CONSEQUENCE. 
MR. DART: IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS NOT --
THE INSURANCE IS NOT DEDUCTIBLE BY HIM, IT'S NOT TAXABLE TO 
HER UPON --IN THE EVENT OF DEATH THAT THE PROCEEDS MAY COME 
TO HER AGAIN NON TAXABLE. THINK THAT WOULD BE I.R.S. 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) RAISES IT. 
THE COURT: YEAH, I THINK THAT'S RIGHT. 
MS. MAYCOCK: I THINK WE CAN STILL PROVIDE THAT 
ALIMONY TERMINATES ON HIS DEATH AND HAVE THE LIFE INSURANCE --
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1 OR ON HER DEATH, I SHOULD'SAY, YEAH, HIS DEATH AND HAVE THE 
2 LIFE INSURANCE A SEPARATE MATTER, AND THEN THAT'S SORT OF THE 
3 MAGIC WORD FOR I.R.S. PURPOSES. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. I WOULD AGREE WITH THAT, ELLEN, 
5 IT'S A GOOD POINT. AS I'VE MENTIONED BEFORE, IF THE PLAINTIFF 
6 OBTAINS SIGNIFICANT EMPLOYMENT, THEN AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY CAN 
7 BE REVIEWED, AND YOU ALL UNDERSTAND THAT. IN ANY EVENT, IN 
8 TWO TO THREE YEARS, THE YOUNGEST CHILD WILL BE IN SCHOOL. I 
9 DON'T SEE ANY POINT THEN WHY THERE CAN'T BE SOME AGGRESSIVE 
10 EMPLOYMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF IN ADVANCE OF THAT FIVE-YEAR 
11 PERIOD OF ALIMONY THAT I'VE AWARDED. BUT IN ANY EVENT, THAT 
12 CAN BE REVIEWED, THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY CAN BE REVIEWED BEFORE 
13 THE EXPIRATION OF THE FIVE YEARS IF THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
14 MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
15 NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY, AND I APPRECIATED OUR 
16 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE THIS MORNING BECAUSE IT -- I STRUGGLED 
17 JUST MIGHTILY LAST NIGHT AND -- BUT I FOUND OUT THAT I DIDN'T 
18 PACK HOME ALL OF MY COURTESY COPIES, AND AFTER WE SPOKE, I 
19 DISCOVERED IN THE STACK OF THE COURT'S EXHIBITS THE DOCUMENT 
20 THAT I WAS LOOKING FOR. AS WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THESE I.R.A. 
21 ROLLOVERS AND THE I.R.A. CONTRIBUTORY ACCOUNTS I SENSED THAT 
22 THERE WAS NOT ANY CONTEST ABOUT THOSE AMOUNTS, AND YET I 
23 COULDN'T GLEAN FROM SOME OF THE EXHIBITS, THAT I'D MADE A LOTS 
24 NOTES AND COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY, AND I WAS JUST LOST, BUT 
25 WHAT I FOUND THAT I DIDN'T HAVE LAST NIGHT AND I DISCOVERED 
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1 AFTER WE SPOKE WAS EXHIBIT P-75. ON MY EXHIBIT AT HOME IT WAS 
2 ORIGINALLY CALLED P-77, AND I COULDN'T FIND IT. AND I DIDN'T 
3 HAVE P-75 EITHER, BUT ONCE I HAD THAT, THEN WITH MY NOTES THEN 
4 A LOT OF THINGS FELL INTO PLACE. AND SO LET ME JUST GO 
5 THROUGH AND NOW ADDRESS THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS, AND I'LL BEGIN, 
6 FIRST OF ALL, WITH THE PREMARITAL PROPERTY THAT I'M GOING TO 
7 AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN. 
8 FIRST OF ALL, I FIND THAT THE KEY BANK AND THE FIDELITY 
9 INCOME TRUST WERE CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE. THOSE 
10 ACCOUNTS WERE TAKEN FROM AND PUT INTO THE FAMILY INCOME STREAM 
11 AND JUST USED. IT'S CONSUMED, IT'S GONE. 
12 I FIND THAT 40,000 OF THE ROSS PROPERTY IS A PROPER -- A 
13 PROPER PREMARITAL ASSET. 
14 I FIND THAT THE I.R.A. ROLLOVER ACCOUNT OF 131,481 IS A 
15 PROPER PREMARITAL ASSET. LIKEWISE, THE I.R.A. CONTRIBUTORY 
16 ACCOUNT OF 74,197, AND THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN PENSION PLAN OF 
17 30,000. 
18 I FIND THAT THE JEEP CHEROKEE IS GONE. 
19 THE CASH IN THE BUSINESS THAT WAS IDENTIFIED OF 35,901 IS 
20 GONE. 
21 AND THAT THE LOAN THAT BRENT BOHMAN PAID HIS BROTHER 
22 DURING THE MARRIAGE IS ALSO GONE. AND LIKEWISE, THE LOAN TO 
23 REBEKAH BOHMAN. AND I THINK YOU'RE BOTH IN AGREEMENT ON THAT. 
24 WITH RESPECT TO THE PREMARITAL PROPERTY THAT NEVER 
25 CHANGED IN TERMS OF CHARACTERISTICS, THE WINETOU -- LET ME 
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JUST -- I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY REAL ISSUE ON ANY OF THAT. 
I THINK YOU'RE ALL IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION 
OF TWO THINGS, AND ONE WAS THE BUSINESS INTEREST IN THE ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN ANESTHESIOLOGY. THAT WAS THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, 
AND THERE WAS A DISPUTE OVER WHAT COLLECTION RATE WOULD BE 
APPLICABLE, AND I FIND THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
INDICATES THAT IN 1989 IT WAS 80 PERCENT AND THAT TODAY IT IS 
60 PERCENT. SO THAT WILL CHANGE THAT 347 FIGURE THAT WAS ON 
EXHIBIT P-75. NO, EXCUSE ME, IT WON'T. IT REMAINS THE SAME. 
I THINK YOU COMPUTED THAT AT THE 80 PERCENT AS I LOOK AT THIS 
EXHIBIT. 
I FIND THAT THE -- OH, WHAT DID I DO WITH THE JEEP 
CHEROKEE? I MADE A NOTE ON ANOTHER EXHIBIT. ANYWAY, I GIVE 
THAT -- AND I'LL ADDRESS THIS LATER, BUT I RECOGNIZE THAT JEEP 
CHEROKEE AS A PREMARITAL ASSET. SO THAT WILL CHANGE THAT 
FIGURE OF 347,678 BY THE AMOUNT OF THAT AND I'LL GIVE YOU THAT 
FIGURE IN A MINUTE. 
NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE REST OF THE ASSETS, I FIND THAT 
THE HOME HAS A VALUE OF $534 -- OR EXCUSE ME, $534,000. AND 
THERE WAS DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO APPRAISALS, BUT THE ONE 
APPRAISAL DID NOT INCLUDE ANOTHER BATHROOM, AND I FELT THAT 
THE BETTER EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE HOME WAS WORTH THE GREATER 
FIGURE. I AWARD THAT HOME TO DR. BOHMAN. AND THE REASON THAT 
I DO THAT IS THAT I THINK THAT IN THE LONG RUN, THE PLAINTIFF 
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT. FOR THE NEXT 
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FIVE YEARS THAT SHE CAN, BUT I THINK IT'S HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT 
AFTER FIVE YEARS THAT SHE WILL BE ABLE TO AFFORD THIS HOME AND 
SHE'LL END UP HAVING TO SELL IT, ANYWAY. AND SO AT THAT 
POINT, THE CHILDREN'S LIVES ARE GOING TO BE DISRUPTED ANYWAY. 
AND THEY'RE ONLY GOING TO BE OLDER AND MORE CEMENTED IN THEIR 
FRIENDSHIPS, AND I THINK IT IS JUST GOING TO CAUSE A TURMOIL 
AT THAT TIME. 
I ALSO FIND THAT SINCE THEY'VE BEEN SEPARATED, SHE'S HAD 
SOME DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THE MORTGAGE CURRENT. AS I'VE 
MENTIONED ALSO, I FIND THAT SHE IS EXTRAVAGANT IN HER SPENDING 
AND THIS PUTS AT RISK HER MEETING THIS OBLIGATION. AND THERE 
IS NO WAY THIS HOME CAN BE REFINANCED TO REMOVE DR. BOHMAN'S 
LIABILITY. AND THEREFORE, NOTWITHSTANDING PAYING ALIMONY AND 
CHILD SUPPORT, HE MAY HAVE TO STEP IN TO TAKE CARE THAT 
OBLIGATION FROM TIME TO TIME, IS THE COURT'S CONCERN, AND THAT 
JUST WOULDN'T BE FAIR. 
I ALSO FIND THAT BASED ON THE LIBERAL VISITATION THAT THE 
COURT CONTEMPLATES, THE CHILDREN ARE GOING TO ENJOY THE HOME A 
GREAT DEAL ANYWAY BECAUSE THEY'LL BE SPENDING A LOT OF TIME 
WITH HIM, AND THAT THAT ADDS TO THE STABILITY OF THAT 
RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM OF RETURNING TO THAT HOME. 
SO ON THAT SIDE OF THE EQUATION, HE WILL RECEIVE $187,635 
IN EQUITY. 
HE OF COURSE IS AWARDED HIS INTEREST IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ANESTHESIOLOGY, INC. 
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THE COURT -- NOW, I'M GOING TO JUST MAKE SOME ARBITRARY 
ASSIGNMENTS, BUT IT MIGHT MAKE SENSE ON A FEW OF THESE TO MOVE 
THEM BACK AND FORTH IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE EQUATION BECAUSE I 
HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO GO THROUGH AND BALANCE THIS OUT. I AM 
JUST GOING MAKE SOME FINDINGS AND I THINK WE'VE GOT ENOUGH 
EQUITY IN THE CHARLES SCHWAB ACCOUNT AND IN THE FIDELITY 
U.S.A. ACCOUNT THAT YOU CAN JUST DO SOME ADJUSTING WITH SOME 
OF THOSE FUNDS TO ULTIMATELY EQUALIZE THE MARITAL ESTATE, 
WHICH IS MY OBJECTIVE. BUT IN ANY EVENT, I'M GOING TO GIVE 
HIM THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES, WHICH I FIND TO BE $93,349. 
ALSO THE BALANCE SHEET ASSETS ON THE 1994 TAX RETURN OF 
$2,798. AND THE W.N.C. TAX CREDIT OF $12,784. 
NOW, IF YOU WANT IT PUT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
EQUATION, IN MY MIND IT SEEMS TO ME I MAY HAVE SEEN THAT 
SOMEPLACE THAT WAY, BUT THAT'S UP TO YOU. 
I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN OF COURSE THE BOHMAN RANCH AND B.B. 
RANCHERS. 
I WILL LET THE PARTIES BID ON THE HOUSEBOAT, AND THE 
HIGHEST BIDDER CAN TAKE IT. BUT IT STRUCK ME RATHER FORCIBLY 
THAT IF THE PARTIES -- WELL, I DON'T WANT TO PUT IT THAT WAY 
BECAUSE IT SOUNDS PEJORATIVE, BUT THIS IS A WONDERFUL 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THESE KIDS TO USE THAT HOUSEBOAT, AND THIS IS 
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO GO DOWN WITH BOTH PARENTS AND ENJOY 
THAT HOUSEBOAT. OUR FAMILY HAS HAD A CONDOMINIUM UP IN BEAR 
LAKE FOR A LOT OF YEARS THAT WE'VE JUST ABSOLUTELY LOVED, AND 
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1 AS THE CHILDREN HAVE BEEN REARED, WE HAVE SO MANY FOND 
2 MEMORIES OF THAT, AND I SUSPECT THAT THOSE CHILDREN CAN HAVE 
3 THOSE SAME FOND MEMORIES IF THIS INTEREST IN THE HOUSEBOAT IS 
4 SHARED AND EXPENSES ARE SHARED. AND THAT WAY, THEY HAVE AN 
5 OPPORTUNITY TO GO TO LAKE POWELL ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION 
6 PERHAPS WITH BOTH PARENTS AT SEPARATE OCCASIONS OF COURSE AND, 
7 THEREFORE, ENJOY THAT EXPERIENCE WITH THAT ASSET. SO JUST AS 
8 A SUGGESTION ONLY, IT WOULD BE THAT YOU SHARE THE INTEREST IN 
9 THAT HOUSEBOAT AND ITS EXPENSES. 
10 COURT FINDS THAT THE MARITAL ASSET IN THE CHARLES SCHWAB 
11 ACCOUNT IS $87,267 ON EACH SIDE OF THE EQUATION. AND YOU MAY 
12 HAVE TO ADJUST THAT A LITTLE BIT TO MAKE THAT EQUITABLE. 
13 I FIND THAT THE FIDELITY IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST IS NOT 
14 A MARITAL ASSET. IT'S AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST. HE HAS NO 
15 CONTROL OVER IT AND, THEREFORE, IT IS NOT PART OF HIS ESTATE. 
16 AND IT IS NOT A MARITAL ASSET. 
17 I'M GOING TO CONFESS THAT BASED ON MY NOTES AND MY 
18 RECOLLECTION THAT I CAN'T TELL YOU WHAT THE VALUE IS OF THE 
19 FIDELITY -- OH, JUST A SECOND. WELL, NO, I THINK THERE IS 
2 0 STILL A DIFFERENCE. YEAH, THERE IS. I'M LOOKING AT THE 
21 FIDELITY U.S.A. ACCOUNT AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
22 EVIDENCE WAS THAT IT WAS $198,974. AND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
23 FELT THE ACCOUNT WAS 180,960. AND I'LL JUST FLATLY CONFESS TO 
24 BOTH OF YOU, I CAN'T RESOLVE THAT BECAUSE I JUST DON'T HAVE 
25 ENOUGH DETAIL ON THE ANNOTATIONS I MADE ON THE EXHIBITS AND IN 
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1 LOOKING AT MY TRIAL NOTES AT THIS POINT IN TIME TO HELP YOU. 
2 AND IF YOU WANT TO BOTH REFRESH MY MEMORY, I'LL DO MY BEST TO 
3 GIVE A FAIR RULING. 
4 MR. DART: I'LL BE GLAD TO DO THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
5 OUR FIGURE WAS TAKEN FROM THE LAST MONTHLY STATEMENT ON THAT 
6 ACCOUNT. 
7 THE COURT: IN MARCH? 
8II MR. DART: YEAH. FOLLOWING THAT STATEMENT, THE 
9 DOCTOR HAD DRAWN ON THE ACCOUNT AND AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
10 TESTIFIED THAT IT HAD THE BALANCE SHOWN ON THEIR EXHIBIT. OUR 
11 ARGUMENT WAS THAT WITH HIS INCOME STREAM, HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
12 ABLE TO COVER DEBT WITHOUT REDUCING THAT ACCOUNT. THEIR 
13 ARGUMENT WAS THAT HE HAD TO MEET DEBT, AND THAT IT WAS 
14 APPROPRIATE TO DRAW DOWN. SO THE DIFFERENCE IS ONE FIGURE IS 
15 THE LAST MONTHLY STATEMENT. THE ONE IS THE DATE OF THE TRIAL. 
16 THE QUESTION --
17 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
18 MR. DART: -- IS WHETHER THE DRAW DOWN IS 
19 APPROPRIATE OR NOT APPROPRIATE. 
2 0 THE COURT: YEAH, I REMEMBER THAT NOW, AND I'M GOING 
21 TO RULE THAT -- AND DO SO I THINK ON THE STRENGTH OF CASE LAW 
22 THAT SAYS I MUST VALUE ASSETS AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE, AND 
23 I WAS NOT IMPRESSED AT THE TIME THAT THIS WAS AN IMPROPER USE 
24 OF THOSE FUNDS. I THINK THE PLAINTIFF RECEIVED A VERY 
25 GENEROUS SUPPORT ORDER, AND SO I WILL ADOPT THE 180,960. 
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YOU'LL SHARE THAT EQUALLY OR ALLOCATE THE FUNDS IN A WAY, 
AGAIN, THAT CAN BE KIND OF A FLOATER, A FLOATING EQUALIZER. 
NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE BANK ACCOUNTS, I FIND THAT THE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK ACCOUNT IS $23,687, AND I'LL AWARD THAT TO 
HIM. IN OTHER WORDS, I'M NOT ADOPTING THE $19,854. SHE HAS 
ON HER SIDE OF THE EQUATION THE WEBER STATE CREDIT UNION 
ACCOUNT. THE CHILDREN HAVE THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS THAT ARE 
IDENTIFIED ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 13-A. I FIND THAT THE AUDI 
VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH IN HIS NAME, WAS PURCHASED WITH HIS OWN 
MONEY, AND THAT HE THEN GAVE IT TO THE CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE 
FOR THE JEEP AND IT, THEREFORE, BELONGS TO ROCKY MOUNTAIN. 
IT'S NOT A MARITAL ASSET. 
I FIND THAT THE PORSCHE CABARET IS A MARITAL ASSET. 
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS TESTIMONY THAT IT WAS GIVEN TO HER AS A 
GIFT, A LOT OF TIMES PEOPLE IN MARRIAGE BUY THINGS THAT ARE 
ALSO NEEDED FOR THE FAMILY AND JUST COINCIDE THOSE THINGS WITH 
GIFTS AS BIRTHDAYS AND CHRISTMASSES AND THINGS. BUT THAT IS 
SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL ASSET THAT IT WOULD BE IMPROPER IN THE 
COURT'S VIEW TO JUST SAY THAT THAT'S JUST HERS. SO IF SHE 
WANTS IT, AND I THINK SHE DOES, SHE HAS FORTY-THREE THOUSAND 
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ON HER SIDE OF THE EQUATION. 
MR. DART: THAT FIGURE AGAIN IS WHAT, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: $43,225. IF I'M MISTAKEN ON THAT, LET 
ME KNOW, BUT I THINK THAT'S WHAT I PICKED UP OUT OF MY NOTES 
OR OFF ONE OF THE EXHIBITS. 
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1 MS. MAYCOCK: THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 THE COURT: THE 1980 PORSCHE IS HIS. IT WAS 
3 PREMARITAL PROPERTY. THE 1989 JEEP BELONGS TO -- BOY, I HAVE 
4 EXCLUDED THAT FROM THE EQUATION, BUT I DIDN'T FOLLOW THROUGH 
5 AND MAKE A NOTE ON THAT. I MAY HAVE TO COME BACK TO THAT, BUT 
6 ANYWAY, I DELETED THAT. MY THINKING IS THAT THAT IS A 
7 PREMARITAL ASSET. 
8 I FIND THAT THE 1992 G.M.C. VAN HAS A VALUE OF $14,691 
9 BASED ON THE AVERAGE N.A.D.A. AND THE EXTRAS THAT WERE 
10 IDENTIFIED. 
11 I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN THE POLARIS SNOWMOBILES HAVING A 
12 VALUE OF $2,500 AND THE SNOWMOBILE TRAILER HAVING A VALUE OF A 
13 THOUSAND. 
14 MRS. BOHMAN IS AWARDED THE HORSE TRAILER FOR 4,000. 
15 WE RESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS. 
16 I ASSUME YOU'VE WORKED THAT OUT? 
17 MR. DART: WE HAVE NOT, YOUR HONOR. WE IN ALL 
18 CANDOR HAVE BEEN TO A POINT WHERE OTHER CASES INTERVENED AND 
19 WE'VE HAD SOME COMMUNICATION, BUT THAT'S STILL AN OPEN ITEM. 
2 0 IT'S ONE THAT I REQUEST THAT WE BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
21 WORK OUT AND IF NEED BE, WE CAN COME BACK BEFORE THE COURT 
22 AGAIN ON IT. BUT I THINK UNLESS THE COURT WANTS TO GIVE US 
23 GUIDANCE HERE TODAY --
24 THE COURT: I DON'T. IN FACT, YOU KNOW, THIS WHO IS 
25 GETTING THE HOME MIGHT FACILITATE SOME OF THAT. MRS. BOHMAN'S 
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GOING TO HAVE A FAIR AMOUNT OF EQUITY, YOU KNOW, CASH THAT SHE 
CAN GO OUT AND BUY A NEW HOME. IT MAY BE THAT SHE WILL BUY 
SOMETHING THAT IN THE LONG RUN MIGHT BE MORE AFFORDABLE AND 
THAT MIGHT DICTATE SOMEWHAT WHAT SHE WANTS TO BUY BY WAY OF 
FURNITURE. SHE MAY AT THAT POINT NOT WANT SOME OF THE THINGS 
OUT OF HOUSE. SHE MAY WANT SOMETHING THAT MIGHT JUST BE MORE 
SUITABLE FOR WHAT SHE'S GOING TO BUY. 
MS. MAYCOCK: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REQUEST THAT WE GIVE 
OURSELVES SOME KIND OF DEADLINE TO DEAL WITH THIS OR GET BACK 
IN FRONT OF THE COURT SO WE DON'T JUST DRIFT WITH IT. 
THE COURT: WHAT WOULD YOU RECOMMEND, ELLEN? 
MS. MAYCOCK: BERT, CAN WE DO THAT WITHIN THE NEXT 20 
DAYS? 
MR. DART: YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. OKAY. THAT WOULD BE GREAT, AND I 
SHOULD BE BACK FROM VACATION BY THAT TIME AND BE IN. IF YOU 
NEED SOME HELP, WE COULD PERHAPS GET TO IT. 
MS. MAYCOCK: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: I ASSUME ART IS INCLUDED IN THE SAME 
CATEGORY AS THE FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS? 
MS. MAYCOCK: I THINK THE ART WAS ALMOST ALL BRAD'S 
PREMARITAL PROPERTY, AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S DISPUTED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I DON'T HAVE MUCH ON THAT. AND 
REALLY DIDN'T KNOW. THERE WERE NO VALUES THAT WERE ASSIGNED 
TO ANY OF THAT AND MAYBE THAT'S WHY. ALL RIGHT. 
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1 MR. DART: AGAIN, IF WE CAN'T (UNINTELLIGIBLE) SAME 
2 CATEGORY. MY RECALL IS SOME OF THE ART IS MARITAL AND THERE 
3 WAS SOME DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER SOME WAS MARITAL, PREMARITAL, 
4 SO LIKE THE FURNITURE BE LEFT AN OPEN ITEM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE JEWELRY, 
6 THIS IS JUST A JUDGMENT CALL, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A 
7 WEDDING RING WHICH IS -- OR AN ENGAGEMENT RING, WHICH IS 
8 USUALLY THE MOST VALUABLE RING, IS A GIFT CONDITIONED UPON 
9 MARRIAGE. AND ONCE THE CONDITION HAS BEEN SATISFIED, I THINK 
10 THAT GIFT BECOMES ABSOLUTE. AND FOR THAT REASON, I'M GOING TO 
11 GIVE HER ABSOLUTELY THE VALUE OF HER WEDDING RING. 
12 WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER JEWELRY, I'LL CONSIDER THAT 
13 MARITAL PROPERTY, AND TO THE EXTENT THE PARTIES CAN APPRISE 
14 SOME VALUE TO IT, YOU CAN DO THAT OR IF YOU WANT, YOU CAN LET 
15 DR. BOHMAN TAKE FIRST PICK, AND THEN MRS. BOHMAN, AND 
16 SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. BUT I DO FEEL IT'S APPROPRIATE SHE 
17 HAVE HER WEDDING RINGS. 
18 WITH RESPECT TO THE HORSES, I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN, DUSTY 
19 AND TO MRS. BOHMAN, PAIGE AND THE FOAL. 
20 THE LIFE INSURANCE HAS NO VALUE EXCEPT FOR LIBERTY LIFE 
21 AND THERE'S AN IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLICY AND I THINK WE ALL 
22 KNOW WHAT THAT IS. THERE'S A CASH VALUE 9,318. HE CAN HAVE 
23 THAT. MRS. BOHMAN NEEDS TO SIGN OFF ON THAT. 
24 AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN THE CHARLES SCHWAB I.R.A. ACCOUNT 
25 THAT I'VE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WAS 
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THE CONTRIBUTORY -- OH, LET'S SEE, WHERE IS THAT EXHIBIT? 
THAT IS CORRECT, ISN'T IT? IT'S THE CONTRIBUTORY ACCOUNT? 
MS. MAYCOCK: RIGHT. 
MR. DART: 181 (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND THEN THE ROLLOVER ACCOUNT, 
AND THEN THERE WAS SOME ADDITIONAL MONEYS ADDED TO IT, AND 
SHE'S GETTING 57,256, IS THAT CORRECT? AND HE'S TAKING 
257,63 9, IS THAT WHAT WAS AGREED? 
MR. DART: IT WAS PROPOSED, WE WERE USING THIS AS 
THE AREA OF THE LUMP FIGURE OR THE --
THE COURT: OKAY, THAT'S RIGHT. YOU'RE CORRECT. 
ALL RIGHT. 
MR. DART: I THINK WHAT WE NEED TO DO, YOUR HONOR, 
IS TAKE WITH THE HOUSE SHIFT AND THIS IS GOING TO REQUIRE US 
LOOKING TO OTHER ASSETS AND SEE WHETHER WE CAN GET TO SOME --
THE COURT: YEAH, YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. I AGREE 
WITH THAT. THAT'S A BIG ITEM OF EQUITY AND --
MR. DART: I CAN MAKE A PROPOSAL TO ELLEN OF HOW, 
USING YOUR FIGURES, WE WORK OUT A DIVISION THEN ELLEN CAN 
EITHER AGREE OR COME BACK AND AT LEAST LET US HAMMER AT IT. 
IF WE'RE ABLE TO WORK IT OUT, FINE. IF NOT, LET'S PUT THAT IN 
THIS SAME 20-DAY GAP WE PROPOSED. 
THE COURT: OKAY, YEAH. I THINK THAT MAKES GOOD 
SENSE. ALL RIGHT. I GIVE TO HIM THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ANESTHESIOLOGY PENSION PLAN OF $56,058. 
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1 I GIVE TO MRS. BOHMAN THE 1994 INCOME TAX REFUND OF 
2 12,259. 
3 NOW, JUST TO HELP YOU, AND IF YOU HAVEN'T ALREADY DEDUCED 
4 THIS, I'VE USED THIS AS KIND OF A STARTING POINT, PLAINTIFF'S 
5 EXHIBIT 13-A. AND I'VE KIND OF OPERATED OFF THAT BECAUSE IT 
6 WAS, FRANKLY, EASIER FOR ME TO FOLLOW THAT. AND SO IF I'VE 
7 OVERLOOKED SOMETHING, JUST INCLUDE THAT UNLESS THERE'S SOME 
8 DISPUTE, AND YOU CAN GET BACK TO ME. OTHERWISE, THE 1995 
9 INCOME TAX REFUND I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT THEY BE SPLIT 
10 EQUALLY. 
11 MRS. BOHMAN WILL ASSUME THE CLIFF CHEVRON AND THANE HALES 
12 EXPENSES OF 854 AND 698 RESPECTIVELY. 
13 MR. DART: IS SHE GETTING A CREDIT EQUALIZATION OF 
14 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES THAT'S SHOWN ON THAT EXHIBIT? 
15 MS. MAYCOCK: YOUR HONOR, OUR POSITION IS THAT BRAD 
16 HAS ALREADY PAID THOSE. 
17 THE COURT: I AGREE, YEAH, AND THAT'S --HE PAID HER 
18 SUPPORT AND THIS IS HER OBLIGATION. 
19 NOW, IN ADDITION TO THIS, COURT FINDS THAT BECAUSE OF 
2 0 MRS. BOHMAN'S EXPENSES AND NOT STAYING WITHIN WHAT WAS 
21 REASONABLY NECESSARY BY WAY OF SUPPORT, DR. BOHMAN LOANED HER 
22 $20,000. AND I AM GIVING THAT TO HER AS AN ASSET. SO ADDED 
23 TO THE PREMARITAL --OR EXCUSE ME, ADDED TO HER SIDE, SHE HAS 
24 THE $20,000 NOTE FROM DR. BOHMAN AND SHE EXECUTED ON MARCH 
25 8TH, 1995. 
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I ALSO FIND THAT SHE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LAKE POWELL 
EXPENSE OF 2,906. 
I FIND THAT SHE --AT LEAST THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATED 
THAT SHE STOCKPILED HER GROCERIES, SO THE SMITH'S BILL IS 
ALSO, 32,000 -- $3,240 IS ALSO HERS. AND I FIND THAT WAS 
THREE TIMES THE NORMAL AMOUNT THAT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
I FIND ALSO THAT THE PROPERTY TAXES PAID FOR MRS. BOHMAN 
BY DR. BOHMAN SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDIT TO HIM. 
I FIND THAT UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER SHE WAS REQUIRED TO 
PAY THESE EXPENSES. SHE DIDN'T. HE STEPPED IN TO PROTECT THE 
ASSET. AND HE SHOULD BE BEGIN CREDIT FOR 2,408. SO ON HER 
SIDE SHE NEEDS TO BE GIVEN CREDIT FOR 20,000, 2,906, $3,240, 
AND 2,408. THAT'S IT. 
MR. DART: QUESTION I HAVE, ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
THE COURT: YES. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR ME 
AND I STRUGGLED WITH THIS NOT KNOWING WHAT WOULD BE THE FAIR 
THING TO DO. I FIND THAT PLAINTIFF REPRESENTS REASONABLE FEES 
AND COSTS OF 42,615. I FIND THAT THERE IS SOME DUPLICATION BY 
HAVING TWO LAWYERS. AND THE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL THEMSELVES 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A $5,000 DEDUCTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. AND 
THERE IS WHERE I STRUGGLED. AND LET ME JUST INDICATE THAT AT 
THIS POINT, THERE'S $3,716 AFTER THE $5,000 CREDIT FOR 
DUPLICATION. WITHOUT HAVING TO GET DOWN AND MAKE SOME 
JUDGMENT OF -- BASED ON WHAT EVIDENCE I RECEIVED, WHAT WAS 
REALLY -- WHETHER THERE REALLY WAS DUPLICATION AND I, FRANKLY, 
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1 HAVE SOME CONCERNS BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNT OF MISS MAYCOCK'S 
2 FEES. AND I KNOWLEDGE THAT HER FEES ARE SOMEWHAT LESS. THAT 
3 IS HER HOURLY RATE. BUT WITHOUT HAVING TO REALLY GET IN AND 
4 ADDRESS THAT BECAUSE, I DON'T KNOW, SOMETIMES WE ALL WORK AT 
5 DIFFERENT PACES AND HIRE THE LAWYER THAT WE HIRE. IT APPEALS 
6 TO ME THAT THERE IS ENOUGH THERE THAT IS NONETHELESS 
7 REASONABLE THAT THE COURT CAN TAKE EVEN A REASONABLE BASIS OR 
8 REASONABLE AMOUNT AND SAY, THERE'S SOMETHING THAT OUGHT TO BE 
9 CONSIDERED HERE BY WAY OF FEES. I FIND THAT, THAT THERE IS 
10 SOME NEED, NOT A GREAT DEAL ON THE PART OF MRS. BOHMAN, 
11 BECAUSE SHE'S GOING GET A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CASH IN THIS 
12 MARRIAGE. SOME OF WHICH, THOUGH, SHE'S GOING TO NEED TO GET 
13 INTO A HOME, A HOME THAT OUGHT TO SOMEWHAT APPROXIMATE WHAT 
14 SHE'S BEEN USED TO. SHE'S CERTAINLY ENTITLED TO DO THAT, BUT 
15 I DOUBT THAT SHE WILL DO THAT BECAUSE SHE HAS GOT TO KNOW THAT 
16 IN FIVE YEARS ALIMONY'S GOING TO TERMINATE AND SHE'S GOT TO 
17 FACE THAT INEVITABILITY AND, THEREFORE, IT MIGHT MAKE A LOT 
18 MORE SENSE TO GET INTO SOMETHING MORE MODEST, THAT SHE CANNOT 
19 ONLY AFFORD NOW, BUT IN FIVE YEARS. 
20 WITH THAT IN MIND, I HAVE ELECTED TO SAY THAT THERE IS 
21 SOME NEED THERE. ON THE OTHER SIDE, HOWEVER, I FIND SOME 
22 LIMITED ABILITY TO PAY. I'M NOT SURE HOW ALL THIS IS GOING TO 
23 SHAKE OUT BY THE TIME HE TAKES THE HOME AND TO TRY TO GIVE HER 
24 A LOT OF CASH TO EQUALIZE SOME OF THESE ASSETS, AND SOME OF 
25 HIS MONEY IS TIED UP IN RETIREMENTS AND THOSE KIND OF THINGS. 
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AND MAYBE I OUGHT TO JUST KIND OF SEE HOW ALL THAT SHAKES OUT 
AFTER YOU'VE HAD A CHANCE TO EQUALIZE EVERYTHING. BUT LET ME 
JUST MAKE THIS OBSERVATION: THAT HE PREVIOUSLY HAS PAID HER 
$7,500, AND I BELIEVE ALSO THERE WAS ABOUT $4,000 IN THE 
ACCOUNT THAT SHE TOOK RIGHT WHEN THEY SEPARATED THAT COULD 
HAVE BEEN USED FOR FEES. BUT FOR CERTAIN, HE GAVE HER $7500 
AS RETAINER FOR FEES. AND UNLESS PARTIES FEEL REALLY STRONGLY 
ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT HE PAY HER 
ANOTHER $5,000. AND I DO THAT SOMEWHAT HESITATINGLY BECAUSE I 
DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS CASH FLOW WILL BE BY GIVING HIM THE HOME. 
BUT UNLESS THERE IS SOME OBVIOUS INEQUITY, MISS MAYCOCK, I'LL 
ORDER THAT HE PAY HER $5,000. I THINK THERE'S A LITTLE ROOM 
EVEN IN HIS INCOME TO DO THAT. 
IF HE DID THAT, THAT'S $12,500 TOWARD HER FEES. AND I 
THINK THAT'S FAIR. AND I DO THAT FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. 
ONE, ALTHOUGH SHE HAS EQUITY IN THE MARITAL ESTATE, SHE 
SHOULDN'T HAVE TO DEPLETE THAT ANY MORE THAN HE DOES. 
AND I THINK THAT HE IN THE LONG RUN WILL HAVE MORE POTENTIAL 
TO EARN INCOME AND, THEREFORE, COULD PAY THOSE FEES. THAT'S 
IT. 
MR. DART: I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS IF I MAY, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DART: ONE OF THE CONCERNS I HAD IS THAT GIVING 
THIS ALIMONY AWARD BASED UPON THE LIFE STYLE AND GIVING HIM 
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THE HOUSE AND HER MOVING TO SOMETHING LESS EXPENSIVE HAS A --
AT LEAST HIM HAVING IN MIND THAT HE CAN COME BACK ON A 
MODIFICATION, I TAKE IT THAT YOUR AWARD OF ALIMONY IS WITH THE 
EXPECTENCY THAT SHE MAY BE BUYING SOMETHING LESS EXPENSIVE AND 
THAT WOULD NOT BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE. 
THE COURT: THAT'S ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. NOW, AT 
LEAST IN MY MIND, THAT'S THE WAY I THOUGHT THAT THROUGH LAST 
NIGHT. NOW, MISS MAYCOCK, IF YOU SEE THAT DIFFERENTLY --
SHE'S IN KIND OF A CATCH 22 BECAUSE SHE HAS ABSOLUTELY A RIGHT 
TO ENJOY THE LIFE STYLE TO WHICH SHE HAS BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO, 
AND I STRUGGLED WITH THAT. BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE 
IS GOING TO BE AN UPHEAVAL IN HER LIFE IN FIVE YEARS UNLESS 
SHE HAPPENS TO MARRY WELL AGAIN. AND, YOU KNOW, THAT'S JUST 
PURE SPECULATION. AND THOSE BOYS HAVE A RIGHT TO ENJOY WHAT 
THEY HAVE HAD, BUT I -- JUST REALISTICALLY, I EXPECTED HER TO 
BUY SOMETHING MORE MODEST, SOMETHING THAT SHE CAN AFFORD. 
SHE'S GOT A CHANCE TO HAVE SECURITY IN A HOME FOR THE REST OF 
HER LIFE IF SHE IS CAREFUL. BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S 
APPROPRIATE TO TURN AROUND AND USE THAT AGAINST HER IF SHE 
HAPPENS TO BE MORE PRUDENT. DO YOU FEEL THAT OR SEE THAT 
DIFFERENTLY? 
MS. MAYCOCK: NO. I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT, YOUR HONOR, 
BECAUSE THIS IS ALL A PART OF THE SAME AWARD. AND I THINK 
THAT OUR CASES TELL US IT HAS TO BE A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT WASN'T CONTEMPLATED WHEN THE DECREE WAS ENTERED AND --
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THE COURT: THAT'S WONDERFUL. 
MS. MAYCOCK: THIS IS ONE THAT IS CONTEMPLATED. 
THE COURT: YEAH, EXACTLY, THOSE ARE WONDERFUL WORDS 
THAT ARE USED IN THE CASES, AND I THINK THEY APPLY IN THIS 
CASE, AND THANK YOU. ALL RIGHT. YOUR NEXT QUESTION PLEASE. 
MR. DART: NEXT QUESTION IS, DATE OF OCCUPANCY OF 
THE HOUSE AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT TO EQUALIZE THE VALUE. 
THE COURT: THAT WAS ONE I THOUGHT ABOUT A COUPLE OF 
DAYS AGO, BUT DIDN'T THINK ABOUT IT LAST NIGHT WHEN I ACTUALLY 
ROUGHED OUT THIS DECISION. I HAD IN MIND SOMETHING BETWEEN 
MAYBE THREE TO SIX MONTHS. I DON'T THINK SHE OUGHT TO BE 
IMMEDIATELY EVICTED. I THINK SHE NEEDS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOP 
SO THAT SHE CAN DO THE RIGHT THING. I STILL THINK IT'S A 
BUYER'S MARKET OUT THERE, ISN'T IT? 
MR. DART: SALT LAKE HAS BEEN A SELLER'S MARKET. 
I'M NOT THAT FAMILIAR WITH OGDEN. 
MS. MAYCOCK: I DON'T KNOW THE OGDEN MARKET EITHER, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I THINK IF YOU'VE GOT CASH, YOU CAN BUY 
A NICE HOME. AND I -- DO YOU WANT TO TRY TO WORK THAT OUT 
BETWEEN YOU AND BRING THAT BACK TO ME OR DO YOU WANT ME JUST 
TO ENTER SOME KIND OF ARBITRARY DECISION THIS MORNING? 
MR. DART: RATHER YOU GIVE US A DATE WITH THE RIGHT 
TO COME BEFORE THE COURT IF CIRCUMSTANCES PROVE THAT THAT DATE 
HAS A DIFFICULTY. 
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MS. MAYCOCK: MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
YOU DIRECT MISS BOHMAN TO MOVE FORWARD IN GOOD FAITH AND THEN 
GIVE HER A PRETTY REASONABLE DEADLINE, BUT THAT SHE BE 
EXPECTED TO BEGIN TAKING STEPS RIGHT AWAY TO FIND A NEW HOME. 
THE COURT: I AGREE WITH THAT, AND I THINK SHE NEEDS 
TO DO THAT. AND, YOU KNOW, SHE MAY NEED A DAY OR TWO JUST TO 
SORT THINGS OUT IN HER OWN MIND. BUT I THINK, MRS. BOHMAN, 
YOU DO NEED TO PROMPTLY START --OR ENGAGE A REALTOR TO SEE 
WHAT'S AVAILABLE OUT THERE. IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HER 
TO WAIT EVEN THOUGH ON THAT UNTIL YOU HAVE BALANCED THINGS 
OUT. SHE OUGHT TO KNOW WHAT SHE'S GOT TO FINANCIALLY WORK 
WITH. 
MR. DART: WE COULD LEAVE THIS AS AN OPEN ITEM, 
THAT IF WE'RE NOT ABLE TO AGREE THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ONE OF 
THE THINGS WE COME BACK BEFORE YOU IN 2 0-DAY ITEM TO SEE IF WE 
CAN SORT IT. OTHERWISE, BE PREPARED WITH OUR REASONS. 
THE COURT: YES, LET'S DO THAT. AND AT THIS POINT, 
I'M GOING TO TRUST THAT MRS. BOHMAN WILL WORK IN GOOD FAITH TO 
FIND A NEW HOME AND THAT DR. BOHMAN WILL BE PATIENT AND 
UNDERSTANDING. I TRUST THAT, YOU KNOW, THE PROPERTY WILL BE 
LEFT IN GOOD CONDITION AND, YOU KNOW, THOSE SORT OF THINGS. 
WHAT ELSE? 
MR. DART: THAT COVERS IT, YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU 
FOR YOU TIME AND DELIBERATION. 
THE COURT: WELL, THANK YOU. 
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MS. MAYCOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: YOU BET. BYE. 
MS. MAYCOCK: BYE. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 944901996 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
April 22, 23, 24 and 26, 1996, plaintiff appearing in person and by 
her attorneys, B. L. Dart and Sharon A. Donovan and defendant 
appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock, and the 
Court having heard testimony of several witnesses, exhibits having 
been introduced and stipulations having been made and items in 
dispute having been argued and submitted and the Court having taken 
the matter under advisement and having made its ruling by telephone 
conference on the 14th day of June, 1996. Thereafter, defendant 
filed a Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's ruling with respect 
to visitation which was argued on July 30, 1996, and the Court 
having ruled on that matter and thereafter defendant having filed 
Objections to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law and the Court having ruled on that matter and these rulings 
having been incorporated in the following Findings and the Court 
being fully advised, hereby does make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Weber 
County, State of Utah and were so for at least three months prior 
to the filing of this divorce action and also the Counterclaim. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other 
in Park City, Utah on the 20th day of September, 1989, and since 
that time have been husband and wife. They separated in the Fall 
of 1994. 
3. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
irretrievably broken this marriage and the parties should be 
granted a mutual divorce one from the other to become final upon 
entry. 
4. The parties are the parents of three minor children, 
to wit: Angela (Angie), age 14, born October 30, 1981, plaintiff's 
child from a former marriage adopted by defendant; the parties have 
as natural issue of their marriage two children, Braxton, age 6, 
born April 17, 1990 and Bryson, age 5, born July 25, 1991. In two 
or three years the youngest child will be in school. 
5. The Court finds that a custody evaluation was 
performed by Mr. Philip B. Johnson, M.S., pursuant to Court Order. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff has been primarily a 
homemaker during the marriage. Defendant is an anesthesiologist. 
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7. The Court observes that it is unfortunate that it 
cannot order joint legal custody in this case. The Court finds 
that each party has strengths, which combined with one another in 
a joint custody arrangement and the flexibility of Defendant's work 
schedule, would really inure to the benefit of the children. 
However, the parties do not agree to an Order for joint custody, 
and the relationship between the parties has been somewhat 
tempestuous during the period of time that these proceedings have 
been pending and has been punctuated by a history of uncooperation 
and, therefore, the Court will decline to make any joint custody 
award, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §30-3-10. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been the 
primary caregiver of these children, although the Defendant has 
contributed meaningfully, especially during the last few years. 
The Court further finds that the children are doing well and have 
adapted to their separate homes apart from their parents. 
9. The Court finds that both parties are equal or would 
be equal in promoting visitation and, therefore, the Court does not 
see any advantage one way or the other in evaluating that factor. 
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff has the greater 
flexibility to provide personal care for the children because she 
has no employment, although the Court finds that Plaintiff needs to 
go to school or obtain employment at some time. It may not be in 
the best interests of Plaintiff to return immediately to work. The 
law certainly would give her leeway to stay home to take care of 
her children, at least until they were in school. On the other 
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hand, there is a concern that the Court has that to the extent 
possible she needs to be either advancing her education or 
advancing her employment because this alimony is going to terminate 
in five years. On the one hand the Court is very concerned about 
the welfare of these children and yet on the other hand she has got 
to take care of them but she has to be farsighted enough to look 
down the road and how she does that, the Court will leave to her 
sound judgment. To the extent reasonably possible, she needs to do 
what she can to help support herself but she ought not be expected 
to do that by sacrificing the welfare of the children. The Court 
finds that Defendant's employment enables him to give generously to 
these children, and therefore, on that issue it is a somewhat close 
question. 
11. The Court finds that this was a close case, but 
nonetheless, Plaintiff met more of the "function related" factors 
than Defendant did. The Court considered that Plaintiff has had 
the children during the time that these proceedings have been 
pending and has found that the children are functioning very well 
in Plaintiff's home. In light of the need for stability in the 
children's lives, the Court finds it is in their best interests for 
Plaintiff to be awarded custody of the children. 
12. The Court finds that the children are happy and well 
adjusted and doing very well. However, the Court also recognizes 
that the Defendant has contributed very meaningfully to their state 
of emotional health and happiness. 
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13. The Court finds that the stability of the 
environment of each parent really made this case close. The 
Plaintiff is leaving her fourth marriage, although she is just 38 
years of age and although some of the problems that she has had in 
previous marriages the Court senses were not entirely of her own 
making and there were some instances of abuse and other problems 
that somewhat made her a victim of those circumstances. 
Nonetheless, her having now gone through four marriages does not 
lend a lot of consistency in her life. On the other hand, 
defendant, himself, is leaving his second marriage. 
14. Defendant presented testimony concerning behaviors 
of Plaintiff that he felt were having a negative impact on the 
children. The Court does find that Plaintiff drinks excessively 
and that there is a potential for an adverse impact on the 
children. However, the Court finds no evidence of that having a 
negative impact on the children. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff is a profligate 
spender and that that was part of the problem in the parties1 
marriage. Plaintiff's extravagant spending caused the Court some 
real concerns about Plaintiff's stability and her ability to manage 
to stay on a budget where things are going to be somewhat limited 
following this marriage. 
16. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a very 
loving, caring parent who really has at heart the best interests of 
her children. Although Plaintiff can be distracted by a lot of 
other activities, the Court finds that fundamentally she deeply 
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cares and loves these children and would always put them first. 
The Court has every expectation that Plaintiff will be a good 
mother and will be a positive influence on the children. 
17. The Court finds that the Defendant has many strong 
qualities and that he is very attuned to education and its 
importance in the children's lives. The Court finds that Defendant 
will be a positive influence on the children if he is given an 
opportunity to have substantial contact so that he can help the 
children with their homework, monitor their grades and provide good 
fundamental motivation. Defendant's work schedule has large 
periods of time when he can spend time with the children and that 
flexibility needs to be realized in his visitation schedule. 
18. The Court finds that Defendant is a very mature, 
stable parent who will provide constancy and consistency. The 
Court finds that Defendant has a strong personality and can 
sometimes be "controlling,M but there is no evidence that that has 
been to the disadvantage of the children. 
19. The Court finds that Angela wants to live with her 
mother and that the Defendant accepts this. Braxton and Bryson are 
too young to decide where they want to live. 
20. The Court finds that it is important for the 
stability and emotional support of Braxton and Bryson, having just 
gone through a separation from their parent's living together, that 
they also live together with one another and that they also live 
with Angela. The Court finds that apart from the tension that 
Braxton and Bryson might sense exists between their parents, Angela 
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would provide some stability and emotional security. The Court 
finds that it is important that custody of Bryson and Braxton be 
with their mother. The evidence supports a strong bond between the 
children and both parents, although Plaintiff is the primary 
psychological parent, according to Dr. Philip B. Johnson. The 
Court finds that both parents are equal in moral character. 
21. The Court finds that Defendant will in the long run 
offer a more stable financial environment than will the Plaintiff, 
but with child support, alimony and the income that Plaintiff will 
eventually be able to earn, Plaintiff will be able to provide 
adequately for the care of the children and, therefore, that is not 
an issue that the Court gave any weight. 
22. The Court finds that despite whatever slants there 
were on the evidence portrayed by each party, this case boiled down 
to a choice between a very good parent and one who was just 
slightly better. The Court orders that neither party should leave 
the area beyond 150 miles, without giving reasonable notice to the 
other. 
23. The Court finds that it is in the best interests of 
the parties' minor children, Braxton and Bryson, that Plaintiff be 
awarded sole custody, subject to liberal visitation on behalf of 
Defendant, as follows: 
(a) Week-End Visitation. Defendant 
should have visitation with the children three 
weekends each month, from Friday at 9:00 a.m. 
to Sunday at 7:30 p.m., or depending on 
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Defendant's work schedule from Saturday at 
9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m. When Friday 
is a school day, visitation should begin after 
school and Defendant should pick the children up 
from home at 4:00 p.m. 
The Court specifically reserves the issue 
as to the 5th weekend of the month visitation for 
further agreement of the parties or order of the Court. 
(b) Holiday Visitation. Defendant 
should h^ve alternate holiday visitation, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §30-3-35, only. 
No other holidays should be divided. A copy 
of the Standard Visitation Schedule is 
attached hereto, as Exhibit "A." The parties 
have agreed that the holiday visitation schedule 
may be reversed so that defendant should have 
the holiday visitation specified for "odd-
numbered" years in the even-numbered years and 
vice versa. 
(c) Mid-Week Visitation. Defendant is 
entitled to one mid-week visitation each month 
from the time the children get home from 
school to 8:00 p.m. that evening. This mid-
week visitation is to be either the week prior 
to or the week following the weekend when 
defendant does not have weekend visitation and 
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is to be scheduled by defendant for a night 
mutually acceptable to the parties or, if they 
cannot agree, to be set by the defendant upon 
providing to plaintiff three or more weeks 
advance notice of the visitation. Insofar as 
midweek visitation is affected by weekend 
visitation, the court reserves that issue for 
further agreement of the parties or order of 
the court. 
(d) Surrogate Care. The parties should 
be required to allow the other party to 
provide care for the children, in lieu of 
surrogate care, when that party cannot 
personally care for the children for a period 
of four hours or more. 
(e) Make-up Visitation. Defendant 
anticipates that occasionally he may need to 
work during his weekend visitation and he 
should know his schedule approximately one 
month in advance. On an occasional basis, if 
Defendant is required to work and is unable to 
exercise his visitation, he will notify 
Plaintiff, with as much notice as he possibly 
can, and will be entitled to make-up 
visitation during the week for the length of 
time that he missed. The Court finds that if 
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this becomes a problem, the Court will review 
the make-up visitation issue. 
(f) Summer Visitation. The Court finds 
that the summer be divided equally, with each 
party taking the children for two weeks at a 
time, with the other parent having telephone 
contact. 
24. The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded 
standard visitation with the parties1 minor child, Angela. The 
Court finds that because of the strained relationship between 
Defendant and Angela, Defendant will probably have to work out that 
visitation, as he can. Plaintiff should encourage the relationship 
between Angela and Defendant. 
25. With respect to income of defendant, the Court finds 
that the evidence preponderates that defendant earns approximately 
$278,000 a year, primarily on the strength of his historical 
income. Defendant did introduce evidence that remuneration for 
positions may be changing but it remains to be seen how that will 
impact the defendant in the future and the Court feels it is just 
too speculative for the Court to deal with that issue at^this 
point. The defendant can move to modify later if his dire 
predictions come true. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant's 
current income capacity is the amount of $278,000 a year or $23,167 
a month. 
26. With respect to income of the plaintiff, the Court 
finds that plaintiff has no income currently though she acquired 
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two years of college during the marriage. The Court has no basis 
to determine whether she can improve her place in the job market if 
she were to return to employment. Before plaintiff married 
defendant her highest income was about $5.00 an hour. The Court 
has no basis for determining that she can earn more than that given 
the small ages of the children and what the Court senses is a 
mutual caring that they be nurtured properly. As stated in 
paragraph 10 above, it may not be in the best interests of 
plaintiff to return immediately to work. Based upon the current 
financial circumstances the Court imputes no income to plaintiff at 
this time. 
The Court observes that the alimony award that the 
Court will award in this case won't last very long. 
27. With respect to child support based upon the 
defendant's income, the Court finds it is fair and reasonable that 
the defendant pay to plaintiff child support in the amount of 
$1,000 per month for each of the three children for a total of 
$3,000 per month. That sum is to be payable one-half on the 5th 
and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the parties 
mutually agree otherwise. Child support under the Decree of 
Divorce should commence with the month of July, 1996. 
As additional support defendant should be ordered to 
provide health insurance so long as the same is available to him 
through his employment. Each party should be responsible for one-
half of the uninsured medical and dental expenses except routine 
office visits which should remain the responsibility of the 
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plaintiff. Plaintiff should not incur any non-emergency 
extraordinary medical expenses which would include medical, dental, 
orthodontia and counseling expenses without giving the defendant 
notice and an opportunity to be heard first. 
Defendant should be ordered to be responsible for 
one-half of the work-related or education-related day care expenses 
and plaintiff should submit to the defendant satisfactory proof of 
those expenses. 
So long as defendant is current on his obligation 
for child support he should be entitled to declare the minor 
children as his exemptions for income tax purposes and plaintiff 
should execute the necessary affidavit to allow this exemption to 
be declared by defendant. 
28. Defendant should be ordered to maintain life 
insurance for the benefit of the children in an amount not less 
than what would be sufficient at that time to see that support is 
maintained for the children at the rate of $1,000 per month per 
child to their majority. 
29. With respect to alimony the Court finds that the 
plaintiff's present standard of living based upon her reasonable 
needs and consistent with what appeared to be the standard of 
living of the parties in the past, was the monthly need of $7,225. 
The Court further finds that plaintiff presently has only a limited 
ability to contribute because of her unemployment with no 
significant work history. Plaintiff's last gainful employment 
before the marriage gave her $5.00 an hour. Plaintiff has two 
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years of college and ought to continue her studies because the 
award of alimony the court is going to award will be brief. 
Because of the tender years of the children and 
because of the interest that each party has in seeing that they are 
nurtured properly and considering the expenses of work, additional 
clothing and day care, it may not be highly profitable for the 
plaintiff to work, although the Court finds that plaintiff should 
obtain employment or go to school. At such time as either of those 
create a substantial, material change of circumstances, the Court 
would be willing to look again at alimony. 
30. The Court finds that the defendants reasonable 
living expenses are approximately between $8,300 to $8,900 a month 
and probably more close to the $8,300 figure. Based upon 
defendant's income he is capable of meeting these living expenses, 
child support and the alimony hereinafter to be awarded, even 
taking into consideration what his anticipated taxes will be on 
this income. 
31. Based upon plaintiff's demonstrated need, which the 
Court finds to be reflected in the plaintiff's Submission of 
Detailed Expenses as set forth in her Exhibit P-10 which appear to 
be reasonable; further based upon her lack of ability to meet that 
need and defendant's ability to meet her need, the Court finds it 
is reasonable that plaintiff should be awarded alimony in the 
amount of $4,225 a month. Alimony under the Decree of Divorce 
should commence with the month of July, 1996 and be paid one-half 
on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the 
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parties mutually agree otherwise. The Court further finds that in 
the event plaintiff moves to another home and because of the short 
duration of the alimony elects to move to a home which is more 
modest and of lesser cost, the Court finds this would be an 
appropriate decision by her which is anticipated by the Court and 
would not be a change of circumstances in a review of the alimony 
award herein. If plaintiff is prudent and appropriate in the 
expenditure of money, this should not be used against her. 
32. The Court finds that this support level to the 
plaintiff should generally equalize the standard of living between 
the parties to the extent that they can ever occur after a divorce. 
33. Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony shall terminate 
on the 3 0th day of June, 2 001, or sooner upon the remarriage or 
cohabitation of plaintiff or the death of either party or by 
operation of law. The amount of alimony can be reviewed before the 
expiration of five years if there is a substantial and material 
change of the circumstances of the parties. 
34. Defendant should be ordered to maintain life 
insurance with the plaintiff as beneficiary in a face amount that 
is equal to his remaining obligation at any time to the plaintiff 
for alimony. This obligation to carry life insurance should not be 
an obligation for alimony and should not be deductible by defendant 
or taxable to plaintiff as alimony. 
35. The amount of alimony awarded to plaintiff may be 
reviewed before the expiration of five years if there is a 
substantial material change of circumstances. 
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36. With regard to the issues of property, the Court 
needs to first address the claims of premarital assets. The 
differences between the parties position regarding defendant's 
claims for premarital assets are set out in plaintiff• s Exhibit 75 
and as to those, the Court finds as follows: 
a. The Key Bank account, 577510 and the Fidelity 
Income Trust X29-002453 were consumed during the marriage. Those 
accounts were taken from the individual name of defendant and put 
into the family income stream and used. They are consumed and gone 
and no premarital credit should be allowed. 
b. The Court finds that defendant owned an equity 
at 1706 Ross Drive for which he should receive premarital credit 
and based upon the testimony of the parties and the exhibits 
introduced, the Court finds that the proper premarital credit 
should be $40,000. 
c. The parties stipulated that defendant should 
have credits in his IRA rollover account in the amount of $131,481; 
his IRA Contributory account of $74,197; and his Rocky Mountain 
Pension Plan of $30,000. 
d. There was a 1986 Jeep Cherokee which under 
Exhibit P-75 appeared not to be contested. Defendant, however, 
supplemented that Exhibit with Exhibit P-75(a), which raised issue 
regarding the Jeep Cherokee. The Court finds that this Jeep 
Cherokee is gone and consumed and for it defendant should receive 
no premarital credits. 
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e. The Court finds that the cash in the business 
that was identified in the amount of $35,901 is gone and consumed 
and for which defendant should receive no premarital credit. 
f. The Court finds that the loan that defendant 
gave to his brother during the marriage is also gone and consumed 
and for which defendant should receive no premarital credit. 
g. The Court finds that the loan to Rebekah Bohman 
of $17,000 loaned prior to the marriage of the parties is gone and 
for which defendant should receive no premarital credit. 
h. The Court finds that as to the accounts 
receivable in Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology the weight of the 
evidence that in 1989 it had a collection rate of 80% and, as such, 
defendant should receive a premarital credit of $100,289. 
i. The Court further finds that the currently 
existing assets of Winetau International Minerals Corporation, 
Buena Ventura Resources (Crown Energy), the Bohman Ranch, BB 
Ranchers, the 1980 silver Porsche and the 1989 Jeep Cherokee are 
premarital assets which should be awarded to defendant free of any 
marital claim of plaintiff. 
j. Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court 
finds that defendant should receive credit for premarital assets in 
the amount of $375,967 based upon the following calculation: 
1706 Ross Drive $ 40,000 
IRA Rollover account 131,481 
IRA Contributory account 74,197 
Rocky Mountain Pension Plan 30,000 




37. As to the currently existing property, liabilities 
and adjustments the Court finds they should be awarded as follows: 
a. The house and real property at 2829 East 
Osmond, Ogden, Utah, has a value of $534,000 based upon the 
defendant's appraisal, less a current outstanding mortgage of 
$346,362, leaving an equity of $187,638, which should be awarded to 
defendant for the reason that the Court does not think in the long 
run plaintiff will be able to afford the mortgage payment and will 
probably end up having to sell it anyway. At that point the 
childrens' lives are going to be disrupted anyway and they are only 
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going to be older and more cemented to their friendships and the 
Court thinks that it is just going to cause turmoil at that time. 
The Court also finds that since the parties have been separated 
plaintiff has had some difficulty in keeping the mortgage current 
which may put her at risk of meeting this obligation and there is 
no way the home can be refinanced to remove defendant's liability. 
The Court finds there is a risk notwithstanding paying alimony and 
child support defendant may have to step in and take care of the 
mortgage obligation from time to time and the Court's concern is 
that this would not be fair. 
The Court further finds that based upon the 
liberal visitation the Court contemplates, the children are going 
to enjoy the home a great deal anyway because they will be spending 
a lot of time with defendant and that would add to the stability of 
their relationship with him of returning to that home. 
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This home is currently occupied by the 
plaintiff under the Temporary Order and plaintiff should continue 
to have the right to occupy this home for a reasonable period of 
time while she is seeking other housing which the Court feels 
should be a period of between three to six months. The Court finds 
that if the parties cannot agree upon a reasonable period of time 
for plaintiff to occupy the home, then either party could come back 
before the Court based upon the then existing circumstances for a 
determination of a specific time. Plaintiff should be taking steps 
in good faith to locate a new home at her earliest convenience. 
So long as plaintiff occupies the home, she 
should be responsible for payment of property taxes and insurance 
and these expenses should be prorated as of the date of change of 
occupancy from plaintiff to defendant. She should leave the home 
in good condition, reasonable wear and tear accepted. 
b. With respect the defendant's business in Rocky 
Mountain Anesthesiology, Inc., the Court finds that the accounts 
receivable at a 60% collectability has a value of $93,349.00 which 
the Court awards to defendant. Also the balance sheet assets on 
the 1994 tax return reflect a value of $2,798.00 which should be 
awarded to defendant. 
c. The Court further finds that the parties have 
a WNC tax credit which at the time of trial was $12,784. This 
credit has been diminished by the amount of deduction taken on the 
1995 joint income tax return as a tax credit in the amount of 
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$4,478. This leaves a remaining tax credit of $8,3 06 which should 
be awarded to defendant at this value. 
d. As stated above, the Court finds that defendant 
should be awarded free of any marital claim of plaintiff the Bohman 
Ranch and BB Ranchers with no marital value ascribed as these 
assets are premarital. 
e. The parties own an interest in a houseboat and 
based upon further discussion of the parties the Court finds that 
the agreed value of this houseboat interest is $21,500 which should 
be awarded to defendant. 
f. The Court finds that there was an account at 
Charles Schwab, No. 16865838, called The Family Trust Account which 
had a value as of the time of the trial of $174,534 which account 
should be divided equally between the parties with each party to 
receive $87,267. 
g. The Court finds that the Fidelity Irrevocable 
Family Trust account, No. TO71932704, is not a marital asset as 
defendant has no control over it and it is, therefore, not part of 
his estate. -
h. The Court finds there was a Fidelity USA 
X29-002453 account which at the time of the trial in this case had 
a value of $180,960, which is a marital asset and which can be used 
as an equalizer account to equalize assets. In order to equalize 
the assets of the parties, the Court awards to plaintiff $101,220 
of this account and to defendant $79,740 of this account. 
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i. Buena Ventura Resources (Crown Energy 
Corporation), at 69,505 shares is a premarital asset of the 
defendant. 
j. The First Security Bank account No. 2021027327, 
should be awarded to defendant at a marital value of $23,687.00. 
k. The First Security Bank account No. 2021022146 
which is a pass through account of plaintiff should be awarded to 
her at no marital value. 
1. The Weber State Credit Union account No. 
799001318862 should be awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of 
$25.00. 
m. The Court finds that the 1999 Audi Quattro 
while in defendant's sole name, was given to the corporation and, 
therefore, belongs to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology and is not a 
marital asset. 
n. The Court finds that the Porsche Cabriolet, 
even though given to plaintiff as a birthday present, is a marital 
asset. A lot of times people in marriages buy things that are also 
needed for the family and just coincide those things with gifts for 
birthdays and Christmas. This is such a substantial asset that it 
would be improper in the Court's view to just say that it is 
plaintiff's. This asset should be awarded to plaintiff at a 
marital value of $43,225.00. 
o. The 1980 Porsche 911SC was defendant's prior to 
the marriage and is a premarital asset and to which no marital 
value is ascribed. 
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p. The 1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. was a premarital 
asset of defendant's and to which no marital value is ascribed. 
q. The 1992 GMC van has a value of $14,691.00 and 
should be awarded to plaintiff at that value. 
r. Defendant should be awarded the Polaris 
snowmobile at a value of $2,500.00 and the snowmobile trailer at a 
value of $1,000.00. 
s. Plaintiff should be awarded the horse trailer 
at a value of $4,000.00. 
t. With regard to furniture, furnishings, artwork 
and jewelry, the parties following the trial of this case agreed to 
binding arbitration with Brian R. Florence and each party submitted 
to him their respective positions regarding these items. Mr. 
Florence has now made his ruling dated March 16, 1997, modified by 
his letter of June 21, 1997, both of which are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and Exhibit "C" and adopted by the Court and 
incorporated herein by reference. These items of property are 
awarded and are to be divided consistent with the decision of Brian 
Florence. The effect of this decision is that plaintiff is awarded 
items of property in these categories in the value of $11,803 more 
than those awarded to defendant and this should be reflected as a 
charge against her in the equalization of assets as hereinafter set 
forth. The Court further reserves any further dispute regarding 
the division of personal property or enforcement of the 
arbitrator's decision for agreement by the parties or further order 
of the Court, consistent with prior rulings of the Court and 
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consistent with the arbitration agreement entered into by the 
parties. 
u. With respect to the horses, plaintiff should be 
awarded Page and the foal at a marital value of $4,500.00. 
Defendant should be awarded Dusty at a marital value of $lf000.00. 
v. Defendant should be awarded all of his life 
insurance policies including Kemper Life Policy No. FK2037564 with 
a $500,000.00 face amount and no cash value; the Liberty Life 
Insurance Policy No. XL10331120 with a $500,000.00 face amount and 
no cash value. 
w. Defendant should be awarded the Charles Schwab 
IRA account No. 1686-6226 at a value of $181,454.00. 
x. The Charles Schwab retirement account No. 
1686-6227 which is an IRA rollover account which had a value as of 
March 31, 1996 of $314,895. This account should be awarded between 
the parties in a fashion to allow plaintiff to be awarded one-half 
Df the marital values in the retirement accounts. 
The total amount of value of the retirement 
accounts reflected in this subparagraph and subparagraph (w) and 
subparagraph (y) immediately before and after this subparagraph 
total $552,407. Of this amount $235,678 was premarital 
contribution of defendant, leaving $316,729 of marital contribution 
in these accounts. An equal division of this amount would be 
$158,365 to each party. Plaintiff should receive her portion of 
the marital values out of this account in the amount of $158,365 
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and the remainder of the account in the amount of $156,530 should 
be awarded to defendant. 
y. Defendant should be awarded his Rocky Mountain 
Anesthesiology pension plan held in Fidelity account No. T098310364 
with a value of $56,058.00. 
z. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half 
of the 1994 state income tax refund when received. 
aa. The 1995 income tax refunds when received 
should be divided with plaintiff to receive the state income tax 
refund and with defendant to receive an amount of the federal 
income tax refund equal to the amount received by plaintiff for the 
state income tax refund. The remainder of the federal income tax 
refund should be divided equally between the parties. Each of the 
parties should be responsible for one-half of any costs in the 
preparation of these returns. 
bb. Plaintiff should be responsible for the 
obligations owing to Cliff's Chevron and Dr. Thane Hales, DDS as 
her responsibilities. 
cc. Plaintiff executed a promissory note to 
defendant during this proceeding and that note should be 
extinguished under an arrangement that defendant should receive a 
credit of $20,000.00 and plaintiff should be charged $20,000.00. 
dd. Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff for a Lake 
Powell trip in the amount of $2,906.00 and defendant should receive 
a credit of $2,906.00 and plaintiff should be charged $2,906.00. 
23 
• 1 KC O 
ee. Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff at Smiths 
in the amount of $3,240.00 and defendant should receive a credit of 
$3,240.00 and plaintiff should be charged $3,240.00. 
ff. Defendant paid property taxes while plaintiff 
was in the home in the amount of $2,408.00 and defendant should 
receive a credit of $2,408.00 and plaintiff should be charged 
$2,408.00. 
gg. Defendant should be awarded credit for his 
premarital assets as provided in paragraph 36 (j) above in the 
amount of $375,967.00. Plaintiff should be awarded credit for her 
premarital assets as reflected on her Exhibit 23(a) in the amount 
of $5,000.00. 
hh. During this marriage the parties had the 
benefit of income tax depreciation on their federal and state 
income tax returns resulting in substantial tax savings which the 
Court finds to be an obligation now owed back to BB Ranchers which 
should be assumed by defendant and for which defendant should 
receive credit for the four tax years 1995, 1994, 1993 and 1992. 
Based upon defendant's Exhibit 45(c), these obligations are as 
follows: 
1995 federal - $(18,894) 1995 state - $(3,090) 
1994 federal - ( 9,932) 1994 state - (1,522) 
1993 federal - ( 7,714) 1993 state - (1,105) 
1992 federal - -0- 1992 state - -0-
$(36,540) $(5,717) 
These amounts come to a combined total of $42,257. 
Defendant's claim for a longer period should be denied because of 
the statute of limitations. 
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ii. At the time of trial defendant had a negative 
cash balance in his Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account of $7,400 
which the Court finds is a marital debt of defendant and for which 
defendant should receive credit* 
jj. The Court finds that the plaintiff submitted 
three insurance claims totaling $6,999 (Schedule P of Exhibit 45A) 
to replace a lost purse containing personal items, a lost makeup 
bag containing jewelry and unidentified items stolen from the 
garage. Additionally, she received insurance reimbursements of 
$3,000 for lost golf clubs. Plaintiff received all of the 
insurance reimbursements during the time the parties were separated 
pending the divorce. 
To the extent that the insurance proceeds were 
used to replace plaintiff's lost personal assets, for example her 
jewelry and golf clubs, the proceeds should be deemed non-marital 
assets on the basis that each party would normally be awarded his 
or her personal property (unless it was extraordinarily valuable 
such as a coin or gun collection and represented an inordinate 
amount of marital asset investment). To the extent, however, that 
the proceeds were reimbursement for lost marital property, (e.g., 
a stolen lawn edger from the garage), then these proceeds should be 
deemed to be marital assets and should be divided between the 
parties. 
Likewise, the proceeds were marital assets if they 
went for living expenses since defendant has already paid plaintiff 
alimony and child support for her reasonable living expenses. 
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However, the Court does not recall specific evidence (and believes 
none was presented) as to the portion of the proceeds that were 
spent on general living expenses. The best evidence presented is 
that "most" of the money was used to replace the items lost or 
stolen leaving an inference that at least some of the insurance 
proceeds may have been used for living expenses. If there is 
record evidence estimating the amount of the insurance proceeds 
that went for general living expenses, then that amount should be 
a marital asset. In the absence of specific evidence, however, 
plaintiff may keep the proceeds other than the amount of money that 
was allocated to replace marital assets because it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to speculate about the amount of money 
that may have been used for living expenses. Either party may 
bring back before the Court further motions regarding this item 
once there has been an opportunity to review this ruling and gather 
evidence relevant thereto. 
kk. Each of the parties should be awarded any 
increase or decrease in the account balances awarded to them 
resulting from interest earned or change in market conditions from 
the date of the exhibits on which the figures used in these 
Findings are taken to the date of distribution between the parties. 
On any account in which there is a proration between the parties, 
the gains and losses, together with the cost of administering the 
account should be prorated on the same percentage as the 
distribution between the parties. 
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38. The Court finds that there are accounts that have 
been set up at First Security Bank for the childrens' college funds 
as follows: 
Angie #2028060247 $22,569.00 (stm. 6/95) 
Braxton #2028214635 $18,869.00 (stm. 6/95) 
Bryson #2028093544 $18,869.00 (stm. 6/95) 
These accounts are not marital assets but are the 
assets of the children and pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties should be distributed only upon the joint signatures of 
both parties. 
There is a Liberty Life Insurance Policy No. 
XF10331121 with a $500,000.00 face amount and which has a cash 
value of $9,318.00 which is owned by an irrevocable trust for the 
benefit of the minor children. This policy is not a marital asset. 
The children are to remain the beneficiaries on this policy and no 
substitute beneficiary is to be named. Based upon this 
understanding, plaintiff should execute the necessary papers to 
allow for the removal of her name as beneficiary. 
39. The award of assets, liabilities and adjustments as 
set forth in the next three foregoing paragraphs is set forth in 
the following accounting: 
DEFENDANT PLAINTIFF 
Real Estate 
House and real property at 
2829 E. Osmond, Ogden 





Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Inc.— 
Current Accounts Receivable $944,035 
at 1/6, 60% collectible $93,349 93,349 
Balance sheet assets, 1994 Tax Return— 
$16,789 @l/6 2,798 
RMA Bank account $30,000 §1/6 share 
WNC Tax Credits XXI 8,3 06 
Partnership Interests 
Bohman Ranch, L.P. (Gifted) 
BB Ranchers ($300,000 invested before marriage) 
Powell Recreation L.C. (Houseboat) 21,500 
Stock and Investment Accounts 
Charles Schwab #1686-5838 Family Trust 87,267 87,267 
(together with any earamgi from the time of the trial of this case) 
Fidelity T071932704 Irrev. Family Trust 
Fidelity USA X29-002453 79,740 101,220 
(together with any earainga from the time of the thai of this case) 
Crown Energy Corp, 69,505 sh. (premarital) 
Bank Accounts 
First Security Bank #2021027327 23,687 
First Security #2021022146 -0-
Weber State Credit Union #799001318862 25 
First Security Bank children's college funds: 
Angi #2028060247 $22,569 (stmt6/95) 
Braxton #2028214635 18,869 (stmt6/95) 





1990 Audi Quattro (corporate asset) 
1990 Porsche 911 C4 Cabriolet (Birthday gift) 43,225 
1980 Porsche 911SC (Brad's premarital) 
1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. (Brad @Ranch) 
1992 GMC Van (Becky) 14,691 
Polaris 500 snowmobile 2,500 
Snowmobile trailer 1,000 
Horse trailer 4,000 
Furniture and furnishings 
(Divided pursuant: to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Art 
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Jewelry exclusive of wedding ring — — 
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Value of personal assets received by plaintiff 
exceeding that of defendant 11,803 
Horses: 
Dusty 1,000 
Page and foal 4,500 
Life Insurance fall owned by Family Trust) 
Kemper Life #FK2037564 $500,000 term 
Liberty Life #XL10331120 $500,000 term 
Liberty L i f e #XF10331121 $500,000 (Cash value 3/4 
$9,318 - c h i l d r e n ' s a s s e t 
Retirement Plans 




Charles Schwab #1686-6227 IRA Rollover 
(3/31/96-5314,895) 
(together with any euningi from the time of the trud of this cue) 
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Pension Plan 





1994 State Income Tax Refund 










R, Thane Hales, DDS 
Debt to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account (7,400) 
Premarital and other Credits 
Premarital assets, Brad Bohman 
—see exhibit 77A 
Premarital assets, Becky Bohman 
—see exhibit 23A 
$20,000 Note between parties re debts 
Lake Powell expense paid by Brad 
Smiths bill paid by Brad 
Property taxes paid by Brad 

















40. Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees and costs in this 
action in the amount of $42,615.00 which the Court finds are 
reasonable fees and were appropriate and necessary for the 
prosecution of this action. The Court finds there was some 
duplication of having two lawyers and plaintiff's own counsel 
acknowledges that there should be a $5,000.00 reduction from this 
bill in the request for attorney's fees from defendant for this 
duplication. The Court finds that it is reasonable based upon the 
respective financial circumstances of the parties and defendant's 
greater income capacity. The Court finds that there is some need 
but not a great deal on the part of plaintiff because she is going 
to get a substantial amount of cash in this marriage, some of 
which, though, she is going to need to get into a home, a home that 
ought to somewhat approximate what she has been used to as she is 
entitled to that. 
With the foregoing in mind, the Court finds that 
there is some need. On the other side, however, the Court finds 
there is some limited ability to pay. The Court further observes 
that defendant has previously paid $7,500.00 of plaintiff's fees 
and also that there was approximately $4,000.00 in the account 
taken by plaintiff when the parties separated that could have been 
used for attorney's fees. Based upon all of the foregoing 
circumstances the Court finds it is reasonable that defendant be 
ordered to pay to plaintiff an additional $5,000.00 as and for 
attorney's fees and costs. 
41. The Court finds that any further request for 
attorney's fees related to the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify the 
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is denied. Plaitiff has made request for supplemental attorney's 
fees for other matters which is currently under advisement and not 
included in this ruling. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce one from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. The custody of and visitation with the three minor 
children of the parties shall be awarded as set forth in paragraphs 
4 through 24 of the Findings of Fact. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded child support from defendant in 
an amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 
of the Findings of Fact. 
4. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for 
the benefit of the minor children as set forth in paragraph 28 of 
the Findings of Fact. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant in an 
amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33 and 35 of the Findings of Fact. 
6. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for 
the benefit of the plaintiff as set forth in paragraph 34 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
7. Defendant is awarded premarital property as set 
forth in paragraph 36 of the Findings of Fact. 
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8. The marital property and liabilities of the parties 
are awarded as set forth in paragraphs 37 and 39 of the Findings of 
Fact. 
9. The college bank savings accounts of the children 
are awarded to the children as set forth in paragraph 38 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment from defendant for 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $5,000.00. 
11. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and 
perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when entered. 
DATED this V day of KAAUXW* , 1997. 
COURTV 
MICHAEE D. L Y O N 1 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
£,^/AfA 
ELLEN MAJCOCK 




UTAH CODE ANN $30-3-35 
The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with kindergarten. 
If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which 
the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
a. one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; 
b. alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. 
on Sunday continuing each year; 
c. holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
d. if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the "child's 
attendance at school for thanrchooi day; 
e. if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that 
the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier 
holiday period; 
f. in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion 
of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(5) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(6) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
g. in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, 
he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(2) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(4) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(6) the. fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(9) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b). plus Christmas day 
beginning at i p.m. until 9 p.ml, so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
h. Father's Day shall be spend with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
i. Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
j . extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(1) up to four weeks consecutive at the* option of the noncustodial parent; 
(2) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(3) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
k. the custodial parent shall#have an identical two week period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation 
from school for purposes of vacation; 
1. if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of the vacation 
time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
m. notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at IMC» in A~..~ -— -* • 





Brian R. Florence 
1943 E. 6200 So. 
Home Ogden. Utah 84403 
479-3942 
March 16, 1997 
Brad Bohman 
2829 East Osmond Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Becky Bohman 
6485 By bee Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Dear Brad & Becky: 
I have mailed a copy of this decision to your lawyers. I have carefully reviewed the 
additional materials that each of you have submitted. As a part of this decision I am 
incorporating the earlier provisions of your agreement as stated in my letter to you dated 
December 22, 1996. In order to provide the entire decision into one document, I am 
restating below the provisions of that earlier letter. 
According to the agreement you made on November 6, 1996, Becky is to receive 
the following items listed on the Family Affairs appraisal: 18; 19 A, B, K, M and O; 20, 21, 
29 (this is the refrigerator--! know that Brad changed his mind about this being a marital 
asset at our second meeting, but I am going to leave it in Becky's column); 32 B; 33, 34, 35, 
40 B; 47 (Brad agreed at our second meeting that this was premarital); 55; 61; 69 A, B and 
C; 74 A; 79; 92; 107; 108 D; 128; 131 and 151. 
Brad will receive the following items: 16 on the list of property in his possession; 12; 
13; 15; 19 C, D, F and L; 30; 31; 32 A; 36; 37; 48 (Becky agreed in our second meeting this 
was premarital); 59 A, B and C; 62; 68 (excluding the wheelbarrow and one ladder 70 
(including the storage box); 74 B and C; 80 A, B and C; 108 A, B and C; 109; 132 and 133. 
At our second meeting, Becky also agreed that some additional items were probably 
premarital and was willing to have those awarded to Brad without allocation of value. 
Those items include: 87; 93; 94 and 99. 
You have agreed that despite the values listed on the Family Affairs appraisal, each 
of you will be awarded the items listed above as if they were equal in value. 
Of the items identified above as being awarded to Brad, he states that many of them 
were missing. For instance: #30 he did not get many of the small appliances including the 
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green blender from the bar, waffle maker, mixers, crockpot/wok, electric fryer and deep 
fryer. 
#31 Some knives are missing. 
#36 Missing bowls and cups; 
#37 He says these were supposed to be the new phone not the old ones. 
#68 Missing the hoe, extension cords, blowers, gas can, good hoses and shovels 
#70 No chemicals were left and the hand-skimmer is missing; 
#74 Missing the ball hopper; 
#80C Center cube missing, other parts damaged; 
#108 Brad says this set was to include the contemporary gun metal lamps; 
At our last meeting, Becky acknowledged that she may have taken some of these 
items inadvertently. To the extent that she has them they are to be returned. 
Before addressing the dispute regarding the balance of the personal property, I want 
to make a few observations. The controversy of the personal property has consumed more 
energy and funds than is warranted given the value of the items. Both of you have the 
resources to move on with your life without devoting this much attention to such petty 
matters. In my view, Brad has been primarily responsible for addressing claims over minor 
items. He wants items of personal property returned and then complains that parts are 
missing or damaged. On the other hand, Becky has basically been in control of most of the 
items of personal property throughout your controversy and has made unilateral decisions 
as .to what she will take without making any effort to reach a reasonable division absent 
considerable lawyer involvement and this mediation. 
Neither of you are going to be happy with this decision. It is time to put the 
controversy behind you. Get on with your lives. You will both be better off for it. 
The balance of the personal property on the Family Affairs appraisal will be awarded 
and valued as stated below. This decision is based on each of your comments at our last 
meeting when we went through each item. I have also considered the written submissions 
I have received from you following that meeting. I have attempted to balance the respective 
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The personal property identified in the appraisal as» being in Brad possession is 

































Brad says these were a gift. In any event each have some and 
Becky's have not been valued. 
Each have one. Becky's has not been valued. 
Becky's have not been valued. 
Decided in Court. 
Each should get one of the wet suits. 
Children's items will not be valued here or elsewhere. 
Decided in Court. 










































































These items total $ 963.50 
The balances of the items that were in Becky's possession at the time of the 





























This was purchased during separation. The contract 
shows a purchase price of $23,955.00 with a trade in 
value of $3,500.00, cash of $2,000.00 and a remaining 
due on the contract of $14,000.00. Equity 
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38 To be returned to Brad—premarital 
39 
40A Brad has this 
40C&DOmitted from further discussion 
40E 
41 Brad has this 
42 
43 Brad has this 
44 
45 Each of you claim the other has these. No further award 
46 Brad has these 
49 
50-51 




56 Brad has this 
57 Brad has this 
58 Brad has this 
60 
63 Brad has this 
64 Brad has this 
65 Brad has this 
66-67 These are to be returned to Brad 
71 Only item I am including as being purchased with $20,000.00 
loan from Brad 
72 At the home 
73 Appraised with the home 
75 There is a dispute as to whether a couch taken by Brad was 
included as part of this appraisal and whether it was premarital. 
Becky claims that this was purchased during separation and 
financed with the loan. Whatever division concerning these sofas 
and couches has taken taken place shall remain and a positive 
value assigned to Becky. $ 400.00 

































































































Each of you have some of these. The division shall remain as is. 
To be returned to Brad—premarital 
Rented 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Shall remain as presently divided 
To be returned to Brad—premarital 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Rented 
Each claim the other has some. Shall remain as divided. 
































































































141 To be returned to Brad 
142 Brad has this 
143 Brad has this 
144 
145-147 
148 Brad has this 
149 Becky says this was left in the home. Brad says it wasn't. 
It shall remain with whomever has it $ -0-
150A Brad has these although Becky has the turn table which 






159 Each of you are to get one. Brad is to get the desk that goes 
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164-165 $ -0-
166 $ 4.00 
167 $ 20.00 
168-190 $ -0-
191 $ 200.00 
192, Decided by Court $ -0-
The value of the items being awarded to Becky total $12,645.00. The value of the 
items awarded to Brad on this list total $1,878.00 which added with the items from the other 
list of $963.50 make the total value of the items going to Brad at $2,841.50. The net 
difference is $9,803.50. 
With respect to the $20,000.00 dispute, the Post-Nuptial Agreement is fairly clear. 
Other than the trampoline which I have previously acknowledged, there will be no further 
credit given to Becky for any items of personal property. The $20,000.00 shall be 
considered a debt owing Brad from Becky and as per the terms of the Post-Nuptial 
Agreement is to decrease the amount of any property settlement. 
Each of you have made claims that the other has property which was not part of the 
formal appraisal. Each of you have made claims that some of the items are premarital or 
should not have been included in the appraisal for one reason or the other. Brad has made 
claims concerning Becky's jewelry. Becky has made claims concerning items of personal 
property Brad has purchased, but then placed at the ranch for use. There is absolutely no 
way of ever being able to determine conclusively which of you is more factually correct. 
Accordingly, all of the rest of the personal property of whatever nature shall be awarded to 
the person presently in possession without further value being assigned. 
As per the terms of the values assigned above, Becky owes Brad the difference of 
$29,803.50. If there are other aspects of your property division that have not been resolved 
then this amount can be included in that overall division. If not, then judgment should be 
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There was some discussion concerning family photographs. If either of you has 
photographs that the other may want, then they are to be copied and costs shall be shared. 
:lorence 
BRF:jt 
cc: B. L. Dart, Esq. 
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MEDIATION SERVICES 
Brian R. Florence 
1943 E. 6200 So. 
Home Ogden. Utah 84403 
479-3942 
June 21, 1997 
Brad Bohman 
2829 East Osmond Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Becky Bohman 
6485 Bybee Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Dear Brad & Becky: 
Brad and Ellen have requested that I reconsider my decision of March 16, 1997. 
Bert agreed they could make that request but made it clear he thought my decision should 
stand and that it covered all of the issues. In response, I feel it necessary to more fully 
explain my perspective so that both lawyers better understand what I have done. 
It was initially agreed by each of you and your lawyers that I would act as a mediator 
to help you reach a decision related to the division of your personal property. This had 
been discussed with Judge Lyon who accepted the idea. That discussion appears on 
pages 94 through 98 of your hearing transcript. During that discussion your lawyers 
presented your respective views concerning the use of the $20,000.00 and property that 
should be excluded as "gifts". Judge Lyon gave you some guidance on how he would 
approach the gift dispute. It would be well for you to review his comments in that regard. 
I attempted to follow his guidance in reaching my decision. 
Our first meeting was November 6, 1996. You both seemed prepared to primarily 
focus on the Family Affairs appraisal. During the general discussion at the start of our 
meeting you each agreed there were substantial errors in the values assigned to some of 
the items of personal property by that appraisal. You both claimed that the other person 
was in possession of personal property that was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal. 
You both claimed that the appraisal included property which should be excluded because 
it was either premarital or a gift or, in Becky's instance, that it had been purchased with the 
$20,000.00. 
We agreed to deal with the items that were on the Family Affairs appraisal first and 
then address your claims as to the items that were not listed. Each of you was given the 
opportunity to exclude from discussion any item on that appraisal as not being part of the 
marital estate. Through that process, we identified each item of personal property that you 
both agreed was marital and subject to division. 
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After reaching that agreement, you made considerable progress in dividing many 
of those items. There was little regard to the actual value assigned in the formal appraisal 
since both of you obviously had a better feel for the true value of many of those items. You 
eventually reached a statement, partially because we were all tired and it was agreed that 
we would meet again to take up the other matters. Our next meeting was set for December 
9,, 1996. 
During that first meeting I got the impression that both of you were likely to become 
intractable concerning some of your positions and expressed that concern to your lawyers. 
They agreed, with your consent, that I would thereafter act as an arbitrator to decide the 
remaining issues. In hindsight, that may have been a mistake. At our second meeting you 
each seemed to be more entrenched and less willing to make any concession, apparently 
hoping that I would see things your way, nothwithstanding my waming that one or both of 
you would likely be very unhappy with my decision if I were forced to make one as an 
arbitrator. I continued to encourage you to try and reach an agreement so it would not be 
necessary for me to make a binding decision. 
Between the first and second meeting, two things happened which in my view set 
the tone for future concerns and governed in large part how I came to view your respective 
claims. First, Brad agreed at the initial meeting that the refrigerator (item 29 in the 
appraisal) was marital and also agreed that it could go to Becky. Before the second 
meeting he decided that was a mistake and that refrigerator was really premarital and 
should go to him. This was the most obvious example to illustrate the point that you both 
seemed to keep changing positions. 
Second, by the next meeting Becky had moved, taking everything with her except 
for those items that she agreed were to be awarded to Brad and some other items that she 
obviously didn't care for and just left at the home. Becky even took those items which she 
had intended to concede to Brad as his premarital property but was not a part of our formal 
agreement in that first meeting. This unilateral action on her part didn't-help matters. More 
importantly was Brad's claim that of the items that were left for him as per our agreement, 
many were damaged or had parts missing. Becky denied this in large part. 
From that, it became clear to me that if I were to make further attempts to divide the 
property rather than make a cash adjustment, it would just lead to additional claims that the 
property was being returned in a damaged condition or with missing parts. Notwithstanding 
Brad's desire to have some of the other marital property actually divided, I believed it would 
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Our second meeting was December 9, 1996. We made absolutely no progress. 
Each of you did admit however that the property issues could probably be settled with a 
payment of cash from Becky to Brad but you had vastly differfent views as to how much that 
should be. Despite repeated efforts on my part to have you approach this differently, you 
each seemed intent on forcing a decision by me. 
At that point I went through the Family Affairs appraisal, item by item, and made 
notes regarding each of your claims concerning the origin and your respective desire with 
respect to each item. I then listened to your claims concerning items of property that you 
each contended the other had but which was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal. 
I wrote down every item that Brad claimed was in Becky' possession and not 
appraised. Becky denied she had some of these items. She claimed that Brad had much 
of it in storage together with other property. Of the items she did acknowledge having, she 
claimed that Brad also had a fair share such as saddles and accessories, water ski 
equipment, golf equipment and other minor items of personalty. 
I also wrote a similar list of the items that Becky claimed Brad had although 
admittedly, her list wasn't as long. 
There was a discussion concerning jewelry. Becky claimed that it was all gifts. 
While Brad acknowledged that a few items may have been gifts, he claimed that the 
balance had either been purchased as an investment or purchased by Becky without his 
prior knowledge. 
We concluded that second meeting by my again encouraging you to reach a 
settlement without my having to make a binding decision. 
I wrote you on December 22,1996, formalizing the agreements that had been made 
in our first meeting and inviting you each to provide me any further documentation you 
might have in support of your respective positions on the balance of the dispute. 
To make certain that the scope of my role and authority was correctly understood, 
we had a conference call on January 10, 1997 with the lawyers and Brad participating. 
That was followed by a letter from Bert dated January 10,1997, a clarifying letter from Ellen 
on January 13, 1997 and a correction letter from Bert on that same day. Those letters 
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Bert mailed me his written position on January 17, 1997 together with the exhibits 
that had been used at trial which stated Becky's claims much more specifically than had 
been provided me during our meetings. 
I received a letter from Brad which is dated January 29, 1997 with some 
supplementary materials but this was not received by me until February 27,1997 when it 
was faxed from Ellen's office. I also received a letter from Brad dated February 13. 1997 
together with a number of supporting documents. It was not clear to me whether Ellen or 
Bert ever saw this letter or materials. 
I then made a substantial effort to try and reconcile the materials that had been 
supplied with your respective claims and tried to fit them in with the items or property that 
were covered by the Family Affairs appraisal. The materials you furnished did nothing more 
than clarify the hopelessness of your polarized positions. The exhibits used at trial were 
helpful but your respective positions had changed some since then and were further 
compromised by the agreements that were made in our first session which made it 
impossible to reconcile those changes. 
With that backdrop, I made the decision I did as contained in my letter to you dated 
March 16, 1997. 
Having reviewed everything once again, I am still satisfied that the overall decision 
and the basis for it is fair and it shall stand with these exceptions. 
It appears that during the course of the trial there may have been some items of 
personal property that you each admitted was to be awarded to the other. These prior 
understandings may not have been made adequately clear to me and my decision may 
have resulted in one or both of you ending up with personal property that was originally 
agreed to be awarded to the other. Having said that, I will not change my decision other 
than to say that I would hope that if either of you are in possession of property that you 
know was to go to the other, then I would hope that you would be honest enough to return 
that without the formality of a specific decision. 
The other area of concern involves the jewelry and the documentation that Brad has 
produced demonstrating other assets purchased during the marriage that have not 
appeared on Becky's list and Brad claims he does not have. Brad is also insistent that the 
Court order requires the jewelry, other than Becky's wedding ring, to be divided. Other than 
the Judge's comments which I have already alluded to, I find nothing in the Judge's decision 
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Brad seems quite intent on having property returned to him rather than cash. For 
the reasons stated above I will not do that. I am concerned about the documentation that 
Brad has produced showing other purchases that have not b6en a part of the Family Affairs 
appraisal and have not been specifically valued. Given your respective tack of trust as to 
the other's honesty, I doubt that it would be possible to ever get truly complete facts to 
make further modifications of my decision and I will not do so. 
The jewelry is a little different matter. I have already stated your respective claims 
concerning the purchase of the jewelry. Having reviewed the receipts Brad has produced 
covering jewelry purchases during this marriage, it appears that the purchases exceeded 
what might normally be consistent with Becky's claim that these were all gifts. Accordingly, 
I am modifying my decision and awarding Brad an additional $2,000.00 cash. 
As I have said before, this case needs closure. At least one of you will always be 
dissatisfied with any decision that is made regarding these issues. It is not a matter of who 
"gloats" or who feels that this decision will "perpetuate the gross inequity". The decision 
must be made. It has been. You both have the ability and hopefully the maturity to get on 
with your lives. 
Cordially, 
ferian R. Florence 
cc: B.L Dart, Esq. 
Ellen Mavcock, ESQ. 
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B. L. DART (818) 7/H/97 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Z7 '^  -i .,.'! 0 57 
(801) 521-6383 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AUG 
000OOO000 
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN, : Civil No. 944901996 
Defendant. : Judge Michael D. Lyon 
000OOO000 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
April 22, 23, 24 and 26, 1996, plaintiff appearing in person and by 
her attorneys, B. L. Dart and Sharon A. Donovan and defendant 
appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock, and the 
Court having heard testimony of several witnesses, exhibits having 
been introduced and stipulations having been made and items in 
dispute having been argued and submitted and the Court having taken 
the matter under advisement and having made its ruling by telephone 
conference on the 14th day of June, 1996. Thereafter, defendant 
filed a Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's ruling with respect 
to visitation which was argued on July 30, 1996, and the Court 
having ruled on that matter, and thereafter defendant having filed 
Objections to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law and the Court having ruled on that matter and these rulings 
having been incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
one from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, 
which Decree shall become final upon entry. 
2. The parties are the parents of three minor children, 
to wit: Angela (Angie), age 14, born October 30, 1981, plaintiff's 
child from a former marriage adopted by defendant; the parties have 
as natural issue of their marriage two children, Braxton, age 6, 
born April 17, 1990 and Bryson, age 5, born July 25, 1991. 
Plaintiff is awarded the sole custody of Angela, Braxton and 
Bryson, subject to liberal visitation with Braxton and Bryson on 
behalf of defendant, as follows: 
(a) Week-End Visitation. Defendant 
should have visitation with the children three 
weekends each month, from Friday at 9:00 a.m. 
to Sunday at 7:30 p.m., or depending on 
Defendant's work schedule from Saturday at 
9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m. When Friday 
is a school day, visitation should begin after 
school and Defendant should pick the children 
up from home at 4:00 p.m. 
The Court specifically reserves the issue 
as to the 5th weekend of the month visitation for 
158? 
further agreement of the parties or order of the Court, 
(b) Holiday Visitation. Defendant 
should have alternate holiday visitation, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann,, §30-3-35, only. 
No other holidays should be divided. A copy 
of the Standard Visitation Schedule is 
attached hereto, as Exhibit "A." The parties 
have agreed that the holiday visitation schedule 
may be reversed so that defendant should have 
the holiday visitation specified for "odd-
numbered" years in the even-numbered years and 
vice versa. 
(c) Mid-Week Visitation. Defendant is 
entitled to one mid-week visitation each month 
from the time the children get home from 
school to 8:00 p.m. that evening. This mid-
week visitation is to be either the week prior 
to or the week following the weekend when 
defendant does not have weekend visitation and 
is to be scheduled by defendant for a night 
mutually acceptable to the parties or, if they 
cannot agree, to be set by the defendant upon 
providing to plaintiff three or more weeks 
advance notice of the visitation. Insofar as 
midweek visitation is affected by weekend 
visitation, the court reserves that issue for 
3 
further agreement of the parties or order of 
the court. 
(d) Surrogate Care. The parties should 
be required to allow the other party to 
provide care for the children, in lieu of 
surrogate care, when that party cannot 
personally care for the children for a period 
of four hours or more. 
(e) Make-up Visitation. Defendant 
anticipates that occasionally he may need to 
work during his weekend visitation and he 
should know his schedule approximately one 
month in advance. On an occasional basis, if 
Defendant is required to work and is unable to 
exercise his visitation, he will notify 
Plaintiff, with as much notice as he possibly 
can, and will be entitled to make-up 
visitation during the week for the length of 
time that he missed. If this becomes a 
problem, the Court will review the make-up 
visitation issue. 
(f) Summer Visitation. The Court orders 
that the summer be divided equally, with each 
party taking the children for two weeks at a 
time, with the other parent having telephone 
contact. 
4 
3. Defendant is awarded standard visitation with the 
parties1 minor child, Angela. Because of the strained relationship 
between Defendant and Angela, defendant will probably have to work 
out that visitation, as he can. Plaintiff is ordered to encourage 
the relationship between Angela and defendant. 
4. Based upon the current financial circumstances of 
the parties, defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff child support 
in the amount of $1,000 per month for each of the three children 
for a total of $3,000 per month. That sum is to be payable one-
half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless 
the parties mutually agree otherwise. This child support shall 
commence with the month of July, 1996. j 
As additional support defendant is ordered to 
provide health insurance so long as the same is available to him 
through his employment. Each party is responsible for one-half of 
the uninsured medical and dental expenses except routine office 
Visits which shall remain the responsibility of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff shall not incur any non-emergency extraordinary medical 
expenses which would include medical, dental, orthodontia and 
counseling expenses without giving the defendant notice and an 
opportunity to be heard first. 
Defendant is ordered to be responsible for one-half 
of the work-related or education-related day care expenses and 
plaintiff is ordered to submit to the defendant satisfactory proof 
of those expenses. 
So long as defendant is current on his obligation 
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for child support he should be entitled to declare the minor 
children as his exemptions for income tax purposes and plaintiff 
should execute the necessary affidavit to allow this exemption to 
be declared by defendant. 
5. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for 
the benefit of the children in an amount not less than what would 
be sufficient at that time to see that support is maintained for 
the children at the rate of $1,000 per month per child to their 
majority. 
6. Based upon the current financial circumstances of 
the parties, plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant in the 
amount of $4,225 a month. Alimony shall commence with July, 1996, 
and shall be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day 
of each month unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. 
Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony shall terminate 
on the 30th day of June, 2001, or sooner upon the remarriage or 
cohabitation of plaintiff or the death of either party or by 
operation of law. The amount of alimony awarded to plaintiff may 
be reviewed before the expiration of five years if there is a 
substantial material change of circumstances. 
7. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance with 
the plaintiff as beneficiary in a face amount that is equal to his 
remaining obligation at any time to the plaintiff for alimony. 
This obligation to carry life insurance shall not be an obligation 
for alimony and shall not be deductible by defendant or taxable to 
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plaintiff as alimony. 
8. Based upon the details set out in the Findings of 
Fact, defendant is awarded credit for premarital assets in the 
amount of $375,967.00 and plaintiff is awarded credit for 
premarital assets in the amount of $5,000. 
9. The currently existing property, liabilities and 
adjustments are awarded as follows: 
a. The house and real property at 2829 East 
Osmond, Ogden, Utah, is awarded to defendant at an equity of 
$187,638.00. 
This home is currently occupied by the 
plaintiff under the Temporary Order and plaintiff shall continue to 
have the right to occupy this home for a reasonable period of time 
of between three to six months while she is seeking other housing 
Plaintiff is ordered to take steps in good faith to locate a new 
home at her earliest convenience. 
So long as plaintiff occupies the home she 
shall be responsible for the payment of property taxes and 
insurance and these expenses shall be prorated as of the date of 
change of occupancy from plaintiff to defendant. She shall leave 
the home in good condition, reasonable wear and tear accepted. 
b. The defendant's business in Rocky Mountain 
Anesthesiology, Inc., has accounts receivable with a value of 
$93,349.00 which shall be awarded to defendant. Also the balance 
sheet assets on the 1994 tax return reflect a value of $2,798.00 
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shall be awarded to defendant. 
c. The WNC tax credit of $8,306 is awarded to 
defendant. 
d. As stated above, defendant is awarded free of 
any marital claim of plaintiff the Bohman Ranch and BB Ranchers 
with no marital value ascribed as these assets are premarital. 
e. The interest in the houseboat $21,500 shall be 
awarded to defendant. 
f. There was an account at Charles Schwab, No. 
16865838, called The Family Trust Account which had a value as of 
the time of the trial of $174,534.00, which account ordered to be 
divided equally between the parties with each party to receive 
$87,267. 
g. The Fidelity Irrevocable Family Trust account, 
No. TO71932704, is not a marital asset as defendant has no control 
over it and it is, therefore, not part of his estate. 
h. The Fidelity USA X29-002453 account which at 
the time of the trial in this case had a value of $180,960.00, is 
a marital asset and which can be used as an equalizer account to 
equalize assets. In order to equalize the assets of the parties, 
the Court awards to plaintiff $101,220 of this account and to 
defendant $79,740 of this account. 
i. Buena Ventura Resources (Crown Energy 
Corporation), at 69,505 shares is a premarital asset of the 
defendant. 
j. The First Security Bank account No. 2021027327, 
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is awarded to defendant at a marital value of $23,687.00. 
k. The First Security Bank account No. 2021022146 
which is a pass through account of plaintiff is awarded to her at 
no marital value. 
1. The Weber State Credit Union account No, 
799001318862 is awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of $25.00. 
m. The 1999 Audi Quattro belongs to Rocky Mountain 
Anesthesiology and is not a marital asset. 
n. The Porsche Cabriolet, even though given to 
plaintiff as a birthday present, is a marital asset which is 
awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of $43,225.00. 
o. The 1980 Porsche 911SC was defendant's prior to 
the marriage and is a premarital asset and to which no marital 
value is ascribed. 
p. The 1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. was a premarital 
asset of defendant's and to which no marital value is ascribed. 
q. The 1992 GMC van has a value of $14,691.00 and 
is awarded to plaintiff at that value. 
r. Defendant is awarded the Polaris snowmobile at 
a value of $2,500.00 and the snowmobile trailer at a value of 
$1,000.00. 
s. Plaintiff is awarded the horse trailer at a 
value of $4,000.00. 
t. With regard to furniture, furnishings, artwork 
and jewelry, the parties following the trial of this case agreed to 
binding arbitration with Brian R. Florence and each party submitted 
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to him their respective positions regarding these items. Mr. 
Florence has now made his ruling dated March 16, 1997, modified by 
his letter of June 21, 1997, both of which are attached hereto as 
Exhibit MB" and Exhibit "CM and adopted by the Court and 
incorporated herein by reference. These items of property are 
awarded and are to be divided consistent with the decision of Brian 
Florence. The effect of this decision is that plaintiff is awarded 
items of property in these categories in the value of $11,803 more 
than those awarded to defendant and this should be reflected as a 
charge against her in the equalization of assets as hereinafter set 
forth. The Court further reserves any further dispute regarding 
the division of personal property or enforcement of the 
arbitrator's decision for agreement by the parties or further order 
of the Court, consistent with prior rulings of the Court and 
consistent with the arbitration agreement entered into by the 
parties. 
u. With respect to the horses, plaintiff is 
awarded Page and the foal at a marital value of $4,500.00. 
Defendant is awarded Dusty at a marital value of $1,000.00. 
v. Defendant is awarded all of his life insurance 
policies including Kemper Life Policy No. FK2037564 with a 
$500,000.00 face amount and no cash value; the Liberty Life 
Insurance Policy No. XL10331120 with a $500,000.00 face amount and 
no cash value. 
w. Defendant is awarded the Charles Schwab IRA 
account No. 1686-6226 at a marital value of $181,454.00. 
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x. The Charles Schwab retirement account No. 
1686-6227 which is an IRA rollover account has a current value of 
$314,895. Of this account plaintiff shall be awarded $158,365 and 
defendant shall be awarded the remaining $156,530. 
y. Defendant is awarded his Rocky Mountain 
Anesthesiology pension plan held in Fidelity account No. T098310364 
with a marital value of $56,058.00. 
z. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
1994 state income tax refund when received. 
aa. The 1995 income tax refunds when received shall 
be divided with plaintiff to receive the state income tax refund 
and with defendant to receive an amount of the federal income tax 
refund equal to the amount received by plaintiff for the state 
income tax refund. The remainder of the federal income tax refund 
shall be divided equally between the parties. Each of the parties 
is ordered to be responsible for one-half of any costs in the 
preparation of these returns. 
bb. Plaintiff is ordered to be responsible for the 
Dbligations owing to Cliff's Chevron and Dr. Thane Hales, DDS as 
bier responsibilities. 
cc. Plaintiff executed a promissory note to 
defendant during this proceeding and that note shall be 
extinguished under an arrangement that defendant shall receive a 
credit of $20,000.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $20,000.00. 
dd. Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff for a Lake 
Powell trip in the amount of $2,906.00 and defendant shall receive 
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a credit of $2,906.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $2,906.00. 
ee. Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff at Smiths 
in the amount of $3,240.00 and defendant shall receive a credit of 
$3,240.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $3,240.00. 
ff. Defendant paid property taxes while plaintiff 
was in the home in the amount of $2,408.00 and defendant shall 
receive a credit of $2,408.00 and plaintiff shall be charged 
$2,408.00. 
gg. Defendant is ordered to assume the obligation 
to BB Ranchers in the amount of $42,257 which shall be a credit to 
him in the division of the assets of the parties. Defendant's 
claim for a longer period is denied because of the statute of 
limitations. 
hh. At the time of trial defendant had a negative 
cash balance in his Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account of $7,400 
which is a marital debt of defendant and for which defendant should 
receive credit. 
ii. Plaintiff received $9,999 from insurance 
claims. To the extent these claims were for personal property of 
plaintiff, they are awarded to her; to the extent they were for 
marital assets they are to be deemed a marital asset. Either party 
shall have the right to bring back before the Court further motions 
regarding this item once there has been an opportunity to review 
this ruling and gather evidence relevant thereto. 
jj. Each of the parties shall be awarded any 
increase or decrease in the account balances awarded to them 
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resulting from interest earned or change in market conditions from 
the date of the exhibits on which the figures used in the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and this Decree of Divorce are taken 
to the date of distribution between the parties. On any account in 
which there is a proration between the parties, the gains and 
losses, together with the cost of administering the account are 
ordered to be prorated on the same percentage as the distribution 
between the parties. 
kk. The award of any account of any kind to either 
party will include any interest earned from the time of trial until 
delivery to said party. 
10. The accounts at First Security Bank for the 
childrens* college funds as follows: 
Angie #2028060247 $22,569.00 (stm. 6/95) 
Braxton #2028214635 $18,869.00 (stm. 6/95) 
Bryson #2028093544 $18,869.00 (stm. 6/95) 
These accounts are not marital assets but are the 
assets of the children and shall be distributed only upon the joint 
signatures of both parties. 
There is a Liberty Life Insurance Policy No. 
XF10331121 with a $500,000.00 face amount and which has a cash 
value of $9,318.00 which is owned by an irrevocable trust for the 
benefit of the minor children. This policy is not a marital asset. 
The children are ordered to remain the beneficiaries on this policy 
and no substitute beneficiary is to be named. Based upon this 
understanding, plaintiff is ordered to execute the necessary papers 
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to allow for the removal of her name as beneficiary. 
11. The award of assets, liabilities and adjustments as 
set forth in the next three foregoing paragraphs is set forth in 
the following accounting: 
DEFENDANT PLAINTIFF 
Real Estate 
House and real property at 
2829 E. Osmond, Ogden 
(Appraisal $534,000 less mortgage $346,362) $187,638 
Business Interest 
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Inc.— 
Current Accounts Receivable $944,035 
at 1/6, 60% collectible $93,349 
Balance sheet assets, 1994 Tax Return— 
$16,789 @l/6 
RMA Bank account $30,000 @l/6 share 
WNC Tax Credits XXI 
Partnership Interests 
Bohman Ranch, L.P. (Gifted) 
BB Ranchers ($300,000 invested before marriage) 
Powell Recreation L.C. (Houseboat) 
Stock and Investment Accounts 
Charles Schwab #1686-5838 Family Trust 87,267 87,267 
(together with any earnings from the time of the thai of this case) 
Fidelity T071932704 Irrev. Family Trust 
Fidelity USA X29-002453 79,740 101,220 
(together with any earnings from the time of the trial of thu caw) 
Crown Energy Corp, 6 9 , 5 0 5 s h . ( p r e m a r i t a l ) 
14 
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First Security Bank #2021027327 23,687 
First Security #2021022146 -0-
Weber State Credit Union #799001318862 25 
First Security Bank children^ college funds: 
Angi #2028060247 $22,569 <stmt6/95) 
Braxton #2028214635 18,869 (stmt6/95) 
Bryson #2028093544 18,869 (stmt6/95) 
Vehicles/Personal Property 
1990 Audi Quattro (corporate asset) 
1990 Porsche 911 C4 Cabriolet (Birthday gift) 43,225 
1980 Porsche 91XSC (Brad's premarital) 
1989 Jeep Chero&ee Ltd. (Brad ©Ranch) 
1992 GMC Van (Becky) 14,691 
Polaris 500 snowmobile 2,500 
Snowmobile trailer 1,000 
Horse trailer 4,000 
Furniture and furnishings — — 
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Art 
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Jewelry exclusive of wedding ring — — 
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence) 
Value of personal assets received by plaintiff 
exceeding that of defendant 11,803 
Horses: 
Dusty 1,000 




Life Insurance fall owned by Family Trust) 
Kemper Life #FK2037564 $500,000 term 
Liberty Life #XL10331120 $500,000 term 
Liberty Life #XF10331121 $500, 000 <c«hv«iuc3/4 
$9,318 - children's asset 
Retirement Plans 
Charles Schwab #1686-6226 IRA Contrib. <3/3i/96> $181,454 
Charles Schwab #1686-6227 IRA Rollover 156,530 158,365 
(3/31/96-$314,895) 
(together with any earnings from the time of the trial of this case) 
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Pension Plan 
Fidelity #T098310364 (i/23/%) 56,058 
Miscellaneous 
1994 State Income Tax Refund 
3,597 





R. Thane Hales, DDS 
Debt to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account (7,400) 
Premarital and Other Credits 
Premarital assets, Brad Bohman 
—see exhibit 77A (375,967) 
Premarital assets, Becky Bohman 
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$20,000 Note between parties re debts 
Lake Powell expense paid by Brad 
Smith's bill paid by Brad 
Property taxes paid by Brad 
Liability to BB Ranchers for tax credits 
TOTALS 
12. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant 
for attorney' s fees and costs in this action in the amount of 
$5,000.00. 
13. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees related to 
the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify is denied. 
14. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees related to 
further proceedings in this case is currently under advisement and 
is not dealt with in this decision. 
15. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and 
perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree 
of Divorce when entered. 
DATED this C? day of 1997, 
BY THE COURTS 
MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/~ 1 n 





MINIMUM SCHFnVLE FOR VISITATION 
UTAH COPT ANN §30 3 i 
1 The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with kindergarten 
2 If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, th& following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which 
the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled 
a. one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.nv until 8:30 p.m.; 
b. alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. 
on Sunday continuing each year; 
c. holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend visitation schedule, 
d. if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the'dhild's 
attendance at school for thanrchool day; 
e. if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that 
the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier 
holiday period; 
f. in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays 
(1) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p m until 9 p m.; at the discretion 
of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p m , unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completel) entitled, 
(4) Memorial Day beginning 6 p m on Friday until Monda> at 7 p m , unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completei) entitled, 
(5) July 24th beginning 6 p m. on the day before the holiday until 1 1 p m on the holiday, 
(6) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p m the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday; and 
(7) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
g. in years ending m an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p m. until 9 p m , at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, 
he may take other siblings along for the birthday, 
(2) New Year's Day^begmning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p rr> on the holiday; 
(3) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday, 
(4) July 4th beginning at 6 p m the day before the holiday until 1 1 p m on the holiday, 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Mondav at "* p m unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period ot time to which the noncustodial parent is completel\ entitled, 
(6) the. fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U E A weekend beginning at 6 p m. on Wednesday 
until Sunday at 7 p m unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled, 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p m. the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday, 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p m ; and 
(9) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day 
beginning at i p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
h. Father's Day shall be spend with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m on the 
holiday, 
t. Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother e\ery year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the 
holiday, 
j . extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(1) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(2) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent, and 
(3) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
k. the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation 
from school for purposes of vacation; 
1. if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of the vacation 
time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits, 
m. notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 Have .« ~^ .— 




M E D I A T I O N S E R V I C E S 
Brian R. Florence 
1943 E. 6200 So. 
H o s n e Ogden. Utah 84403 
479-3942 
March 16, 1997 
Brad Bohman 
2829 East Osmond Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Becky Bohman 
6485 Bybee Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Dear Brad & Becky: 
I have mailed a copy of this decision to your lawyers. I have carefully reviewed the 
additional materials that each of you have submitted. As a part of this decision I am 
incorporating the earlier provisions of your agreement as stated in my letter to you dated 
December 22, 1996. In order to provide the entire decision into one document, I am 
restating below the provisions of that earlier letter. 
According to the agreement you made on November 6, 1996, Becky is to receive 
the following items listed on the Family Affairs appraisal: 18; 19 A, B, K, M and O; 20, 21, 
29 (this is the refrigerator--! know that Brad changed his mind about this being a marital 
asset at our second meeting, but I am going to leave it in Becky's column); 32 B; 33, 34, 35, 
40 B; 47 (Brad agreed at our second meeting that this was premarital); 55; 61; 69 A, B and 
C; 74 A; 79; 92; 107; 108 D; 128; 131 and 151. 
Brad will receive the following items: 16 on the list of property in his possession; 12; 
13; 15; 19 C, D, F and L; 30; 31; 32 A; 36; 37; 48 (Becky agreed in our second meeting this 
was premarital); 59 A, B and C; 62; 68 (excluding the wheelbarrow and one ladder; 70 
(including the storage box); 74 B and C; 80 A, B and C; 108 A, B and C; 109; 132 and 133. 
At our second meeting, Becky also agreed that some additional items were probably 
premarital and was willing to have those awarded to Brad without allocation of value. 
Those items include: 87; 93; 94 and 99. 
You have agreed that despite the values listed on the Family Affairs appraisal, each 
of you will be awarded the items listed above as if they were equal in value. 
Of the items identified above as being awarded to Brad, he states that many of them 
were missing. For instance: #30 he did not get many of the small appliances including the 
. * * i £ i 43 (1 "i£»'j"" 
»ar- .•M^iiison # i.-iisiuvar 
Office 
399-9291 
• 1 £i\ f 
Brad Bohman 
Becky Bohmam 
March 16, 1997 
Page2 
green blender from the bar, waffle maker, mixers, crockpot,'\vok, electnc fryer and deep 
fryer. 
#31 Some knives are missing. 
#36 Missing bowls and cups; 
#37 He says these were supposed to be the new phone not the old ones 
#68 Missing the hoe, extension cords, blowers, gas can, good hoses and shovels 
#70 No chemicals were left and the hand-skimmer is missing; 
#74 Missing the ball hopper; 
#80C Center cube missing, other parts damaged; 
#108 Brad says this set was to include the contemporary gun metal lamps; 
At our last meeting, Becky acknowledged that she may have taken some of these 
items inadvertently. To the extent that she has them they are to be returned. 
Before addressing the dispute regarding the balance of the personal property, I want 
to make a few observations. The controversy of the personal property has consumed more 
energy and funds than is warranted given the value of the items Both of you have the 
resources to move on with your life without devoting this much attention to such petty 
matters In my view, Brad has been pnmanly responsible for addressing claims over minor 
items He wants items of personal property returned and then complains that parts are 
missing or damaged. On the other hand, Becky has basically been in control of most of the 
items of personal property throughout your controversy and has made unilateral decisions 
as to what she will take without making any effort to reach a reasonable division absent 
considerable lawyer involvement and this mediation 
Neither of you are going to be happy with this decision. It is time to put the 
controversy behind you. Get on with your lives You will both be better off for it. 
The balance of the personal property on the Family Affairs appraisal will be awarded 
and valued as stated below This decision is based on each of your comments at our last 
meeting when we went through each item. I have also considered the wntten submissions 
I have received from you following that meeting. I have attempted to balance the respective 
equities and claims as fairly as possible 
Brad Bohman 
Becky Bohmam 
March 16, 1997 
Page3 
The personal property identified in the appraisal as/being in Brad possession is 

































Brad says these were a gift. In any event each have some and 
Becky's have not been valued. 
Each have one. Becky's has not been valued. 
Becky's have not been valued. 
Decided in Court. 
Each should get one of the wet suits. 
Children's items will not be valued here or elsewhere. 
Decided in Court. 



















































































39 $ 4.00 
40 $ 12.00 
These items total $ 963.50 
The balances of the items that were in Becky's possession at the time of the 
appraisal are awarded as follows: 








9 This was purchased during separation. The contract 
shows a purchase price of $23,955.00 with a trade in 
value of $3,500.00, cash of $2,000.00 and a remaining 
due on the contract of $14,000.00. Equity $9,000.00 
10 $ -0-
I I $ 12.00 
14 $ 24.00 
16- $ 12.00 
17 $ 20.00 
19E $ 50.00 




19N $ 80.00 
19P $ 336.00 




27 To be returned to Brad —premarital $ -0-









To be returned to Brad—premarital 
Brad has this 




















Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Each of you claim the other has these. 
Brad has these 
No further award 
Was included as part of the earlier agreement related to 
items #68B 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 





Only item I am including as being purchased with $20,000.00 
loan from Brad 
At the home 
Appraised with the home 























































included as part of this appraisal and whether it was premarital. 
Becky claims that this was purchased during separation and 
financed with the loan. Whatever division concerning these sofas 
and couches has taken taken place shall remain and a positive 
value assigned to Becky. $ 400.00 











































Each of you have some of these. The division shall remain as is. 
To be returned to Brad—premarital 
Rented 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Shall remain as presently divided 
To be returned to Brad—premarital 
Brad has this 
Brad has this 
Rented 
Each claim the other has some. Shall remain as divided. 
































































































141 To be returned to Brad 
142 Brad has this 
143 Brad has this 
144 
145-147 
148 Brad has this 
149 Becky says this was left in the home. Brad says it wasn't. 
It shall remain with whomever has it $ -0-
150A Brad has these although Becky has the turn table which 






159 Each of you are to get one. Brad is to get the desk that goes 







































































March 16, 1997 
Page8 
164-165 $ -0-
166 $ 4.00 
167 $ 20.00 
168-190 $ -0-
191 $ 200.00 
192, Decided by Court $ -0-
The value of the items being awarded to Becky tota^ $12,645.00. The value of the 
items awarded to Brad on this list total $1,878.00 which added with the Items from the other 
list of $963.50 make the total value of the items going to Brad at $2,841.50. The net 
difference is $9,803.50. 
With respect to the $20,000.00 dispute, the Post-Nuptial Agreement is fairly clear. 
Other than the trampoline which I have previously acknowledged, there will be no further 
credit given to Becky for any items of personal property. The $20,000.00 shall be 
considered a debt owing Brad from Becky and as per the terms of the Post-Nuptial 
Agreement is to decrease the amount of any property settlement. 
Each of you have made claims that the other has property which was not part of the 
formal appraisal. Each of you have made claims that some of the items are premarital or 
should not have been included in the appraisal for one reason or the other. Brad has made 
claims concerning Becky's jewelry. Becky has made claims concerning items of personal 
property Brad has purchased, but then placed at the ranch for use. There is absolutely no 
way of ever being able to determine conclusively which of you is more factually correct. 
Accordingly, all of the rest of the personal property of whatever nature shall be awarded to 
the person presently in possession without further value being assigned. 
As per the terms of the values assigned above, Becky owes Brad the difference of 
$29,803.50. If there are other aspects of your property division that have not been resolved 
then this amount can be included in that overall division. If not, then judgment should be 




March 16, 1997 
Page9 
There was some discussion concerning family photographs. If either of you has 
photographs that the other may want then they are to be copied and costs shall be shared. 
:lorence 
BRF:jt 
cc: B. L. Dart, Esq. 
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MEDIATION SERVICES 
Brian R. Florence 
1943 E. 6200 So. 
H o n i e Ogden. Utah 84403 
479-3942 
June 21, 1997 
Brad Bohman 
2829 East Osmond Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Becky Bohman 
6485 Bybee Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Dear Brad 8i Becky: 
Brad and Ellen have requested that I reconsider my decision of March 16, 1997. 
Bert agreed they could make that request but made it clear he thought my decision should 
stand and that it covered all of the issues. In response, I feel it necessary to more fully 
explain my perspective so that both lawyers better understand what I have done. 
It was initially agreed by each of you and your lawyers that I would act as a mediator 
to help you reach a decision related to the division of your personal property. This had 
been discussed with Judge Lyon who accepted the idea. That discussion appears on 
pages 94 through 98 of your hearing transcript. During that discussion your lawyers 
presented your respective views concerning the use of the $20,000.00 and property that 
should be excluded as "gifts". Judge Lyon gave you some guidance on how he would 
approach the gift dispute. It would be well for you to review his comments in that regard. 
I attempted to follow his guidance in reaching my decision. 
Our first meeting was November 6, 1996. You both seemed prepared to primarily 
focus on the Family Affairs appraisal. During the general discussion at the start of our 
meeting you each agreed there were substantial errors in the values assigned to some of 
the items of personal property by that appraisal. You both claimed that the other person 
was in possession of personal property that was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal. 
You both claimed that the appraisal included property which should be excluded because 
it was either premarital or a gift or, in Becky's instance, that it had been purchased with the 
$20,000.00. 
We agreed to deal with the items that were on the Family Affairs appraisal first and 
then address your claims as to the items that were not listed. Each of you was given the 
opportunity to exclude from discussion any item on that appraisal as not being part of the 
marital estate. Through that process, we identified each item of personal property that you 
both agreed was marital and subject to division. 
K-i'.i ~M:n<*wt\ [tKj!\i)v'at 
Office 
399-9291 




June 21, 1997 
After reaching that agreement, you made considerable progress in dividing many 
of those items. There was little regard to the actual value assigned in the formal appraisal 
since both of you obviously had a better feel for the true value of many of those items. You 
eventually reached a statement, partially because we were all tired and it was agreed that 
we would meet again to take up the other matters. Our next meeting was set for December 
9, ,1996. 
During that first meeting I got the impression that both of you were likely to become 
intractable concerning some of your positions and expressed that concern to your lawyers. 
They agreed, with your consent, that I would thereafter act as an arbitrator to decide the 
remaining issues. In hindsight, that may have been a mistake. At our second meeting you 
each seemed to be more entrenched and less willing to make any concession, apparently 
hoping that I would see things your way, nothwithstanding my waming that one or both of 
you would likely be very unhappy with my decision if I were forced to make one as an 
arbitrator. I continued to encourage you to try and reach an agreement so it would not be 
necessary for me to make a binding decision. 
Between the first and second meeting, two things happened which in my view set 
the tone for future concerns and governed in large part how I came to view your respective 
claims. First, Brad agreed at the initial meeting that the refrigerator (item 29 in the 
appraisal) was marital and also agreed that it could go to Becky. Before the second 
meeting he decided that was a mistake and that refrigerator was really premarital and 
should go to him. This was the most obvious example to illustrate the point that you both 
seemed to keep changing positions. 
Second, by the next meeting Becky had moved, taking everything with her except 
for those items that she agreed were to be awarded to Brad and some other items that she 
obviously didn't care for and just left at the home. Becky even took those items which she 
had intended to concede to Brad as his premarital property but was not a part of our formal 
agreement in that first meeting. This unilateral action on her part didn't help matters. More 
importantly was Brad's claim that of the items that were left for him as per our agreement, 
many were damaged or had parts missing. Becky denied this in large part. 
From that, it became clear to me that if I were to make further attempts to divide the 
property rather than make a cash adjustment, it would just lead to additional claims that the 
property was being returned in a damaged condition or with missing parts. Notwithstanding 
Brad's desire to have some of the other marital property actually divided, I believed it would 





June 21, 1997 
Our second meeting was December 9, 1996. We made absolutely no progress. 
Each of you did admit however that the property issues could probably be settled with a 
payment of cash from Becky to Brad but you had vastly different views as to how much that 
should be. Despite repeated efforts on my part to have you approach this differently, you 
each seemed intent on forcing a decision by me. 
At that point I went through the Family Affairs appraisal, item by item, and made 
notes regarding each of your claims concerning the origin and your respective desire with 
respect to each item. I then listened to your claims concerning items of property that you 
each contended the other had but which was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal. 
I wrote down every item that Brad claimed was in Becky1 possession and not 
appraised. Becky denied she had some of these items. She claimed that Brad had much 
of it in storage together with other property. Of the items she did acknowledge having, she 
claimed that Brad also had a fair share such as saddles and accessories, water ski 
equipment, golf equipment and other minor items of personalty. 
I also wrote a similar list of the items that Becky claimed Brad had although 
admittedly, her list wasn't as long. 
There was a discussion concerning jewelry. Becky claimed that it was all gifts. 
While Brad acknowledged that a few items may have been gifts, he claimed that the 
balance had either been purchased as an investment or purchased by Becky without his 
prior knowledge. 
We concluded that second meeting by my again encouraging you to reach a 
settlement without my having to make a binding decision. 
I wrote you on December 22,1996, formalizing the agreements that had been made 
in our first meeting and inviting you each to provide me any further documentation you 
might have in support of your respective positions on the balance of the dispute. 
To make certain that the scope of my role and authority was correctly understood, 
we had a conference call on January 10, 1997 with the lawyers and Brad participating. 
That was followed by a letter from Bert dated January 10,1997, a clarifying letter from Ellen 
on January 13, 1997 and a correction letter from Bert on that same day. Those letters 





June 21, 1997 
Bert mailed me his written position on January 17, 1997 together with the exhibits 
that had been used at trial which stated Becky's claims much more specifically than had 
been provided me during our meetings. 
I received a letter from Brad which is dated January 29, 1997 with some 
supplementary materials but this was not received by me until February 27, 1997 when it 
was faxed from Ellen's office. I also received a letter from Brad dated February 13. 1997 
together with a number of supporting documents. It was not clear to me whether Ellen or 
Bert ever saw this letter or materials. 
I then made a substantial effort to try and reconcile the materials that had been 
supplied with your respective claims and tried to fit them in with the items or property that 
were covered by the Family Affairs appraisal. The materials you furnished did nothing more 
than clarify the hopelessness of your polarized positions. The exhibits used at trial were 
helpful but your respective positions had changed some since then and were further 
compromised by the agreements that were made in our first session which made it 
impossible to reconcile those changes. 
With that backdrop, I made the decision I did as contained in my letter to you dated 
March 16, 1997. 
Having reviewed everything once again, I am still satisfied that the overall decision 
and the basis for it is fair and it shall stand with these exceptions. 
It appears that during the course of the trial there may have been some items of 
personal property that you each admitted was to be awarded to the other. These prior 
understandings may not have been made adequately clear to me and my decision may 
have resulted in one or both of you ending up with personal property that was originally 
agreed to be awarded to the other. Having said that, I will not change my decision other 
than to say that I would hope that if either of you are in possession of property that you 
know was to go to the other, then I would hope that you would be honest enough to return 
that without the formality of a specific decision. 
The other area of concern involves the jewelry and the documentation that Brad has 
produced demonstrating other assets purchased during the marriage that have not 
appeared on Becky's list and Brad claims he does not have. Brad is also insistent that the 
Court order requires the jewelry, other than Becky's wedding ring, to be divided. Other than 
the Judge's comments which I have already alluded to, I find nothing in the Judge's decision 





June 21, 1997 
Brad seems quite intent on having property returned to him rather than cash. For 
the reasons stated above I will not do that. I am concerned about the documentation that 
Brad has produced showing other purchases that have not been a part of the Family Affairs 
appraisal and have not been specifically valued. Given your respective lack of trust as to 
the other's honesty, I doubt that it would be possible to ever get truly complete facts to 
make further modifications of my decision and I will not do so. 
The jewelry is a little different matter. I have already stated your respective claims 
concerning the purchase of the jewelry. Having reviewed the receipts Brad has produced 
covering jewelry purchases during this marriage, it appears that the purchases exceeded 
what might normally be consistent with Becky's claim that these were all gifts. Accordingly, 
I am modifying my decision and awarding Brad an additional $2,000.00 cash. 
As I have said before, this case needs closure. At least one of you will always be 
dissatisfied with any decision that is made regarding these issues. It is not a matter of who 
"gloats" or who feels that this decision will "perpetuate the gross inequity". The decision 
must be made. It has been. You both have the ability and hopefully the maturity to get on 
with your lives. 
Cordially, 
Brian R. Florence 
cc: B.L. Dart, Esq. 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
